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PREFACE 
It is the purpose of this Preface to indicate the 
way in which the theme of this dissertation developed, 
thus hopefully providing a context in which its 
content may be more fully appreciated. 
My previous investigations at undergraduate level 
focused on the general issue of relativism (primarily 
in anthropology), particularly as expressed in terms 
of both rationality and emotion (cf Reynolds 1989). 
In undertaking a higher degree, I was keen to develop 
both my interest in the cross-cultural study of 
emotion and the debate between 'universalists' and 
'relativists'. The selection of shame as the 
particular emotion concept for exploration was the 
result of a number of things. 
One of my objectives was to conduct 
investigations which would be of interest and 
relevance to both philosophers and anthropologists, 
and which would hopefully encourage dialogue between 
the two. This entailed finding a research topic 
especially amenable to such an interdisciplinary 
approach. Shame has long been a topic of interest 
for anthropologists, and the most recent manifestation 
of such interest is in psychological anthropology, 
represented in particular in the work of the late 
Michelle Rosaldo (1980; 1983; 1984). It was her 
assertion that 
"'Shames' differ as much cross-culturally as 
our notions of 'shame' and 
'guilt. '"(1984: 149) 
which initially suggested the idea of taking shame as 
the specific example of a moral emotion concept for 
study. In addition, shame has in many ways been the 
'poor relation' in the analysis of moral concepts in 
philosophy, and, as a number of philosophers had begun 
ix 
to point out, the time was ripe for a renewal of 
attention to it. Thus, given the prevailing 
situation in these disciplines, coupled with the 
beginning of a revival of interest in shame in 
psychoanalytic theory, shame seemed the obvious 
choice. 
Armed with such a concept, the next step was to 
determine my approach. While wanting to concentrate 
primarily on exploring the possibility of multiple 
interpretations of shame, suggested by Rosaldo's 
comments, the initial literature survey indicated that 
in addition to the question of shame's universality or 
otherwise, there were several other issues 
preoccupying its students across cultures, disciplines 
and philosophical 'traditions'. I felt that certain 
of these merited investigation, particularly where 
they seemed to have some bearing on the main issue. 
Consequently, the remit of the dissertation has 
enlarged, so that its main objective is to explore, in 
the broadest terms, what may be understood by 'shame'. 




Some twenty-five years ago, Herbert Morris 
commented that "The almost total lack of philosophic 
[sic] interest in shame is, in a word, shameful. " 
(1971: 2). Until relatively recently, the concept of 
shame has indeed only rarely been treated as a topic 
of interest and deserving consideration, not only in 
philosophy but also in the social sciences (with 
perhaps the exception of anthropology; see below). 
Those commentators who have turned their attention to 
it are united in remarking on this omission and in 
decrying this state of affairs (cf for example 
Braithwaite 1989: viii; Heller 1985: 1; Lynd 1958: 19; 
Scheff 1990a: xvi; 1990b: 744). 1 
This introduction will briefly consider both some 
possible reasons for this neglect of shame, and the 
way in which it has been studied in anthropology. The 
nature and aims of the study will then be outlined and 
the major and subsidiary questions which an 
exploration of shame must seek to address will be 
indicated. Finally, the structure of the study will 
be described. 
1. THE NEGLECT OF SHAME 
In philosophy, the neglect of shame is 
symptomatic of the broader situation whereby the study 
of emotions generally has been only peripheral 
(particularly in relation to the study of morality). 
"This is not to say that there have been no 
attempts to subject shame to philosophical analysis, 
as will become clear in Chapter One. However, such 
attempts have been. only sporadic and fragmentary, so that no corpus of systematic work on shame has developed, explicitly drawing and building on previous 
accounts. 
1 
Perhaps the most influential reason for this has been 
the Kantian view of morality which has dominated much 
of contemporary ethical theory. Its emphasis on reason 
and its denial of any role for emotions in matters of 
moral judgement, motivation and action (because they 
are considered to be outside the province of the will) 
has been largely responsible for the lack of interest 
in the relationship between emotions and morality and 
the ethical aspects of emotions (with notable 
exceptions, cf Blum 1980, Oakley 1992, Williams 1973). 
Consequently, until the advent of cognitive theories 
of emotions, which recognized that these could be 
characterized in terms of certain beliefs and 
judgements which may be considered rational (cf for 
example Greenspan 1988; Solomon 1976), emotions were 
not generally regarded as being eligible for serious 
investigation. 
However, despite the fact that there has been 
something of a return to philosophical consideration 
of emotions (cf for example Rorty 1980), of those 
which are usually classified as 'moral' (for reasons 
which will be explored in this study), it has been 
guilt, rather than shame, with which the majority of 
commentators have been preoccupied. This preoccupation 
itself requires explanation. 2 Thrane (1979: 140-141) 
speculates on four possible reasons for the preferring 
of guilt over shame. The first is the influence of 
Freud. The second is the Christian obsession with 
guilt. The third is the frequent co-incidence of 
shame and guilt, which may lead to their 
2During the course of this study, and arising 
directly from a close examination of various aspects 
of shame, some of these possible reasons will be 
explored more fully, particularly in Chapters Three 
and Six. Thus, it is hoped that it will become 
clearer just how the current situation might have come 
about. 
2 
'entanglement' and difficulty in separating out the 
elements of the experience of each. Finally, he 
suggests that guilt, unlike shame, is often considered 
a more 'acceptable' emotion because while it is 
similarly painful, it nonetheless has connotations of 
strength, dignity and maturity which shame lacks (cf 
Broucek 1991, Lewis 1971; Scheff 1990a). 
1.1 Freud 
The field in which perhaps the greatest 
resurgence of interest in shame has taken place during 
the last decade is psychology, in particular 
psychopathology and psychoanalysis. Some of the most 
recent works in this field (Broucek op cit; Kaufman 
1985,1989; Morrison 1989) have explored the reasons 
behind the implicit moratorium on shame discussion 
which has prevailed in the discipline since Freud. 
According to Broucek, the latter was responsible for 
creating fundamental misunderstandings (amongst both 
professionals and the educated public) about the 
nature and importance of this concept, which led 
directly to its neglect. 3 
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SHAME RESEARCH IN ANTHROPOLOGY 
In anthropology, shame enjoyed a considerably 
important status in the 1930s and 1940s, largely due 
to the work of Margaret Mead (1937) and later Ruth 
Benedict (1946), and their now widely known division 
of cultures into two categories, based on which moral 
emotion (guilt or shame) apparently predominated as a 
means of social control. The influence of Freudian 
psychoanalytical theory was also evident in their 
research. 
'There will be further consideration of the 
influence of Freud on shame research in Chapter Three. 
3 
Another major area in which shame has constituted 
a thriving and fruitful field of interest for 
anthropologists in the past is in studies of various 
'Mediterranean' cultures. The dual concepts of honour 
and shame were evidently of overriding importance in 
the moral lives of the peoples under observation and 
were thus a recurrent theme for investigation in 
research conducted in this particular 'culture area' 
(cf e. g. Campbell 1964; Herzfeld 1980; Peristiany 
1965; Pitt-Rivers 1961). 
More recently, shame has been 'revisited' by 
researchers in psychological anthropology, who, going 
beyond psychoanalytical interpretations, have once 
again focused on this concept in attempts to 
articulate its meaning and significance (cf e. g. 
Geertz 1973; Keeler 1983; Rosaldo 1983,1984). The 
emphasis now is on the putative relationship between 
wider social factors (such as forms of social 
organization) and emotional experience. One 
theoretical perspective which informs a considerable 
proportion of contemporary emotion research in the 
social sciences is that of 'social constructionism'. 
3. GENERAL NATURE AND AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The present study seeks to contribute to 
remedying the imbalance between the philosophical 
consideration of guilt and shame by taking the latter, 
in all its aspects, as its focus. Rather than having 
one central, specific claim, which it is the purpose 
of the thesis to demonstrate, its main aim is to 
answer, in the broadest terms possible, the question 
of how we are to understand shame. An inter- 
disciplinary and cross-cultural exploration of this 
concept and emotion is the means by which the 
provision of such an answer is attempted. 
4 
3.1 Interdisciplinary dialogue 
One of the drawbacks of much modern philosophy is 
that it fails to take cognizance of, for example, 
historical or anthropological accounts of the 
phenomenon under examination and it thus operates in 
a 'vacuum'. As noted above, one aim of this study is 
thus to integrate other approaches with philosophy and 
thereby stimulate interdisciplinary dialogue and 
'cross-fertilization', in addition to achieving a more 
comprehensive account of the concept and emotion of 
shame as a consequence. In particular, the study's 
aim of exploring possible variations in the 
understanding of shame is facilitated by looking at 
the ways in which different disciplines interpret this 
concept. 
Accordingly, while the thesis first critically 
examines, compares and contrasts accounts of shame 
given by contemporary philosophers, in an attempt to 
identify similarities and differences which may 
provide clues to an understanding of the concept, it 
then goes further, in examining views of shame reached 
by researchers in other disciplines (particularly in 
the social sciences). One purpose of this is to 
explore whether and how the findings of empirical 
research into the nature of shame reflect (or indeed 
undermine) the philosophical characterization of this 
concept. 
3.2 Cross-cultural comvarison 
Another important aim of this study is to explore 
whether the understanding of shame of 'western' 
academics is (as is often at least implicitly claimed) 
an absolute, 'accurate' and universally valid 
characterization of shame, or whether it is in fact a 
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cultural product (and one which might justifiably be 
described as that of 'high' rather than 'popular' 
culture). This will be achieved by exploring the 
concept of 'shame' operative in other cultures or 
historical periods. 
3.2.1. The concept of 'culture area' 
Difficulties arise when attempting to determine 
what designates a given culture or 'culture area'. 
Generally, a 'culture area' is held to comprise a 
group of cultures, usually in close geographic 
proximity, which despite a greater or lesser degree of 
heterogeneity between those component cultures 
nonetheless share certain characteristics and/or 
preoccupations. However, this concept is a contested 
one, especially in anthropology. ` Despite such 
disagreement, cultural parameters are essential for 
the purposes of comparison; therefore it is necessary 
to work with this concept. As such, when for example 
reference is made to shame in 'western' culture, this 
is intended to primarily denote Anglo-American 
culture. However, it is recognized that there may 
well be considerable within-cultural variation 
between, say, the understanding of shame adopted by 
academics and that of the 'lay' members of society. 
It is hoped that the cross-cultural investigation 
into shame will constitute a specific example which 
may shed light on other more general questions 
concerning the nature of emotional and moral 
experience, such as the universality or cultural 
specificity of emotions. 
'For discussion of the concept of 'culture area', 
particularly with reference to 'the Mediterranean', cf 
e. g. Davis 1977; Herzfeld 1980,1985. 
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4. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE STUDY 
Inevitably, any project with such a general brief 
as that described above must identify the various 
aspects of the overall research field and select 
certain issues for more sustained and in-depth enquiry 
whilst indicating, but not necessarily undertaking 
such detailed analysis of, related subsidiary 
questions. In the case of shame, there are indeed a 
number of central recurrent themes in the literature, 
together with several more peripheral concerns. 
4.1 Is shame universal or variable across cultures? 
Of the former, - one of the most significant is the 
(largely implicit) debate between what may be termed 
'essentialists' and 'constructionists'. 5 Adherents 
to the first of these approaches maintain that there 
is indeed an essential structure to all experiences of 
shame, which by implication is universal. ' Opponents 
of this view hold that the experience of any emotion 
is constituted by a complex combination of beliefs, 
attitudes, desires etc. which are acquired rather than 
innate and conditioned (to a greater or lesser extent) 
by culture. The implication of this view is that such 
experience varies in line with cultural variation. 7 
This 'social constructionist' viewpoint insists on the 
importance of attending to the circumstances in which 
an emotion such as shame is felt, by whom and for 
what, etc., in order to fully understand it. It 
"This debate is but another manifestation of the 
opposition between universalism and relativism, framed 
in terms of emotional constitution and experience. 
6Taylor (1985) represents an extreme example of 
the essentialist position. 
7Rosaldo (1980,1984) represents an extreme example 
of the constructionist position. 
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maintains that it is not enough (if indeed it is even 
possible) just to identify any underlying structure. 
One of the primary tasks of the thesis is 
therefore to explore these opposing claims and the 
general question of the universality or cultural 
specificity of shame. A related subsidiary task is to 
assess the validity of social constructionism as a 
theory of emotions and their relationship with 
concepts and contexts, and to consider other possible 
models of emotions which take a less extreme view than 
either of the above positions and which may contribute 
to the clarification of the main question. 
4.1.1 Cross-cultural terminology, conceptual 
equivalence and the problem of translation 
Given that it is the debate concerning the 
universality or cultural relativity of emotions in 
general and shame in particular which is the subject 
of exploration in the first Part of this study, the 
question of conceptual equivalence cannot be begged, 
nor the conclusions of Chapter Two pre-empted. It is 
therefore necessary at this point to consider and 
clarify the question of cross-cultural comparability. 
In connection with exploring the nature of shame 
across cultures, one radical argument potentially 
raised by 'essentialists' (whose implicit or explicit 
claim is that 'our', i. e. 'their' [western academic] 
understanding of shame is the 'real' or 'right' one, 
and universally applicable) is that linguistic muddles 
are responsible for the idea that there are different 
'shames'. Consequently, it may be claimed, when 
reference is made to such other concepts, they are 
being mistranslated and do not in fact refer to 
genuine shame - that is, as understood by our term 
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shame and the properly translated equivalent terms in 
other languages. 
There is indeed an inherent problem, acknowledged 
by ethnographers, in any cross-cultural study, 
concerning the identification of the concepts chosen 
for analysis and comparison between various cultures. ' 
Nonetheless, there are a number of counter-arguments 
to the 'essentialist' position identified above. 
Firstly, unless there is good cause to doubt it (on 
evidence of lunacy or some other rational deficiency), 
one must accept the data of anthropologists in good 
faith, on the assumption that they know enough about 
the conception of shame both to understand it in their 
own culture and to be able to recognize similar 
concepts encountered in their fieldwork abroad. ' 
Secondly, the idea that the contemporary understanding 
of shame is the sole and correct one ignores both the 
Bcf Mesquita and Frijda (1992: 200-201), Reynolds 
(1989: Chapter 4 passim), on the difficulties in 
establishing conceptual equivalence, and the 
indeterminacy of translation; also Wierzbicka (1986), 
who proposes a neutral metalanguage for the purpose of 
transcending this problem. The difficulty is 
exacerbated both when it is necessary to rely on 
secondary sources, owing to an inability to read a 
text in the original language and the lack of an 
English translation, (as is the case with the work of 
certain Japanese scholars discussed in Chapter Four) 
and when an author translates a foreign concept as 
'shame' without referring to the indigenous term for 
it nor discussing the context of its usage (cf Ng's 
1981 account of Confucian Chinese 'shame', also in 
Chapter Four). Throughout this study, where no indigenous term for an apparently similar concept is 
given, the term 'shame' will be used in inverted 
commas to indicate that it is a provisional 
translation. 
'This idea of the 'reasonable anthropologist' is 
but an extension of the assumption of the 'reasonable 
man' employed in much philosophical discourse. 
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fact that all concepts have anchorage in some 
linguistic community and the historical shift in usage 
of the concept of shame even in our own culture (as 
between its predominant interpretation in the 
nineteenth century-as the 'sense of shame' and the 
current usage implying 'shame the emotion'). Such a 
usage is temporally shallow and as such, its 
extrapolation as the only valid one is unjustified. 
Furthermore, the essentialists' claim (that 'our' 
shame concept is the 'true' one) is undermined by a 
view of emotion categories as overlapping rather than 
discrete entities. In this view, classificatory 
categories do not depend on their members possessing 
common features but are, rather, 'chains' or 'ropes' 
whose 'links' or 'fibres' (the members) overlap, the 
"definitive attribute ... changing from one link to 
the next" (Vygotsky 1962: 64). This expresses the same 
principle as that outlined by Wittgenstein: 
"... these phenomena [i. e. members of a 
class] have no one thing in common which 
makes us use the same word for all, - but 
they are related to one another in many 
different ways. ... you will not see 
something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole 
series of them at that. ... we ... can see how similarities crop up and disappear ... we see a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes 
overall similarities, sometimes similarities 
of detail. I can think of no better 
expression to characterize these 
similarities than 'family resemblances' . 
... we extend our concept of [] as in 
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. 
And the strength of the thread does not 
reside in the fact that some one fibre runs 
through its whole length, but in the 
overlapping of many fibres. " (1953: pp3le- 
32e) lo 
1°Needham (1975) also identifies the convergence 
of these views with the zoological taxonomic principle 
of "polythetic classification" (Sokal and Sneath 1963, 
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Thus, such a view allows that 'foreign' concepts 
identified by anthropologists as sufficiently similar 
to shame may be assimilated into the category of shame 
phenomena for the purposes of cross-cultural 
comparison. It does not preclude the possibility of 
universal 'common features' but unlike the 
essentialist view, it does not claim that they must be 
present in order for members to be included in a given 
class. 
4 .2 What is the relationship between shame and 
the 
self? 
A feature of many modern accounts of shame, of 
both essentialist and constructionist persuasion and 
in various disciplines, is the claim that shame and 
the sense of self or identity are indissolubly linked. 
Accordingly, there is limited consideration of the 
relationship between the two concepts, again as a 
subsidiary question to that of shame's cross-cultural 
universality. In particular, the claim of certain 
constructionists (cf Rosaldo op cit), that the concept 
and emotion of shame varies in line with variation in 
the self-concept, is examined. In addition, it is 
questioned whether the concept of 'self' is a valid or 
useful one for the purposes of cross-cultural 
comparison. 
4.3 What is shame's contemporary significance and 
value 
Another question which exercises late twentieth 
century philosophers writing about shame is that of 
its moral and social significance. Since Freud, shame 
has been seen by many as a repressive emotion and 
concept and one which it would be best to try and 
Jensen 1970, cited in Averill 1980: 308). 
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overcome. (As noted above, this view is perhaps one 
of the most powerful reasons why shame has received 
little serious attention. ) 
However, more recently there has been a counter- 
swing among some researchers, who believe that the 
positive benefits of a sense of shame have been 
overlooked (cf e. g. Ablamowicz 1984; Schneider 1977). 
Consequently, they have devoted themselves to 
demonstrating that we ignore these to our peril. 
It has also been suggested that shame has ceased 
to be an important element in most people's 
experience. This view, too, has been challenged by the 
work of some psychologists (cf Lewis 1971) and 
sociologists (cf Scheff 1990a), who maintain that 
rather than having declined in significance or 
'disappeared', although now generally devalued and 
therefore denied, shame is still highly influential. 
This question as to the contemporary significance 
of shame, together with its cultural evaluation, thus 
constitutes a secondary concern of the thesis. 
However, since answering it also entails exploring 
possible reasons for the apparent variation in the 
salience and valuation of shame across cultures and 
historical periods, which may shed light on the 
question as to the universality of emotions in 
general, it also relates to the main question 
concerning shame identified in subsection 4.1 above. 
5. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
At this point, it is important to discuss and 
explain the methods adopted in this study. Given the 
diversity of disciplinary approaches to shame 
represented, there were difficulties in selecting a 
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uniformly applicable methodology which could be 
employed throughout. Instead, an attempt was made to 
allow the purpose and subject matter of each Chapter 
to dictate the most appropriate method. Thus, for 
example, the aim of the first Chapter being to 
determine the essential characteristics of shame 
according to contemporary philosophers and social 
scientists, it was felt that the most fruitful way to 
proceed was to examine individual authors' accounts 
(in order to identify recurrent themes, points of 
convergence or divergence etc. ) rather than begin by 
selecting specific issues for discussion. In 
particular, given the subject matter of the majority 
of the accounts considered, i. e. the so-called 
'structure' or 'essence' of shame, it seemed 
particularly appropriate to emulate the 
phenomenological method in this way, (i. e., 
'suspending preconceptions'), thus avoiding any 
tendency to pre-empt shame's definition. 
Rather than discuss other specific methodological 
choices further here, the introduction to each 
subsequent Chapter will include a reference to the 
particular method adopted. 
6. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Part One is concerned with the two related 
'debates' about shame identified in Section 4 above. 
Chapters One and Two critically examine accounts of 
shame given by representatives of the 'essentialist' 
and 'constructionist' positions, to illustrate the 
debate, while Chapter Three considers the evaluation 
of shame; hence a number of different positions taken 
on the value and importance of shame are examined. 
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In Part Two, the focus shifts to other cultures. 
Chapter Four explores accounts of concepts apparently 
similar to 'shame' given by anthropologists, 
psychologists and philosophers researching abroad, 
while Chapter Five considers the place of shame in the 
cosmological and ontological accounts of nineteenth 
and early twentieth century thinkers such as Hegel, 
Scheler and Sartre. One of the primary purposes of 
this Part is to explore whether accounts of 'shame' 
originating in other cultures (and philosophical 
'traditions', i. e. European phenomenology/ 
existentialism rather than Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy) emphasize similar aspects to those on 
which contemporary 'western' writers concentrate, or 
whether their concerns lie elsewhere. 
In the final Part, an attempt at evaluation is 
made. Chapter Six is devoted to assessing the 
respective merits and deficiencies of the various 
debates and approaches examined in the preceding 
chapters. In terminology borrowed from the philosophy 
of science, it asks 'what is the most "promising" way 
to study shame? ' Chapter Seven concludes the study by 
indicating possibilities for future research into 
shame. On the basis of the findings emerging from the 
study, it suggests topics for investigation which look 
likely to yield further important insights into this 
complex concept. Finally, it stresses the value of, 
and urges the practice of, collaboration between 
philosophers and researchers in other disciplines (or 
at least greater consideration of each other's work) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
"PHENOMENOLOGY"1: THE SEARCH FOR SHAME'S 
'ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is the aim of this chapter to outline a broad 
view of what defines shame f or modern thinkers. To 
this end, in the first part a number of accounts of 
shame given by contemporary philosophers will be 
examined, followed in the second part by those of 
certain psychoanalysts and social psychologists. 
While the main emphasis of each of these accounts may 
differ, what is common to them all is some attempt to 
elucidate the fundamental structure of shame, which, 
in the late 20th century, is generally understood to 
be primarily an emotion rather than, for example a 
disposition. 2 
The initial survey of these shame accounts will 
be largely descriptive; detailed criticism will be 
'My usage of this term is not intended to imply 
that those analyses which attempt to discover shame's 
'essence' employ the methods of the phenomenological 
tradition. Clearly, most of them do not. However, 
because of their (implicit or explicit) concentration 
on such an essence, I see them as similar in intent to 
the kind of eidetic analysis propounded by Husserl and 
his successors, i. e.: 
"... looking for properties of [a 
phenomenon] ... which would be impossible to imagine as not being properties of [that 
phenomenon] ... these properties ... [are] 'essentially necessary' and 'essential 
universal' properties ... no counter-example [to such properties] could possibly be 
discovered. " (Hammond et al 1991: 77) 
2This distinction will be considered elsewhere in 
this study. 
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made later, once a general idea of shame's putative 
nature has been reached. 
(a) Philosophical Studies 
As noted in the Introduction, philosophical 
attention to shame in the second half of this century 
has been only intermittent and relatively disjointed. 
However, there are substantial similarities between a 
number of the accounts considered below which allow 
them to be grouped together. Of these, the work of 
Rawls (1971) is taken as a starting point, both 
because it is chronologically the first significant 
treatment of shame in recent philosophy and because it 
contains a number of ideas about shame which are 
echoed in subsequent accounts, which will therefore be 
termed 'Rawlsian'. Once these have been examined, 
attention will be turned to another account which 
calls into question the validity of the 'Rawlsian' 
characterization of shame. 
2. RAWLS (1971) 
Although Rawls' account of shame (and guilt) is 
given within the context of his theory of justice, 
rather than being the primary focus of his inquiry, it 
is nonetheless considerably detailed. According to 
Rawls: 
"... shame is the emotion evoked by shocks 
to our self-respect, a special kind of 
good. " (443) 
2.1. Self-respect 
it is this notion of self-respect, or self-esteem 
(the two are not distinguished by Rawls) which is the 
key one in the Rawlsian account of shame. It 
comprises two elements: 
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1) "... a person's sense of his own value" 
2) "... confidence in one's ability ... to fulfil one's intentions" (440) 
Beginning with the first element, one's sense of 
personal value or worth depends on two factors: 
i) the belief that one has a "plan of life" 
which "is worth carrying out" (ibid); 
ii) the knowledge that those with whom one 
associates have a good opinion of one 
and accord one respect (440-442). 
Thus: 
"... shame implies an especially intimate 
connection ... with those upon whom we depend to confirm the sense of our own 
worth. " (443) 
Turning to the second element, it is essential 
for self-respect that one believes oneself capable of 
doing whatever is necessary to succeed in executing 
one's "plan of life". 
2.2. Ideals, standards and failure to 'measure up' 
Given Rawls' definition of shame indicated above, 
it is clear that any evidence or belief that one or 
more of the elements necessary for self-respect is 
lacking will be sufficient to cause shame. Thus, 
i) if one becomes disillusioned with one's life-plan 
and sees it as unworthwhile; ii) if one believes or 
perceives that one's associates do not or no longer 
approve of one; iii) if one discovers that one is in 
some way lacking in ability so that one's plan of life 
cannot be realized; in any or all of these 
circumstances, shame will occur. 
All these discrepancies between what one believes 
'ought to be' and what 'is', reflect a deficiency in 
the self, which is a further defining characteristic 
of shame : 
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" shame springs from a feeling of 
diminishment of self ... (445) 
2.3. The relativity of shame objects 
Clearly, individual plans of life and capacities 
vary widely, and given the relationship between a 
particular plan of life and the requisite capacities 
to fulfil it, it follows that the objects of shame 
will vary between persons. Thus, there are no 
absolute objects of shame: 
"... feelings of shame are relative to our 
aspirations, to what we try to do and with 
whom we wish to associate. " (444) 
2.4. 'Natural' shame and 'moral' shame 
Rawls makes a distinction between what he calls 
'natural' shame and 'moral' shame. The former arises 
when one's deficiency relates to acts or attributes 
which are necessary to fulfil one's plan of life (see 
above). The latter is more closely tied to what Rawls 
classifies as "the virtues". If one is lacking in all 
or any of these, one is liable to "moral shame" (444). 
2.5. Resolution of shame feelings 
Moving on to how the feeling of shame is 
overcome, it follows that being caused by awareness of 
failures and deficiencies, it can be removed only by 
subsequent evidence of success: 
"... of defects made good... " (484) 
3. RICHARDS (1971) 
Richards' structural account of shame follows 
Rawls' closely and is- not substantially different 
except in one or two minor respects. His emphasis is 
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on elucidating the beliefs which are characteristic- 
ally associated with various feelings, as he rejects 
characterizations based on other factors such as 
"behavioural manifestations", "sensations 
and kinesthetic feelings" etc. (250-251), 
which may be common to nonetheless different emotions. 
As in Rawls' account, 
"In the case of shame, the defining 
explanation of having the feeling involves 
the belief of failing to attain one's 
conception of the self's competence, some 
self-ideal of excellence. " (253) 
and occasions for shame 
11... involve failures in the competence of 
the self - in the capacity to control 
appetites, lack of mastery in execution, 
lack of courage and confidence in one's 
ability to do things. " (255). 
3.2. Shame and responsibility 
Richards additionally points out that shame is 
not restricted to those acts or attributes (which 
contravene one's ideal of excellence) for which one is 
personally responsible. It can also be felt, through 
a process of identification with broader groups with 
whom one considers one's ideals and interests are 
associated (254), for acts and attributes of members 
of such groups. 
3.3. Resolution of shame 
Despite his recognition of the above broader 
understanding of responsibility, which is related to 
a wider conception of the self which recognizes the 
connections between the individual and his/her 
associates, Richards nonetheless resorts to a more 
conventional account of the way in which shame may be 
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overcome. Thus, the Rawlsian characterization of 
shame generally embraced by Richards, i. e. that it is 
inherent in some belief in, or experience of, the 
self's failure, leads him also to conclude that only 
by replacing such failure with success can shame be 
eliminated (256). 
4. O'HEAR (1976) 
4 . 1. Shame and public opinion 
According to O'Hear, the Rawlsian emphasis on 
shame's relationship with self-ideals is intended as 
a corrective to prior views', which insisted that 
crucial to shame's experience is concern that one's 
faults will become public; that others will thus have 
a less favourable view of one (77). 
O'Hear sees the confusion over the role of the 
public, or 'audience', in shame, as deriving from the 
particular kinds of societies, and the values they 
emphasize, on which characterizations of shame by 
anthropologists and historians are typically based. 
Thus, where public esteem and one's reputation is of 
the utmost importance, (as, in for example, Homeric 
Greece, or in small, close-knit 'Mediterranean' 
communities), it follows that shame is necessarily 
bound up with concern for public opinion. However, 
this is not because such concern is an intrinsic 
element in shame, but because a good reputation is 
highly valued, and having a poor or diminished one is 
thus an object of shame for members of such societies 
(80-81). 
However, in eliminating unfavourable public 
judgement as a necessary condition for shame, there is 
'Cf e. g. Campbell op cit; du Boulay 1974. 
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a danger of overlooking the fact that in the 
experience, the individual concerned takes on the role 
of judge of self previously accorded to others (77). 
4.2. Shame and self-ideals 
While O'Hear sees this shift as valuable, he 
nevertheless considers that in concentrating on 
demonstrating that shame can occur without recourse to 
public opinion, the Rawlsian characterization obscures 
the fact that it is still possible to feel shame for 
reasons other than those to do with personal 
standards. He claims that violating one's self-ideals 
(which, as we have seen, being relative to one's life- 
plan and largely self-imposed, can be arbitrary, 
personal and idiosyncratic) is an inadequate 
explanation to cover all experiences of shame (78-79). 
While such violation may indeed be a sufficient reason 
for shame to occur in certain cases, it is by no means 
necessary. O'Hear thus extends the definition of 
shame given by his predecessors to include failure "to 
meet basic moral demands" (79). Thus, for O'Hear, 
shame can also result from failing to live up to a 
generally accepted conception of what a decent person 
should be and how s/he should act. 
4.3. Oblects of shame 
In addition, and in agreement with the earlier 
accounts, O'Hear acknowledges that there are myriad 
possible objects of shame, none of which are 
necessarily to do with 
"what is reprehensible or intentional in 
[one's] conduct" (76). 
Thus again, the relativity of, and irrelevance of 
responsibility for, the things over which one feels 
shame, is noted by O'Hear. 
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S. THRANE (1979) 
As in the preceding accounts, in Thrane's 
treatise on shame the central features of the concept 
are again taken to be ideals or standards against 
which performance is measured, and the associated 
failure or shortcoming (144). However, in addition, 
the intimate and intrinsic connection between shame 
and one's sense of self or identity is emphasized 
(ibid). This latter aspect of shame is explored more 
fully by Thrane than by any of his predecessors 
already considered. 
5.1. Shame and identity 
ýý ... the object of shame 
is paradigmatically 
oneself ... A man who is ashamed is ashamed 
of what he is. " (144) 
Thrane's discussion of the notion of identity is 
thorough. He stresses that it is erroneous to 
conceive of identity in terms of an atomistic, 
isolated individual, untouched and unaffected by 
historical or current circumstances and he criticizes 
the presentation of the self in such terms in much 
philosophy, particularly ethics (ibid). Such views 
ignore the way in which, during an individual's 
development, a collection of attributes is 'gathered': 
for example, one's nationality, parentage, education 
etc. All of these contribute to the constitution of 
one's identity, so that it is possible to feel 
ashamed, not just of personal, particular 
deficiencies, but also of those of groups, persons, 
institutions etc. with whom one is associated in this 
way. Shame for one's country, for example, is thus 
not irrational, but explicable, given that one's 
nationality is "instanced" in one (145). 
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Further, the process of identification plays an 
important role in the relationship between shame and 
identity. Identifications are of two kinds: firstly, 
there are those which have little to do with personal 
choice, which relate for example to the kinds of 
things described above. Then there are those which 
Thrane calls "wished-for" identifications (148); that 
is, with people etc. with whom one would like to be 
associated: 
" .. shame is dependent on ... identifica- tion. ... only some identifications are freely chosen. ... the most important identifications are surely the infantile and 
unconscious ones. " (145) 
"On the one hand, there is my identification 
with those I see as my like. Such 
identification is not necessarily chosen; it 
may well be thrust upon me. On the other 
hand, there is ... 'wished-for' identifica- tion. " (148) 
Thus, for example, a PhD student may aspire to be 
a member of the academic community. Failure to 
produce work of a sufficiently scholarly standard 
will, then, induce shame; shame that s/he does not 
merit the description of 'academic'. 
By his analysis of identity, Thrane can be 
distinguished from Rawls, who not only does not 
explicitly discuss the notion, but rather, implicitly 
marries the sense of identity to ideas about aims, 
ideals and the way one conducts one's life. 4 
5_. 2. Shame and ideals 
As noted earlier, on somewhat more Rawlsian lines 
is Thrane's discussion of 
`This point is brought out by Deigh (1983) whose account is considered below. 
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"failure to achieve or possess the (admired) 
ideal" (144) 
as the cause of shame feeling. Again, the idea that 
such ideals are or must be personal is accepted by 
Thrane. By this is not meant, however, that they must 
of necessity be particular to an individual, only that 
they must be "embraced" before failure to live up to 
them can be instrumental in bringing about shame. 
Thus, Thrane's view is not significantly different 
from O'Hear's. 
Moreover, since there are varying degrees of 
failure or shortcoming with respect to an- ideal or 
standard, there are also varying degrees of shame 
(ibid). However, it does not follow that the greater 
the failure, the greater the shame: 
"A small thing may provoke intense shame" 
(143). 
The intensity of the shame experience is thus not in 
direct proportion to the level of deficiency. 
5.3 Shame and responsibility 
The question of responsibility is again raised in 
Thrane's account. As we have already seen in the 
discussion of identity, it is identification which 
plays the most influential role in determining whether 
one will feel shame. Such identifications need not be 
made freely or consciously, both of which would appear 
to be prerequisites for attributions of responsibility 
to be justified. 
5.4 Shame and 'the other'. 
The role of 'the public', or 'the other', in 
shame is also, according to Thrane, not unproblematic. 
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Again, one must identify with the public attempting to 
shame one if its efforts are to succeed. Just as 
" .. with regard to unembraced ideals one 
will be shameless" (144), 
so too with respect to a judging party whose standards 
one does not share, will one be shameless. Rather, 
the intended shaming may induce quite different 
emotions in the object of its efforts, such as anger 
or contempt, or even mere indifference (147). 
However, there is one way in which 'the public' 
does represent an important element in the experience 
of shame. This is in its role as exemplifying an 
objective perspective on one's self. To feel shame, 
one must be able to look at one's character, actions, 
etc. from the point of view of an outsider. It is 
only when one recognizes that there is a discrepancy 
between one's own view of oneself and that of others 
that shame can occur: 
"When we feel shame, we (at least imagine 
that we) see ourselves as others see us. " 
(153) 
5.5. Resolution of shame feelings 
Finally, with respect to the resolution of shame 
feelings, Thrane concurs with his predecessors: 
failure must be replaced by success. Or, one must 
adjust one's standards so that one will not judge 
oneself so severely in future (144). 
6. BOONIN (1983) 
6.1. Shame, guilt, norms and values 
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Boonin's central thesis is that, contrary to what 
is commonly argued, shame is not essentially social in 
nature (295). Rather, it is guilt which has this 
characteristic. The explanation for this lies in the 
relationships between the two concepts and norms and 
values. Norms, being socially-prescribed rules or 
standards indicating proper conduct, are restricted to 
actions, whereas values can also include 
"states of character and states of affairs. " 
(299). 
Guilt arises when the former are transgressed; both 
the way in which it is incurred and the means by which 
it is eliminated are socially determined (ibid). 
Shame, however, 
"relates to failures as seen in terms of the 
individual's own self-estimation" (ibid), 
i. e., in terms of the particular values and ideals 
held by persons (which may or may not be shared by 
others in society); hence the more private and 
'internal' nature ascribed to shame by Boonin. 
6.2. Shame, ideals and failure 
Boonin is in agreement with his predecessors on 
the fundamental relationship between shame and 
"failures, imperfections, 
inadequacies and weaknesses. " 
(296) ; 
specifically failure 
"to measure up to a valid and binding 
ideal. " (ibid) . 
Irrespective of whether such ideals are personally or 
socially relative (as noted earlier), or universal (in 
the sense of 
"an objectively valid conception of the 
nature and function of man" [297, cf O'Hear 
op cit: 79]), 
shame results from failure to conform to those ideals 
(Boonin op cit: 297). 
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6.3. Shame and self/identity 
The thematic that in experiences 
one's self which is negatively judge 
oneself is continued in Boonin's work 
that sense of self is, and from where 
are not explored): 
to .. shame focuses directly identity... " (301) 
of shame it is 
d or valued by 
(although what 
it is derived, 
on one's 
11 . shame ... relates to one's own negative 
self-evaluation of one's own being and 
existence. " (302) 
"In shame one has essentially only failed 
one's self - one's innermost valuation of 
one's own being ... " (299) 
Again comparing shame to guilt (which, as noted 
above, relates to acts), in the latter's case, the 
focus is primarily on the act which occasions the 
guilt and only secondarily on the actor, as agent of 
the deed. By contrast, in shame, (in those cases when 
it does arise from an act), it is 
"what the act reveals about the actor and 
his basic character" (300) 
which is the focus of attention. 
6.4. Shame and responsibility 
The question as to whether shame can (and should) 
be felt for things over which one has no control is 
also raised by Boonin. Following from his discussion 
of the respective relations between guilt and shame 
and norms and values, he too concludes that questions 
of responsibility are irrelevant in shame. Values 
(and thus shame) not being essentially connected with 
acts, it is impossible to attribute blame for failures 
or shortcomings which are the source of shame. In 
particular: 
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°... we do not seem able to exercise any 
clear or conscious control over our ideal 
conception of ourselves, and as we are 
continually falling short of our ideals and 
frequently exhibiting personal inadequacies, 
we cannot in retrospect see as clearly what 
we could have done to avoid them. " (ibid) 
6.5. Resolution of shame 
Unlike guilt, for which (due to its intrinsically 
social nature) there are clearly prescribed ways of 
making reparation, there are no institutionalized 
means by which shame may be overcome. Transformation 
of the self (by means of revising one's values, 
improving one's performance, etc. ) is, again, 
acknowledged as the sole 'antidote' to shame, for 
which there is rarely (if ever) immediate relief t? 99, 
300-301). 
7. LM! B (1983) 
7.1. Shame and responsibility 
The key element of shame which is scrutinized by 
Lamb is its relationship to responsibility. 5 As 
comparison of the preceding accounts shows, there is 
a general consensus that ideas about personal 
responsibility have no relevance to the experience of 
shame. In addition, Lamb points out that one can be 
put into a "state of shame" by something done by 
another (332) and that 
5His motive for doing so is to demonstrate that 
shame and shame feelings, in contrast to guilt and 
guilt feelings, cannot "provide a basis for morality" 
(345) - when morality is understood as having to do 
with rules, acts and responsibility. Lamb's arguments 
concerning the relationship (if any) between shame and 
morality, together with the question as to whether his 
conception of morality is adequate, will be discussed 





"shame can 'attach' to a person without that 
person's being aware of his state in that 
respect. " (339)6 
7.2. Guilt, shame, norms and values 
Lamb agrees with Boonin that 
11. in pursuing the distinction between 
guilt and shame, we are led to pursue the 
distinction between rules and ideals. " 
(337). 
Again, 
"Rules govern ... what we 
do. Ideals govern 
... what we are. " 
(338) 
Whilst it is intelligible to talk about being 
responsible for what we do, it is not usually the case 
that we ascribe responsibility to ourselves for what 
we are. Thus, again, the lack of connection between 
shame and responsibility is argued by Lamb. 
8. TAYLOR (1985) 
Taylor's account of shame, although extremely 
'Rawlsian' in nature (as will be seen below) might 
nonetheless also be construed as a critique of 
previous philosophical accounts. This is because 
(echoing Richards op cit, but taking his approach 
further) it concentrates on identifying a universal 
belief-structure underlying the emotion, in an attempt 
to eliminate the variable aspects of shame and in 
particular, to refute the view that there are 
different 'kinds' of shame (e. g. Rawls' 'moral' and 
'natural' shame). It is thus perhaps the paradigmatic 
6 However, in these latter cases, it is not shame 
as an emotion which is being considered. Nonetheless, 
so far as shame the emotion is concerned, it is still 
the case that in order to feel it, one need not 
believe that one is responsible for whatever it is of 
which one is ashamed. 
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example of what have been classified as 
'phenomenological' approaches. 
8.1. Shame and beliefs 
For Taylor, shame is indeed characterized by a 
particular and invariant set of beliefs; her account 
is thus in addition a paradigmatic example of a 
cognitive approach to the study of emotions. ' 
According to Taylor, there are two aspects to the 
beliefs typically associated with shame. Firstly, 
giving rise to the emotion, there is a "self-directed 
adverse judgement" (64) of oneself, a belief that one 
is a different and most importantly lesser person than 
one "believed, assumed or hoped" was the case (ibid). 
Secondly, there is the idea that one either 
(a) actually is seen, or (b) could be seen, in some 
way which differs from the way one believed one was 
seen, or ought to be seen (cf Thrane, op cit). This 
awareness of a discrepancy between an actual or 
potential objective view and the actual or desired 
subjective view, is what gives rise to the critical 
self-judgement which causes shame. 
8.2. Shame and the "audience" or observer 
The greater part of Taylor's discussion of shame 
focuses on analyzing the significance which the notion 
of an audience or observer has in the experience. The 
issue is to determine the necessity or otherwise of an 
7While she concedes that such an account is not 
necessarily exhaustive, it is clear that she regards her approach as the key to reaching the most accurate (and possibly the most important) characterization of 
shame - consideration of its other more "superficial" 
(54) elements serving only to cloud and confuse the 
ability to understand its essential nature. 
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actual other as observer, as against the sufficiency 
of just oneself taking an observer's perspective on 
oneself. 
The role of public opinion in cases of shame has 
been investigated in certain of the accounts already 
considered. In particular, Taylor's discussion 
appears to owe much to that of O'Hear (op cit), as 
will become clear. However, it is features of the 
Sartrean description of shame with which she most 
takes issue. Sartre's ontological view of shame will 
be explored fully in Chapter Five and cannot be pre- 
empted by outlining it here; a brief indication of his 
conception of a person experiencing shame is, though, 
essential. 
A man (unwittingly) makes a vulgar gesture. He 
then realizes he is being watched and that the person 
watching him considers his gesture vulgar. Becoming 
aware that he is, thus, capable of appearing vulgar, 
he feels shame (Sartre 1956: 221). 
8.2.1. Taylor on Sartre on shame 
" ... shame is not originally a phenomenon of 
reflection ... it is in its primary 
structure shame before somebody ... 
... the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of 
myself as I appear to the Other. " (Sartre 
1956: 221-222). 
"By the mere appearance of the Other, I am 
put in the position of passing judgment on 
myself as an object, for it is as an object 
that I appear to the other ... shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I 
as the Other sees me. " (ibid) 
There are two views expressed in the above 
passages with which Taylor disagrees. Firstly, that 
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for shame to be felt, it is essential that there be 
'another' involved (what this 'other' is, is also in 
dispute). Secondly, that in shame, the shame-feeler 
identifies or concurs with the description of 
themselves (or their behaviour) held by the 'other'. 
8.2.1.1. The role of the 'other' in shame. 
"it is plainly untrue that all cases of 
feeling shame are cases of public exposure, 
untrue, that is , that an actual observer is 
required for shame to be felt. Nor is it 
true even that the agent must believe, 
rightly or wrongly, that he is being 
observed by some other person. One may feel 
shame when quite alone and knowing this to 
be so ... the weaker claim, that shame involves imagining an audience, is not 
correct either. ... All that seems necessary is that [the agent] shift his viewpoint 
[from that of the observed to that of an 
observer]. " (Taylor op cit : 58 ) 
" .. if all [shame] requires is that one 
should occupy an observer's position vis-a- 
vis oneself then the metaphors of eyes being 
upon one or being revealed to an audience 
seem to be rather heavy machinery for making 
just this point. The problem therefore is 
to give adequate content to the notion of 
the audience without introducing what is 
conceptually irrelevant to feeling shame. " 
(ibid, 59) 
What seems to be at issue is whether "another", 
an observer (real or imagined) is required, (albeit 
only as a catalyst), for an agent to become conscious 
of him/herself (as an object capable of being seen, 
described, assessed) rather than just conscious in the 
sense of being aware of what s/he is doing. Sartre, 
as noted, says, 
"... the Other is the indispensable mediator 
between myself and me" (op cit: 222) 
and elsewhere that 
"I see myself because somebody sees me" (op 
cit: 260). 
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This is important, because in Sartre's view, we only 
exist as objects by virtue of the existence of Others 
as subjects. Without the Other, we would remain at 
the level of Beings-for-themselves, existing only with 
unreflective consciousness, and could never take an 
observer's position vis-a-vis ourselves (Taylor op 
cit: 59). The other is the essential catalyst for our 
ability to 'see ourselves': 
"The unreflective consciousness does not 
apprehend the person directly or as its 
object; the person is presented to 
consciousness in so far as the person is an 
object for the other. " (Sartre op cit: 260) 
Taylor does acknowledge that an observer is the 
means by which we are made aware of ourselves; 
however, she considers that 
"[t]he observer is merely the means towards 
this end, and as such he is dispensable. " 
(Taylor op cit: 59, emphasis added). 
It is not clear (since shame is not possible 
without this kind of self-awareness) how the means by 
which it is-achieved could be anything other than 
indispensable. Therefore, to dismiss the Other as 
"merely" this means is to diminish the importance of 
the way in which consciousness of the self as an 
object is achieved. It also implies that Taylor 
believes such self-awareness is a possibility for 
human beings in isolation; i. e. that the presence or 
existence of Others is not the sole means towards it. 
However, elsewhere she acknowledges that 
"[s]hame requires a sophisticated type of 
self-consciousness ... it is plainly a state 
of self-consciousness which centrally relies 
on the concept of another, for the thought 
of being seen as one might be seen by 
another is the catalyst for the emotion. " 
(ibid: 67). 
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Given that Taylor herself thus recognizes this 
crucial role of the 'other' in shame, it is difficult 
to see why she then imputes to Sartre the view that 
this 'other' is a concrete, particular Other, when 
there is nothing in his account to suggest that he 
differs from her own view. 
Taylor's criticism of Sartre's account of shame 
and the crucial role played in it by the 'other', 
therefore appears to rest on a fundamental 
misconstrual of his discussion of this role. This 
discussion is not intended by Sartre to show that an 
actual, specific Other is required for every case of 
shame but rather that shame is not possible without 
the kind of self-awareness which derives from our 
relationship with others in general. As this latter 
relationship is, according to Sartre, fundamentally 
important for the nature of our Being, to take his 
account of shame out of context, as Taylor does, is to 
entirely miss Sartre's point in discussing it. 
8.2.1.11. Identification with the 'other's' opinion 
As noted above, not only does Taylor dispute the 
indispensability of "the Other" in shame, she also 
disputes 
a) that any observer who may be involved is 
necessarily "critical of the agent" (60) and 
b) that 
"the agent accepts what he takes to be 
the observer's description of what he 
is doing" (ibid) 
[i. e. that the agent necessarily identifies or 
concurs with the view of the observer]. 
In these respects, Taylor's criticism deserves 
sympathetic consideration. Sartre, she maintains, 
oversimplifies "the notion of the audience" (ibid) and 
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she goes on to develop a more complex notion. As she 
states, "being seen at all" is the fundamental 
'trigger' for shame and 
11 h ow [the agent] is seen, whether he 
thinks of the audience as critical, 
approving, indifferent, cynical or naive is 
a distinguishable step. " (ibid). 
According to Taylor, therefore, in every case of 
shame, there are two distinguishable points of view: 
1) the view of the 'first audience', which 
"sees the agent under some description" (64) 
[but not necessarily an evaluative one]; 
2) the view of a 
"second, higher-order" 'audience' (61) 
which sees how the agent is (or may be) seen by the 
'first audience'. 
The way in which Taylor disputes that the 'first 
audience' is necessarily critical (as it is in 
Sartre's example of a man making a vulgar gesture - 
(Sartre op cit: 221]) is as follows. She maintains 
that the first audience's view of the agent could be 
one of approval. This would not preclude the agent's 
feeling shame, however, since it may be that the 
audience is one whose approval the agent rejects. 
S/he rejects it because s/he regards that audience 
negatively, i. e., considers it one whose approval 
reflects badly on the agent by placing the agent on a 
level with the audience (when s/he does not consider 
that level to be one of which s/he is worthy) . The 
shame here derives from the agent's potential for 
being identified with an audience whose values s/he 
rejects. 
This counter-example involving an approving 
'first-order' audience thus also indicates the error 
of the view that the agent experiencing shame always 
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shares the assessment of him/herself (whether negative 
or positive) which that audience makes. 
According to Taylor, it is by the second, higher- 
order audience that the agent's negative self- 
judgement (essential for shame to be felt) is 
prompted. The realization by the agent that s/he is 
or may be seen under a certain description, which 
description is one which ought not to be applicable to 
her/him, is what causes the feeling of shame. The 
shame consists in 'being able to be seen in a way in 
which one ought not to be seen'. 
There thus seems to be a considerable degree of 
validity in Taylor's criticisms of Sartre's example of 
shame as an over-simplification of the reality. 
However, by taking 
"the description of the features of shame as 
we find them in Sartre's example as the 
description of the paradigm case" (Taylor op 
cit: 64, also 60), 
Taylor again misconstrues Sartre's purpose in 
discussing shame. Sartre does, not, like Taylor, 
attempt a 'pure' analysis of shame for its own sake, 
nor does he himself posit this example as the 
"paradigm case". All he seeks to do is to demonstrate 
that we only exist as objects (for-ourselves and for- 
Others) by virtue of the existence of others. It is by 
reference to Others that our 'objectness' is 
constituted and it is 'being an object' which at 
bottom gives rise to shame (Sartre op cit: 288). The 
purpose of his example is not, therefore, to give a 
definitive "description of the features of shame", but 
rather to make the point that it is only in relation 
to Others that we are beings susceptible to 
description and evaluation, and that we are only 
capable of recognizing such descriptions and 
evaluations of ourselves (which recognition is 
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required for shame - we have to 'see how we are seen') 
by identifying with the Other. 
This identification does not necessarily mean 
that I endorse the view of myself held by the Other, 
merely that by assuming the position of the Other vis- 
a-vis myself, I recognize that it is a view which 
"appears to fit" (Taylor op cit: 66) and this 
recognition causes my shame. 
Nor does there seem to be anything unusually 
inappropriate about using a visual metaphor (i. e. 
'being seen') when discussing shame. Indeed, since 
shame is, as Sartre says, originally derived from our 
visibility as objects to Others, it seems natural and 
inevitable that the notion of 'seeing' should be 
retained metaphorically even in the absence of actual 
Others. If this metaphorical use is to be 
misinterpreted so that 'the Other' and 'the audience' 
are taken literally as elements in every occurrence of 
shame, which misinterpretation leads to the 
introduction of "what is conceptually irrelevant" 
(ibid: 59), then Taylor appears to be a prime culprit 
in her treatment of Sartre's account. 
9. ABLAMOWICZ (1984; 1992) 
The work of Ablamowicz represents a radical 
departure from the usual way of investigating shame in 
philosophy, in that it utilizes a genuinely 
phenomenological methodology. However, many of the 
conclusions of her study are sufficiently similar to 
those of the Rawlsian accounts to enable comparisons 




In contrast to the loose interpretation of 
'phenomenology' given above (see footnote 1), 
Ablamowicz's study of shame is firmly rooted in the 
phenomenological tradition proper. 
"Within the phenomenological method, the 
researcher concentrates on the lived-world 
of a person and explicates shame in terms of 
how human experience is revealed for the 
person in his/her own experiencing of it. 
The phenomenology begins with the 
descriptions of everyday life experience 
and, through the careful reflective analysis 
of these descriptions, attempts to reach the 
essential meaning of the given phenomenon. " 
(1984: 22-23) 
"... the aim is not just to arrive at w at 
this communication phenomenon is as a pure 
consciousness that is abstract from the 
lived world but to specify the basic 
definition of a lived-experience as it 
exists for the person who lives through it. " 
(1992: 33) 
A further aim of the chosen methodology, whereby 
"both the researcher and the subject 
'bracket' their natural attitude" (ibid: 33- 
34), 
is to enable an understanding of the phenomenon of 
shame which is unclouded by 
"existing presuppositions or theoretical 
assumptions" (ibid). 
Thus, one of the advantages of Ablamowicz's study is 
that a genuine attempt at objectivity is inherent in 
the method, in that it takes features of shame as it 
is empirically experienced by "selected research 
subjects" (ibid) as its 'raw material'. By contrast, 
accounts of shame given by philosophers in the 
analytical tradition (as indicated earlier) tend to be 
8Whether this is indeed possible is a matter for 
debate and will be considered below. 
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based largely on their subjective reflections on shame 
and the extrapolation of these, to provide a 
characterization which purports to be universally 
valid. 
The data on shame (or "phenomenological 
description") obtained from the research subjects is 
then subjected to a series of "reflections" resulting 
in 
i) a "reduction" of the description, 
"to include only those themes that are 
essential for the existence of the 
consciousness of experience" (ibid) 
and 
ii) an "interpretation" of those essential themes in 
order to give a fundamental definition of shame. 
9.2 The "Phenomenological Description" 
Ablamowicz organizes the essential themes 
emerging from the descriptions of shame elicited from 
her research subjects (PhD students) into the 
following categories: 
1) Personal/situational definitions 
2) Personality/attitude 
3) Relationships/interaction 
4) Body/physical appearance 
5) Self-expression (ibid: 38) 
9.2.1. Objects of shame 
In the first category, 
amongst PhD students are as 
complete the thesis; failure 
the objects of shame 
follows: failure to 
to work sufficiently 
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hard; failure to show evidence of knowledge; "hurting 
people" and "being irresponsible" (ibid: 39). 
Apart from the last two, these objects share a 
common feature, namely failure, or an inability to 
meet what are perceived as expected standards (of the 
self, or of others). Thus, the similarity between 
this conclusion and the 'essence' of shame according 
to the accounts already examined, is clear. 
9.2.2. Shame and self-confidence 
In the second category, loss of self-confidence 
is seen as integral to the shame experience and 
consequent on the recognition that one is 
"lacking in some essential quality(ies)" 
(ibid: 40). 
Again, this might be interpreted as a corroboration of 
the idea that shame entails loss of self-esteem/self- 
respect, in particular Rawls' point about not 
possessing the requisite capacities to execute one's 
plan of life. 
9.2.3. Shame and the body 
The fourth category, that of the part played by 
the physical body in shame, reveals elements of shame 
which are largely omitted in other philosophical 
accounts. This thus represents another significant 
'So far as "hurting people" is concerned, this is 
an interesting element on which Ablamowicz does not 
elaborate. However, it is a feature which is commonly 
considered to be a significant element in quilt (when 
this is being discussed in contrast to shame) and in 
particular, it is alleged by De Vos (1960), cited in 
Lebra (op cit), to be a defining characteristic of 
shame/guilt among Japanese. Consequently, it will be 
returned to later, both in the context of discussing 
distinctions between shame and guilt, and in the 
consideration of shame cross-culturally. 
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distinction between Ablamowicz's account and those 
already considered. 
Perhaps most important is the idea that shame 
involves a desire to hide or disappear: 
"I wanted to drag myself behind the curtain" 
(ibid: 41). 
9.2.4. Shame and the divided self 
In addition, the loss of one's usual experience 
of oneself as an integrated whole is brought out: 
"I was looking at myself as I was reduced in 
size ... " (ibid: 42). 
This resonates with the idea that in shame one is 
both observer and observed (cf Taylor op cit: 59 and 
Thrane op cit: 153). 
9.2.5. Shame and communication/relationships 
In terms of self-expression, what emerges is the 
general withdrawal from, and inability to communicate 
with, other people, which is endemic in shame 
experiences, together with a loss of volume and 
articulateness in speech due to one's loss of 
confidence (ibid). Finally, in the category of 
relationships/interaction, these communication 
difficulties and withdrawal are extended, so that 
shame is seen as an impediment to successful 
relationships, or indeed any relationship with others 
(ibid: 43-44). 
9.3 Reduction 
On the basis of the "essential themes" identified 
in the phenomenological description, Ablamowicz 
provides a "synthetic description" of shame, i. e. one 
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which is derived from the data elicited from, but not 
explicitly given by, her respondents. 
9.3.1. Shame and failure/imperfection 
"Shame is the awareness in consciousness of 
one's lived experience of imperfection ... 
Shame is experienced by the doctoral 
students as 'becoming self-aware of one's 
imperfections' and is manifest as a feeling 
of personal failure" (1984: 99) 
9.3.2. Shame and the body 
Further: 
"The experience of shame reveals a subject's 
vulnerability to being reduced to his/her 
bodily existence. As an 'I' regards itself 
as an object of observation by the self or 
some Other, it becomes separated from and 
thereby overcome by its body" (ibid: 101). 
9.3.3. Resolution of shame 
Ablamowicz's account differs from the Rawlsian 
accounts in that there is no mention of replacing 
failure with subsequent success as the means whereby 
shame is overcome. Rather, the paradoxical co- 
existence of the shame sufferer's desire to avoid 
communication with others (through fear of the others' 
contemptuous judgement) with a simultaneous urge to 
speak about one's experience, is highlighted by 
Ablamowicz (ibid: 102). This leads to the conclusion 
that sharing the shame experience is ultimately the 
only way in which one can regain one's equilibrium. 
Moreover, this indicates that rather than being a 
passive victim in shame (as is sometimes claimed, cf 
43 
e. g. Taylor op cit: 68), an individual can and most 
often does ac to eliminate shame: 
"... persons ... attempt to replace the 
passivity with activity by facing shame and 
coping with it in their own existential ways 
which are often different from social 
prescriptions ... it is our choice what kind 
of signification we attach to the particular 
situation of shame in the context of our 
life. And, it is our choice what [sic] and 
how we deal with the consequences of this 
experience. " (1984: 111)10 
9.4. Critique 
As noted above, Ablamowicz's study is to be 
welcomed for its contribution to demonstrating the 
importance of attending to empirical data when seeking 
to establish the essence of shame. Nonetheless, its 
full potential is not realized, due to a number of 
flaws in its design. 
9.4.1. Research subjects 
The selection of the particular 'target-group' of 
respondents (i. e. PhD students in a 'western' 
university) is highly suspect, especially in the 
context of attempting to take account of possible 
variations in shame cross-culturally. Ablamowicz 
claims that she has "problematized the universal trait 
"Several other authorities are agreed that there 
are a number of ways in which shame can be 
'discharged' by one's own actions (Epstein 1984: 42-43; 
Heller op cit: 20-21,23; Broucek op cit: 72-73). There 
will be further discussion of these below, 
particularly in the context of comparing philosophical 
and psychoanalytical accounts of shame's 
phenomenology. 
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in shame" (ibid: 113) by ensuring cultural and sexual 
variation between her respondents. Thus, although she 
seeks, and expects to find, such (a) universal 
trait(s)11. Ablamowicz nonetheless also seeks to 
eliminate the possibility that cultural differences 
may have an influence on the way in which shame is 
experienced. She concludes from her data that despite 
such differences, 
"the essential core of the experience of 
shame remains invariant. "(ibid); 
(an inevitable conclusion, given her approach). What 
is not clear, then, is what she means by her statement 
that 
"it is possible that people from another 
background or different national/cultural 
environment may experience shame in a 
different manner" (ibid). 
Moreover, she fails to recognize that the context in 
which such culturally variable respondents are 
experiencing shame may also have a significant 
influence, which may override cultural differences. 
Thus, given what is expected of doctoral students in 
'western' universities, it is not surprising that 
their experiences of shame should show a high level of 
similarity. " Indeed, by concentrating on doctoral 
students, Ablamowicz shows that she has already made 
assumptions about the nature of shame: 
"'This is of course the purpose of a 
phenomenological eidetic approach; see the definition 
at the outset of this Chapter. 
12cf also Johnson et al (1987: 362): 
"All of the present subjects are college students and 
it is probable that the Korean and Taiwan Chinese 
students are more westernized than would be a broader 
sample of Korean or Taiwanese subjects. " 
Also Mesquita & Frijda (1992: 200): 
"In many studies, use is made of university students, 
but obviously the social position and provenance of 
students may be quite different in different 
cultures. " 
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"The context of a university graduate school 
offers an especially appropriate environment 
for shame situations to occur ... working on 
a doctoral degree is a process in which 
one's ability to perform and achieve is 
constantly exposed, criticized and 
questioned ... doctoral students ... 
experience a strong sense of competition ... 
with their own inner image of the perfect 
self. " (1992: 34, emphasis added) 
Such a bias in choice of research subjects 
exposes at least one presupposition on the part of the 
researcher, i. e. that one of the 'essential 
properties' of shame is a sense of failure derived 
from inability to achieve. This sits ill with the 
professed suspension of existing ideas about shame: 
"To avoid any behavioral or sociocultural 
conditioning qualifications and to direct 
the focus on the meaning and reality of 
shame in its immediacy, this researcher's 
nreconcentions were initially susuended. UU 
(ibid: 46, emphasis added) 
10. CRITIQUE OF RAWLSIAN ACCOUNTS OF SHAME 
It was noted in the Introduction to this chapter 
that the so-called 'Rawisian' accounts of shame showed 
certain similarities. Various criticisms to which 
they might be subjected will now be discussed. In so 




Shame and self-respect/esteem. 
According to Rawls, it will be recalled, having 
self-respect or self-esteem amounts to having what one 
believes to be a worthwhile "plan of life" and the 
requisite capacities for executing it and 
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"shame is the emotion evoked by shocks to 
our self-respect ... " (Rawls op cit, 443). 
It must now be considered whether such a 
characterization is adequate to encompass all 
occasions when shame is experienced. This entails 
determining whether there exist plausible counter- 
examples in which a) a person experiences a blow to 
his/her self-esteem but nonetheless does no feel 
shame and conversely b) a person does feel shame, but 
on account of something other than such a blow, so 
that his/her self-esteem remains intact. 
Deigh (op cit: 230-231) supplies a convincing 
counter-example which satisfies the first requirement 
outlined above, that of loss of self-esteem with no 
ensuing shame. A boy, aspiring to become a tennis 
professional on the basis of early successes in 
limited competitive encounters, suffers his first 
convincing defeat after meeting players of greater 
skill. He quickly recognizes that his game is not of 
a suitable calibre for a professional tennis player, 
i. e., he discovers he is deficient in the necessary 
skill to realize his ambition ("plan of life"). His 
self-esteem, (according to Rawls' definition of it) is 
thus reduced, in that he sees himself as being less 
competent than he previously believed, but he feels no 
shame, only disappointment. (He need not feel shame, 
since he gave an adequate performance, presumably his 
best, which no observer would consider to be poor. ) 
Thus, whereas the Rawlsian account maintains that loss 
of self-esteem inevitably produces shame, the above 
example demonstrates the error of this view. 
There are indeed a number of situations in which 
shame may be experienced without one's self-esteem 
being affected. For example, one may feel shame over 
something which could in no way be construed as an 
expression or reflection of one's excellence - such as 
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one's name. If this has humorous or ridiculous 
connotations (as in the case of ' Pratt' , for example) , 
and one is consequently made an object of ridicule, it 
is readily conceivable that this may result in feeling 
ashamed of one's name. However, since one's name 
cannot be said to have a material influence on one's 
aims or ideals, nor on one's ability to realize them, 
this example can immediately be seen to pose a problem 
for the Rawlsian characterization. 
10.2 Shame and the opinion of others 
In addition, it is possible to feel shame as a 
result of unfavourable judgement of oneself by others 
even when one does not share that judgement (cf 
Taylor's discussion of the Sartrean example examined 
above). Thus, if one has an ideal to which one 
conforms completely, one can experience the derision 
of others (who do not recognize such an ideal as 
worthy) yet no feel shame. However, it is more 
commonly the case that it is just the others' negative 
opinion which of itself, causes shame (despite one's 
own unshaken conviction that one's ideals and 
abilities are not defective). 13 For example, a woman 
13Cf Heller (1985: 14): 
"If our Ego-ideal is shaped according to our 
conscience, we can be ashamed even if we 
measure up completely ... [f]or should this Ego-ideal contradict the norms of external 
authority when it is the judgement of the 
latter with which we are confronted, we will 
still feel shame. " 
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may believe that being a good mother means spending 
time playing with her children rather than doing 
housework. Nonetheless, when visitors call and her 
house is dirty and/or untidy, (and she senses their 
disapproval) she feels ashamed. This again, then, 
constitutes a case of shame which the Rawlsian 
definition cannot accommodate. 
The very real capacity for shame possessed by 
young children and documented by, for example, Erikson 
(1965), is yet another fact which undermines the 
conception of shame as dependent on shocks to one's 
self-esteem (Deigh op cit, 233-234). A child may 
indeed have a sense of personal worth; however, that 
sense cannot intelligibly be said to derive from 
having a consciously-devised plan of life and a belief 
in one's capacities to execute it. Thus, the shame 
experienced by children must have its source 
elsewhere. 
10.3 Shame and 'status incongruency' 
A further counter-example to the Rawlsian 
conception of shame is perhaps the most interesting 
and significant, and one which suggests a connection 
between the form and values of the wider society or 
culture and the way in which shame is conceptualized. 
Deigh (op cit: 234-235) distinguishes two kinds of 
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society. One has an ethic of achievement, which is 
allied to a meritocratic social structure with (real 
or ideal) social mobility, (i. e., the kind of society 
in which Rawls' conception of shame has been 
engendered); the other has an 'aristocratic' ethic, 
such as might be found in a rigid class or caste 
society. In the latter, shame, far from being 
associated with failure to achieve one's self-allotted 
ambition, results from failing to conduct oneself in 
a manner appropriate to someone of a particular rank 
or status. Thus, it is concerned with incongruence 
between (social) expectation and reality. 14 
10.3.1 Shame of status 
There is yet a further manifestation of shame in 
relation to status for which the Rawlsian 
characterization cannot account. In some societies 
(particularly in many 'traditional' cultures) there is 
the shame of ascribed status. In this case, a whole 
status can be shameful. Examples of this include 
India (the 'untouchable' caste); the 'old South' (the 
slave class) and Japan (the ghetto class). In such 
societies, the modern, individualist 'liberal' 
understanding of shame exemplified in the Rawlsian 
account is inapplicable. The question of shame does 
not relate to how well or badly one performs in one's 
status, but has to do with the absolute moral 
evaluation of the whole status. 15 
14Cf Lebra (op cit), whose work on Japan will be 
considered in Chapter Four. 
15The implications of such an 'illiberal' 
interpretation of shame, particularly in terms of the 
question of shame's value, will be considered in 
Chapter Three below. 
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10.4 Shame and identity 
It may be argued that the incongruency referred 
to in section 10.3 above is also precisely what the 
Rawisian view describes as the essence of shame (i. e., 
a discrepancy between ideal and actual fact). 
However, an important distinction which is lost by 
conflating the two interpretations of shame in this 
way is that between a view of shame applicable to 
individuals who construe their personal identity in 
terms of how they plan or organize and conduct their 
life, i. e. who believe their identity is created by 
themselves, and that which applies to those whose 
identity is ascribed to them by virtue of their 
position in society. 
This important point, of how one's identity is 
constituted, is particularly relevant to 
considerations about shame in different cultures. The 
Rawlsian view of shame arises from and is inevitably 
appropriate to and acceptable in a 'liberal' society 
in which things such as one's class, gender, race etc. 
are ostensibly incidental and external attributes of 
individuals, and not defining characteristics of one's 
identity (Deigh op cit) . Contrast this with a society 
in which what one is (in India, a Brahmin, or an 
Untouchable, for example) determines who one is. 
10.5 Shame and the sense of worth 
Allied to the points about status and identity is 
the question of one's sense of worth. As already 
established, for Rawls one's sense of one's worth is 
derived from one's aims and ideals and those actions 
and conduct which are consistent with achieving those 
aims and matching those ideals (Rawls op cit: 408; 
Deigh op cit: 235; of Thrane op cit). However, in a 
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hierarchical society, just as one's identity is 
ascribed to one, (rather than created by oneself), so 
too is one's sense of worth derived from one's 
position in that social structure (Deigh op cit: 241). 
Questions of 
"how well or badly [one] conducts [one's] 
life" (ibid) 
have no relevance to one's worth in such a society. 
So in this case, Rawlsian shame (understood as the 
response to a diminishment in one's sense of worth) is 
unintelligible, since the sense of worth operative 
here is independent from success or failure in 
conducting one's life in accordance with one's 
professed ideals. What is at stake, rather, is 
whether or not one's conduct is in keeping with 
someone of one's (fixed) status and associated worth. 
Indeed, one's worth may be determined absolutely, 
purely on the basis of one's allotted social position, 
in which case one's conduct has no bearing whatsoever 
on that worth. 
10.6 Shame and the body 
One important aspect of shame which the Rawlsian 
characterization, in its preoccupation with and 
emphasis on 'life-plans', leaves out, is shame of the 
body. As noted above, Ablamowicz's account highlights 
the significance of this. Not only in traditional 
societies but also in contemporary western society, 
discrimination on grounds of appearance persists. 16 
It is not acceptable to 'censor out' such elements of 
shame, simply because they cannot be accommodated 
within the model one wishes to construct. 
16cf the work of e. g. Goffman on stigma. 
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(b) Psychoanalytical Studies 
There are a number of reasons for the inclusion 
of selected psychoanalytical accounts of shame in this 
Chapter. " Psychoanalysis is a significantly 
different tradition from both philosophy and 
anthropology1' and the consideration of shame 
currently enjoys some prominence in this discipline 
(as indicated in both the Preface and the 
Introduction) . Its view of shame 
is thus an important 
one when attempting to gain an idea of contemporary 
academic understanding of this concept and the way in 
which such understanding may vary across disciplines. 
The way in which psychoanalytical studies will be 
incorporated in this study is twofold. Firstly, in 
this Chapter there will be a consideration of the 
current situation in the discipline with regard to the 
interpretation of shame, i. e. a descriptive account of 
shame according to selected practitioner/theorists 
will be given, followed by a comparison of such an 
account with the philosophical accounts already 
examined above. Secondly, in Chapter Three below, 
there will be some discussion of the evidential basis 
for the claims of psychoanalysts concerning shame 
(e. g. the question of its repression or denial); i. e. 
their data will be assessed. 
17and in Chapter Three below on the significance 
and value of shame. 
"However, historically psychoanalysis has been 
important in the anthropology of shame; as noted in 
the Introduction, both Mead's (op cit) and Benedict's 
(op cit) accounts are Freudian, and certain other 
cross-cultural studies of 'shame' (cf e. g. Epstein 
1984) employ an explicitly psychoanalytic model in 
their interpretations. There is also at least one 
paper on shame published in the Journal of Psycho- 
analytic Anthropology (cf Nachman 1984). 
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The 'phenomenological' descriptions of shame 
given by writers in the psychoanalytical tradition 
have, understandably, generally been situated within 
studies of clinical cases in which shame has been 
recognized as a significant element. Nonetheless, the 
discussion of shame's phenomenology tends to be very 
clearly delineated in such works. This facilitates 
the task of comparison with the conclusions of 
philosophical accounts, referred to in the previous 
paragraph (see section 15 below). 
As indicated in the Introduction, the founding 
father of psychoanalysis, Freud, paid little (if any 
serious) attention to shame, for reasons which have 
already been suggested and which will be explored 
below19 and as one writer notes: 
"Except for isolated contributions ..., the 
study of shame and of narcissistic phenomena 
remained, to a greater or lesser extent, on 
the sidelines for more than 30 years after 
Freud's death. " (Lansky 1995: 1079). 
It is not until the work of Erikson (1950) and Piers 
(1953) that shame begins to be overtly and extensively 
discussed in psychoanalytical writings, and Lansky 
identifies the work of Lewis (1971) as the point at 
which 
11[t]he reemergence of shame as a major and 
central focus of psychoanalytic thinking was 
ushered in ... " (ibid). 
Since then, there have been a number of significant 
psychoanalytical examinations of shame. A limited 
selection of these will be considered below. 20 
19A number of interpretations of Freud's own 
thoughts on shame will be presented in Chapter Three. 
20The accounts to be examined have been selected 
on the basis of their seminality or substantial 
furtherance of the understanding of shame. They are intended to represent the range of views of 
psychoanalytic thought on the subject, rather than 
comprise a comprehensive review of all the existing 
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Despite the chronological priority of Erikson's work, 
since the work of Rawls (op cit) clearly owes much to 
the understanding of shame elaborated by Piers (as 
will become evident), the latter's account will be 
taken as the starting point of this part. 
11. PIERS (1953,1971)21 
Piers identifies four different interpretations 
of shame: 1) as an affect or emotion; 2) as a neurotic 
symptom; 3) as a character trait and 4) as 
"a distinctly differentiated form of inner 
tension which as such is a normal 
concomitant of ego development and superego 
formation", at least in our 
culture. 23(1971: 18, emphasis added). 
It is shame in the latter sense with which Piers is 
concerned, and to which his structural definition, 
outlined below, refers. 
work on shame in this field, which is beyond the scope 
of the current study. 
21References are to the 1971 edition. 
22As an extensive discussion of the well-known 
Freudian concepts of ego, superego and ego-ideal is 
not possible here, a summary definition must suffice. 
The ego broadly corresponds to the individual 'self', 
the superego represents an internalized authority 
(usually deriving from parental influence) regulating 
the ego, while the ego-ideal, as the term suggests, 
represents an idealized model or image of behaviour, 
character etc., again deriving from an external source 
(possibly, but not necessarily, parental), to which 
the ego aspires. According to Piers, the concept of 
ego-ideal is closely implicated in shame, and as such 
will be explored more fully below. 
"It is clear from this passage that Piers 
recognizes the potential cultural relativity of the 
nature of shame, a recognition which sets him apart 
from many of his contemporaries writing about shame. 
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11.1 The structure of shame 
According to Piers: 
"Shame arises out of a tension between the 
ego and the ego ideal" (ibid: 23). 
At this point, therefore, it is clearly necessary to 
consider the concept of ego ideal in more detail. 
11.1.1 The ego ideal 
"The ego ideal represents the sum of the 
positive identifications with the parental 
images. Both the loving, the reassuring 
parent, the parent who explicitly and 
implicitly gives the permission to become 
like him, and the narcissistically expecting 
parent and the parent who imposes his own 
unobtained ideals on the child may be 
represented here. " (ibid: 26, original 
emphasis) 
In addition to these parental identifications are 
those formed later in life: 
". . the ego ideal contains layers of later identifications, more superficial ... and 
more subject to change than the earlier 
ones, but of the greatest social importance. 
.. It is important to recognize that the images that go into the formation of this 
part of the ego ideal do not have to be 
parental ones at all. The sibling group and 
the peer group are much more significant. " 
(ibid: 27, original emphasis) 
A further aspect of the ego ideal is that it contains 
the "goals" of the ego's drive towards mastery (ibid) 
and it 
"is in continuous dynamic interfunction with 
the unconscious and conscious awareness of 
the ego's potentialities. "(ibid, original 
emphasis). 
11.1.2 Shame as failure 
This concept of ego ideal, particularly in its 
latter aspect, thus explains the characterization of 
shame as 
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"that particular inner tension which stems 
from failure to reach one's own 
potentialities. ", 
arising 
"whenever goals ar 




and is associated with 
id images presented by the 
reached. "(ibid: 28). 
a real 'shortcoming"' 
failure (ibid) . 
"I 
11.1.3. Shame and contempt 
In addition, the anxiety in shame derives from 
the threat of abandonment: 
"Behind the feeling of shame stands ... the fear of contempt which, on an even deeper 
level of the unconscious, spells fear of 
abandonment ... this anxiety ... draws its terror from the earlier established and 
probably ubiquital separation anxiety. " 
(ibid: 29) 
This fear manifests itself later in the developmental 
sequence as fear 
"not ... of active punishment by superiors 
. but social expulsion, like ostracism., ' (ibid). 
12. ERIKSON (1950: 1965)25 
In Erikson's developmental schema, he identifies 
"Eight Ages of Man", each of which is characterized by 
a pair of polarized concepts, one positive and one 
negative. In the context of this schema, his 
discussion of shame is as the opposing concept to 
24This structural definition of shame thus clearly 
represents possibly the most significant influence on 
the characterization of shame outlined by Rawls (op 
cit). 
25References are to the revised edition. 
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autonomy. It is also coupled with the concept of 
doubt. 
The potential for shame arises, according to 
Erikson, around the time when an infant learns to 
stand upright unaided, due to "muscular maturation" 
(243). This acquisition of a degree of autonomy is 
increased due to the fact that a greater degree of 
manipulative control over his or her environment is 
also achieved at this time (ibid). However, this 
upright stance and muscular control also open the way 
for the associated experience of frustration and shame 
both at the inability to exercise control, and 
particularly at the child's relative smallness in 
comparison with large adults (ibid: 244-245). One 
sphere of life in which these two issues are 
experienced keenly is apparently that of bowel 
training. As Thrane notes, 
"It is at this stage that the child begins 
to dread parental disgust and his own lack 
of self-control. " (op cit: 150) 
Thus, according to Erikson: 
"This stage ... becomes decisive for the 
ratio of love and hate, cooperation and 
wilfulness, freedom of self-expression and 
its suppression. From a sense of self- 
control without loss of self-esteem comes a 
lasting sense of good will and pride; from 
a sense of loss of self-control and of 
foreign overcontrol comes a lasting 
propensity for doubt and shame. " (1960: 245- 
246). 
13. LEWIS (1971, 
As noted above, Lewis' work on shame represents 
a watershed in the psychoanalytical discussion of the 
topic; it might almost be said that she `rediscovered' 
shame for psychoanalysis. She too recognizes that 
there is more than one conceptualization of shame: it 
is both an affect and a motive of behaviour (63). In 
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the former, the emphasis is on the affective aspect of 
the phenomenon; in the latter, it is on the cognitive 
aspect (65). However, it is shame according to the 
first interpretation with which her work is primarily 
concerned. 
Her major thesis is that shame is ubiquitous in 
therapeutic sessions, but that in the majority of 
cases, it is not identified by the person experiencing 
it. This difficulty in the identification of shame, 
Lewis suggests, is a manifestation of the denial of 
shame (196), which is one of three defining 
characteristics of the phenomenon. The others are: 
"reduction of the self both in size and in 
efficiency of functioning" (197); 
and 
"difficulty in the discharge of hostility. " 
(198). 
Each of these three aspects will be considered in 
turn. 
13.1 Shame and denial" 
There are two aspects to the denial of shame, 
amounting to two different 'types' of shame 
experience. 27 According to Lewis, which of these 
variants prevails depends on the degree of 
"availability or overtness of affect" 
(ibid). 
13.1.1 "Overt, unidentified shame" (ibid: 197) 
26The significance of the denial of shame will be 
discussed further below, in Chapter Three. 
27This is not to suggest that Lewis considers 
there to be more than one 'kind' of shame, in the 
sense in which Taylor (op cit) denies, merely that the 
mode in which it is experienced varies. 
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In this experience, as the term suggests, the 
shame affect is overtly experienced (as verifiable by 
observation by another of various 'markers' of 
shame28), yet the subject is unable or unwilling to 
recognize it as such. 
13.1.2 "By-passed" shame (ibid) 
By contrast, in "by-passed" shame the subject 
"is aware of the cognitive content of shame- 
connected events" (ibid) 
yet does not, as would be expected in the face of such 
appropriate "antecedent events" (cf Mesquita & Frijda 
op cit), experience the emotion of shame at all, 
except to register awareness in consciousness of a 
""wince, ' 'blow' or 'jolt . "' (ibid). 
13.2 Shame and the self 
The involvement of the self in the experience of 
shame is perhaps its most significant characteristic. 
Such involvement is two-fold: first, the self is 
always the focus of the cognitive content of shame, 
which emphasizes "the varieties of deficiencies of the 
self. " (86) ; second, the functioning of the self is 
disrupted due to its perception and experience as 
small, weak and incapable. 
13.3 Discharge of hostility 
28These markers include behavioural indicators 
(both verbal and non-verbal), such as stammering, 
hesitant, or inaudible speech, avoidance of eye- 
contact etc. together with evidence in the content of 
what is said by the client of any characteristic 
feature of shame experience (outlined in more detail 
below, see subsection 14.4). 
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According to Lewis, 
"Shame evokes retaliatory rage at the 
'other' or at the witness [i. e., the one who 
has directed the self's negative attention 
towards itself], but since it is shame-rage, 
hostility is quickly directed back upon the 
self ... " 
(198) 
In shame, the reason for hostility is the self's 
deficiencies, thus the self is both the source and the 
target of that hostility (87). The co-existence of 
positive feelings (i. e. valuation of the self and the 
other) alongside the negative feelings of humiliation 
and rage, again towards both the other and the self 
(all of which is characteristic of the ambivalence 
inherent in every shame experience), makes the 
discharge of hostility extremely difficult if not 
impossible (ibid, 198). 
13.4 Characteristics of shame 
The three categories identified above cover the 
general characteristics of shame. Within these three 
categories, a number of more detailed characteristics 
can be identified, e. g.: 
a) concern for the opinion of others: 
H the consciousness of something 
dishonoring, ridiculous or indecorous about 
oneself requires the existence of what James 
(1890) called a 'judging companion'. But 
the self must share the 'other's' standard 
of judgment if shame is to be felt. " (64); 
thus, 
b) "The question of personal responsibility is 
unclear": 
since 
"the self is not directly and not solely 
responsible for its own feeling of 
disgrace. " (ibid) ; 
c) the boundaries of the self are indistinct: 
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"... shame can be experienced for someone 
else ... " (ibid) ; 
d) it is thus also unclear whether the source of shame 
is strictly the self, or the other (65). 
e) shame involves a reduction in the dignity or status 
of the self (68); 
f) it also involves failure in the functioning of the 
self (ibid); 
g) shame is triggered by multiple stimuli which may be 
"one's own aggressions" ('moral' shame) or 
"a defeat, disappointment, or failure" 
('nonmoral' shame) (84); 
h) in shame, 
"the content or [sic] consciousness is 
likely to be about the sense of identity. " 
(86) ; 
i) resolution of, or defence against, shame tends to 
be effected by personal achievement (89). 
14. WURMSER (19 81) 
Echoing Lewis (whose work, interestingly, he 
nowhere cites), Wurmser considers shame, though 
neglected, to be a highly significant, if often 
hidden, element in therapeutic encounters: 
11 ... the clinical significance of shame seems 
paramount. Not only are shame affects 
directly observed and expressed in therapy, 
but, even more pervasively, they appear in 
veiled form. " (27) 
14.1 Three 'types' of shame 
Wurmser, like his predecessors, identifies a 
variety of possible interpretations of shame, as for 
example an affect, character trait, symptom etc. (49), 
but within his phenomenological study (Chapter 2 
passim) concludes that there are "three major 
phenomenological types of shame. " (49). These are: 
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1) " .. anxiety about something 
impending - 
shame anxiety"; 
2) "... a reaction about something that has already 
occurred - shame affect in the narrower 
sense"; and 
3) "... a character attitude that should 
prevent the other two -a shame attitude" 
(ibid). 
Of these, the first two clearly represent what 
Taylor (op cit) refers to as forward-looking and 
backward-looking shame, while the third is less to do 
with shame affect and more dispositional. a' 
14.1.1 Shame anxiety 
"Shame is a specific form of anxiety evoked 
by the imminent danger of unexpected 
exposure, humiliation, and rejection. " 
(1981: 49) 
In this form, shame primarily functions as a warning 
to the self that what may at present be a situation in 
which only mild rejection is implicit, has the 
potential to become one in which there is scope for 
humiliation of "traumatic proportions". (50) 
14.1.2. Shame proper 
According to Wurmser, 
"This complex affect is clearly the center 
of the entire range of shame affects. " 
(ibid). 
It follows the actual exposure of whatever it is in 
the self which is regarded by that self as weakness, 
and 
29cf Schneider (1977) on "discretion-shame" (see 
Chapter Three below. 
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"entails self-condemnation and attempts 
somehow to expiate the disgrace incurred, 
both to wipe out the stain and to prevent 
further degradation. " (ibid). 
14.1.3. Shame attitude 
This dispositional manifestation of shame acts as 
a protective and preventive measure against the 
encounter of situations or engagement in activities 
which are likely to lead to shame anxiety or shame 
affect proper. It is "a rigid defense structure built 
into the character" (ibid) which ensures that an 
individual will avoid finding him or herself in such 
circumstances. 
14.2 Bipolarity of shame 
In addition to these three 'divisions' of shame, 
Wurmser further identifies its "bipolar" nature. i. e., 
shame typically has two aspects: 
1) the "object Dole" ("the factor in front of 
which one is ashamed" [43, original 
emphasis]) and 
2) the "subject pole" ("the aspect of which one 
is ashamed" [ibid, original emphasis]); 
in other words, the judge and the content. 
The former 
"is originally always a person; later it is 
an inner representative of such a person, 
usually vested in the superego. " (44). 
The latter in turn has three aspects: a shameful 
action, its consequences and 
"its reflection on the whole acting person" 
(ibid). 
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14.3 Content of shame 
This revolves round a typical set of issues: 
1) weakness of the self or failure of the self in 
competition (27); 
2) dirtiness of the self and disgust with the self; 
3) defectiveness of the self (mental or physical); 
4) loss of self-control (emotional or physical) 
(28). 
More specifically, these include: 
a) sexual exposure (32); 
b) failure to achieve (ibid); 
C) character faults (33); 
d) cowardice (34) ; 
e) giving up on an undertaking (37); 
f) failure "to fulfill expectations vested in a 
certain self-image held by [the] self" (40) . 
14.4 Discharge of shame 
Shame, once experienced, can be alleviated by a 
number of strategies. These include: 
1) "turning passive into active by showing 
another person as ridiculous and 
contemptible instead of oneself" (28); 
2) self-aggrandizement, to oneself or others 
(ibid) ; 
3) "provoking humiliation (externalization)" 
(ibid). 
This latter strategy may take the form of 
creating life-situations in which the experience of 
shame before actual others is inevitable. It is 
regarded as a defence against the allegedly more 
painful "internalized shame" which occurs when the 
object-pole of shame has been introjected by the self 
(45). 
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15. Comparison with philosophical accounts 
It can be seen from the foregoing that there are 
a number of points on which the philosophical 
characterization of shame outlined in the first part 
of this Chapter and the psychoanalytical accounts just 
described resemble one another. 
15.1 Failure 
As indicated in footnote 24 above, perhaps the 
most striking similarity is that between the Rawlsian 
characterization of shame as failure to meet the 
self's ideals or standards (cf Rawls, Richards, 
Thrane) and Piers's conception of shame as failure to 
reach the ego ideal's goals and images (op cit: 28), 
which is echoed particularly by Wurmser (op cit: 40; 
see subsection 14.3 (f) above). However, there are 
other resonances. 
15.2 Contempt/ostracism and concern for others' 
opinion 
It will be remembered that Rawls' conception of 
self-worth is that it is partly dependent on the good 
opinion of one's associates and that withdrawal of 
this is an occasion for shame (op cit: 440-442). This 
is similar to Piers' claim that shame involves the 
fear of contempt and/or "social expulsion" (op cit: 28) 
and Wurmser's identification of shame as anxiety 
signalling imminent rejection (op cit: 49). The 
concern for the opinion of others is also reflected in 
Lewis (op cit: 64). There is dispute however, as to 
whether shame entails concurrence between the self's 
and the other's standard of judgment (ibid). Some 
philosophers argue that it does (e. g. Thrane op cit) 
while Taylor (op cit) makes a strong case for the view 
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that it does not (echoed by e. g. Deigh [op cit] and 
Heller [op cit]). 
15.3 Autonomy and self-control 
Erikson's central claim is that shame stems from 
the lack of self-control and autonomy. Richards (op 
cit) refers to shame as resulting from failure of the 
self's competence, for example in controlling 
appetites and in "lack of mastery in execution" (253). 
The same idea is expressed by Lewis (op cit: 68) and 
Wurmser (op cit: 28). Thrane also emphasizes the 
significance of the lack of autonomy as a major source 
of shame (op cit: 152-153). 30 
15.4 Responsibility 
The question of the part played by personal 
responsibility in shame appears to be primarily a 
preoccupation of contemporary philosophers" and is 
30Thrane correctly points out that "exploration of 
the reasons for th[e] desirability [of autonomy] has 
not been common in analytic philosophy. 11 (ibid) . He further claims that "To lose autonomy is always 
shameful; autonomy is part of dignity. " (ibid). 
However, his assumption that autonomy is a supreme 
human value is questionable. There may be cultures in 
which autonomy and individuality are seen as 
aberrations from the norm and where the values of 
equality and sameness are emphasized (Rosaldo [1983] 
claims that the Ilongot are such a culture). Such 
questions can only be decided empirically. The error 
is in taking a particular culture's preoccupation and 
elevating it to the status of a necessary condition of 
shame. This is similar to O' Hear' s point about the 
importance of public reputation in some cultures and 
the subsequent mistaking of this as an essential 
element in shame (see subsection 4.1 above, p. 2I ). 
31This preoccupation with the attribution of fault 
or blame appears to be ubiquitous in 'western' culture 
(cf Metge 1986: 33) and like that of autonomy is one of 
the potential sources of fundamental misunderstanding 
about the nature of shame across cultures. There will 
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not extensively discussed in the psychoanalytical 
writings considered, with the exception of Lewis, who 
agrees that 
" ... the self 
is not directly and not solely 
responsible for its own feeling of 
disgrace. " (op cit: 64). 
15.5 Reduction in status/self esteem 
The Rawlsian identification of damage to self 
esteem as intrinsic in shame is (despite its 
contention by e. g. Deigh) supported by Lewis (op 
cit: 68), although she does not similarly elevate it to 
the status of the defining characteristic. 
15.6 Identity 
Like Thrane, Lewis notes that 
"the content or [sic] consciousness is 
likely to be about the sense of identity. " 
(op cit: 86). 
15.7 Discharge/resolution of shame 
In respect of the ways in which a person 
experiencing shame deals with it in order to resume 
normal functioning, there is a considerably greater 
variety of strategies identified by the psychoanalysts 
than the philosophers. The latter are almost 
unanimous in the view that replacing failure with 
success is the only means by which shame may be 
overcome. However, as is indicated by Ablamowicz and 
others (cf footnote 10), several options are in fact 
available and adopted by different people in different 
circumstances. Thus, although (like the Rawlsian 
accounts) Lewis limits her view of the only effective 
be some further limited discussion of the notion of 
responsibility in Chapter Three below. 
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"defence against" shame to "personal achievement" (op 
cit: 89), Wurmser emphasizes the expression of contempt 
for another (often the person(s) originally 
responsible for shaming the individual) as a 
particularly common reaction to being shamed. The 
expression of rage or aggression (although, as Lewis 
points out, often directed back against the self) is 
also generally agreed as a means of discharging shame 
(cf Epstein op cit). 
16. Summary of the characteristics of shame 
At this stage, it is possible to review the 
preceding accounts and thus arrive at a summary of the 
defining characteristics of shame as it is understood 
by many modern thinkers: 
1) It has an intimate relationship with one's sense 
of self or identity; 
2) It is occasioned by the belief or the perception 
of a discrepancy between what 'ought to be' and what 
, is, in terms of that self; more specifically by 
failure to meet standards, ideals or values, whether 
imposed on the self by the self (most often) or by 
others (less commonly); 
3) It thus always entails a negative self- 
assessment; 
4) The result of such an assessment is a sense of 
damaged or reduced self-esteem; 
5) It involves the idea of (the possibility of) 
'being seen'-from another's (i. e. an objective) point 
of view; 
6) It is not related to ideas about responsibility, 
i. e. it can be felt for things which it is not within 
one's power to alter, or which one played no personal 
part in bringing about. 
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17. Summary and Conclusion 
This Chapter has surveyed the (loosely) 
'phenomenological' accounts of shame of certain 
contemporary Western philosophers and psychoanalysts. 
The content of these has been 'reduced' to give a 
description of the fundamental features of shame, 
which has been subjected to various criticisms. Such 
criticisms, especially those of Deigh (op cit), while 
valid, are nonetheless themselves directed towards 
establishing a definition of shame which can encompass 
every aspect of this concept. Such an attempt, while 
valuable as a corrective to a too-narrow view such as 
Rawls', is itself misplaced. In showing that there is 
an important connection between the conceptualization 
of identity, worth and thus shame and the organization 
and values of the wider society, Deigh has already 
(implicitly) indicated that understandings of shame 
generated in one culture are unlikely to lend 
themselves to universalization. The lesson to be 
drawn from highlighting such defects in the Rawlsian 
(read 'twentieth century western`) characterization of 
shame, then, is that rather than seeking to determine 
a universal structural definition, which embraces 
every possible manifestation of shame, attention 
should be paid to elaborating the ways in which 
differences in social structures and cultural values 
are reflected in differences in shame experiences and 
in their understanding. 
This is precisely what is argued by those 
researchers who take a 'social constructionist' 
viewpoint in studying emotions, whose approach will be 
examined in Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
'SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM': 'SHAME' IN CONTEXT 
As noted in the previous chapter, to search for 
the 'eidos' of shame is regarded by some as a 
misdirection of effort, given the evident relationship 
between aspects of the broader sociocultural context 
in which shame occurs and the way in which it is 
interpreted (as suggested by examples such as 
Deigh's). The general consensus among those who are 
attempting to furnish a more sociological account of 
shame is that emotional experience does not occur in 
a vacuum but is influenced in important ways by such 
contextual factors; however, the extent of this 
influence is a matter for debate. 
1. Method and structure 
In what follows, a brief outline of the social 
constructionist perspective as it is formulated at a 
metatheoretical level will first be given, drawing on 
a number of sources, then its specific implications 
for the study of emotions will be considered. An 
attempt will also be made to show its potential value 
as an approach in the comparative analysis of emotion 
concepts. A survey of a selection of ethnographic 
accounts of variations in the self-construct of a 
number of cultures will be made and the implications 
of these for the nature of 'shame' will be considered, 
together with an example of the application of a 
constructionist perspective in an account of the 
concept of 'shame' in another culture. The validity 
of the social constructionist approach will be 
assessed in the concluding section. 
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2. General theory 
At its most fundamental level, social 
constructionism is concerned with questioning 
assumptions about the foundation and nature of 
knowledge in general. It rejects both the empiricist 
conception of knowledge as a reflection of an 
objectively existent 'real world', obtained by 
induction and verified by reference to the senses, and 
the rationalist conception according to which 
knowledge is fashioned by the cognitive capacities 
(thought, categorization, 'information processing') of 
human individuals. It seeks to transcend the dualism 
of such conceptions and substitute a view of knowledge 
as generated in the process of social intercourse, as 
"not something people possess somewhere in 
their heads, but rather, something people do 
together" (Gergen, 1985: 270). 
If 'knowledge' is thus seen as a social artifact, 
produced in specific historical and cultural 
circumstances, then its sources become potential 
objects of sociological, historical and 
anthropological enquiry. 
Such a radically different conception of 
knowledge is inevitably resistant to acceptance. As 
Gergen notes, 
"The investments in and sense of security 
fostered by the enduring traditions are 
profound. " (ibid, 272). 
In particular, whilst social constructionism 
challenges the criteria by reference to which 
empiricism 'verifies facts about the world' (regarding 
"so-called 'reports of one's experience' 
[as] linguistic constructions guided and 
shaped by historically contingent 
conventions of discourse" [ibid]), 
it does not itself provide alternative criteria by 
which the 'truth' may be established. Indeed, it 
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calls into question the concept of 'truth' itself, 
this being seen as whatever the participants in the 
discourse giving rise to 'knowledge' agree counts as 
'truth' at any given time. Social constructionism is 
thus a relativistic theory and as such is subject to 
the usual criticisms of relativism. This is another 
reason for potentially widespread rejection of its 
claims. However, whilst it does not offer an 
alternative account of the objectively valid 
foundations of knowledge, if the demand for such 
foundations can be suspended, a social constructionist 
perspective can nonetheless be valuable and furnish 
interesting and thought-provoking accounts of 
phenomena in many domains of enquiry. One such domain 
is that of human emotion. 
3. The social construction of emotions. 
In the field of psychology, the theory concerning 
the social construction of emotions is but one aspect 
of a more general view of individual experience, and 
'mental' concepts in particular, as irreducibly social 
in origin. A seminal work propounding such a view is 
that of Mead (1934) and the philosophical 
investigations of Wittgenstein (1953) and his 
successors into the relationships between social 
circumstances and subjective phenomena such as 
intentions, motives, thoughts etc., manifest the same 
preoccupations. 
It is particularly important when considering the 
specific application of a social constructionist 
perspective to issues in psychology, to note that it 
not only offers an explanation of how different 
conceptualizations, theories and analytical tools are 
generated and developed in accordance with specific 
historical and cultural contexts but goes beyond this 
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to claim that the subject matter of psychology itself 
derives from social sources. 
To understand the precise meaning of such a claim 
with regard to emotions, it is necessary to summarize 
the main propositions of the social constructionist 
theory of emotions. 
There are six major claims made by 
constructionist theory concerning emotional 
experience: 
a) Emotions are cognitive phenomena, that is, they 
can be characterized as involving a complex of 
attitudes comprising beliefs, evaluations and desires. 
b) Such attitudes are not natural and innate, but 
are acquired during socialization into a particular 
culture, i. e., they are learned, and their specific 
content is determined by the cultural beliefs and 
values of the community. 
c) Contrary to the common view that emotion 
attitudes and emotion 'feeling' (taken to be, 
variously, a physiological disturbance, a bodily or a 
mental sensation) are two ontologically distinct and 
sequential aspects of emotional experience, the 
attitudes in terms of which an emotion may be 
characterized are themselves constitutive of emotion 
'feeling', which is thus determined by sociocultural 
factors. 
d) Not only are the emotion attitudes which 
constitute emotion feeling learned, so too is an 
individual's particular emotional response to a given 
event or situation dependent on having learned to 
interpret such events/situations as warranting that 
emotion. Moreover, the correctly-learned 
interpretation of an event/situation not only warrants 
but also requires the individual to respond with the 
appropriate emotion; the experience of particular 
74 
emotions in specific circumstances is therefore 
prescribed by the community. 
e) Emotions thus have a sociocultural function, 
i. e., 
"the possession of culturally appropriate 
emotions serves to restrain undesirable 
attitudes and behaviour, and to sustain and 
endorse cultural values. " (Armon-Jones 
1986: 34) 
f) Emotions, being cognitive and involving 
culturally learned attitudes, are amenable to 
evaluation on grounds of rationality; furthermore, by 
implication, individuals can be held responsible for 
their emotions (ibid). 
3.1 Methodological considerations 
The way in which emotions are conceptualized has 
important implications for the way in which they 
should be studied. Contrary to the 'traditional' view 
of emotions as 'inner states' of individuals (cf e. g. 
Heelas 1984: 23; Needham 1981: 76) and thus as entities 
to be abstracted in order to study them (Harre 
1986: 4)1, constructionist theory holds that emotions 
are (variously) "syndromes", or "transitory social 
roles" (Averill 1980: 305) or at least, cognitive 
processes comprising a number of component elements 
(Mesquita and Frijda 1992: 179). According to Averill, 
such 'syndromes' are 
"organized set[s] of responses (behavioral, 
physiological, and/or cognitive)" and 
". no single response is a necessary or 
sufficient condition for the entire 
syndrome, although some kinds of responses 
may be more typical of an emotional syndrome 
than are other kinds of responses. " (Averill 
1985: 98) 
1 The methodological difficulties to which such a 
view gives rise have been considered elsewhere (Reynolds 1989: 33-34). 
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A further aspect of the view of emotions taken by 
constructionists is that they have a strategic 
function. As Harre notes: 
"They play roles in forms of action. And 
actions occur in situations. "(op cit: 12). 
The multi-faceted nature of emotions thus viewed 
therefore necessitates looking beyond the individual 
to the "concrete world of contexts and activities" 
(ibid: 4) in which emotions occur. It is this belief 
in the fundamental importance of context, and the 
close attention thus paid to it in studying any 
particular emotion, which distinguishes social 
constructionism from the 'phenomenological' approach 
illustrated in Chapter One. 
At this point, it is necessary to examine each of 
the major constructionist claims in considerably more 
detail. A critique, and assessment of social 
constructionism's adequacy as a theory of emotions, 
will be made at the end of this Chapter (see Section 
6 below). 
3.2 Emotions as cognitions, 
The claim that emotions are cognition-based is, 
of course, not unique to social constructionism. As 
indicated in the Introduction, in both psychology and 
philosophy, the idea that emotions are not merely 
simple, natural, involuntary affective states, but 
involve cognitive factors such as beliefs, judgements 
and desires (which together comprise the attitudes 
associated with various emotions), did not gain ground 
until the later part of the 1970s (cf Solomon op 
cit). 
2 However, the now accepted validity of such a 
2 There were, however, earlier significant 
contributions towards establishing a cognitive theory 
of emotions, e. g. Arnold 1960; Lazarus 1966. 
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of such a view provides the foundation on which the 
constructionists' particular claims for the role of 
attitudes in emotions are based (see subsection 3.4.3 
below). 
3.3 The acquisition of emotion attitudes. 
The claim that the attitudes involved in emotions 
are learned rather than innate, and that their content 
depends on the particular norms, customs, values etc. 
of the relevant cultural community, can be supported 
in the following way: the belief that climbing a 
virtually sheer rockface is dangerous may be natural. 
However, the judgement that to do so is therefore 
foolish is not. Suppose a community regards attempts 
by individuals to accomplish dangerous feats as 
indicative of personal qualities regarded as 
commendable (e. g. courage, endurance, physical prowess 
etc. ) Suppose too that the possession of such 
qualities entitles an individual to a particular 
status or position of power within the community. 
Given this context, such attempts would presumably be 
evaluated as wise (if only for certain categories of 
community members) rather than foolish. 
3.4 The constitution of emotion 'feeling' by 
attitudes. 
The idea that emotion 'feeling' is itself 
constituted by the relevant attitudes involved in 
emotional experience is perhaps the aspect of social 
constructionist theory which is most resistant to 
acceptance. Whilst acknowledging the possible 
validity of other constructionist claims, many persist 
in holding a more traditional view of the nature of 
such feeling. Thus, before attempting to explain the 
constructionist claim concerning the constitution of 
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emotion 'feeling', the conventionally-held views must 
first be outlined. 
341 Emotion 'feeling' as an inner cruale. 
The idea that in every emotional experience there 
is an element which is both individual and subjective, 
and phenomenally distinct from the attitudes in terms 
of which the emotion is conceptualized, is widely held 
(cf Arnold op cit). Precisely what this quale 
consists in and how it differs from a physiological 
response (which will be discussed below), and thus how 
it may be adequately represented conceptually, is not 
clear. However, it is believed to be an aspect of an 
emotion which is independent of all other emotional 
'components'. 
3.4.2 Emotion 'feeling' as a vhysioloaical 
disturbance 
It is evident that many emotional experiences 
involve a physiological response (the release of 
hormones, e. g. adrenalin; an increase in heartrate; 
perspiration etc. ) which are unquestionably biological 
and thus viewed as 'natural'. The way such 
physiological disturbances are consciously 'felt' by 
the individual experiencing the emotion leads some (cf 
e. g. Perkins 1966) to the perception that such 
disturbances are the essential emotion feeling. 
Either of the above views, if accurate, poses 
problems for social constructionist theory, given its 
claim that not only some (e. g. attitudes) but all 
components of an emotional experience are constituted 
socioculturally. Firstly, if there is a realm of 
emotion feeling which is ontologically distinct from 
the other aspects of emotion (attitudes, expression 
etc. ), it is not clear how such a realm could 
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intelligibly be said to be influenced by sociocultural 
factors. Secondly, if emotion feeling is equated with 
physiological responses, understood as natural, it is 
again unclear how such responses could be construed as 
socioculturally constituted. Even if it be accepted 
that there is a causal relationship between 
socioculturally constituted attitudes and resulting 
physiological changes, and that thus emotion 'feeling' 
is indirectly affected by cultural factors, this is 
not the same as the claim that emotion feeling is 
itself constituted by emotion attitudes, which is what 
constructionism maintains. 
3.4.3 The constructionist characterization of emotion 
'feeling' 
If neither an inner quale nor a physiological 
disturbance constitutes the 'feeling' element in any 
emotion, what convincing alternative account of such 
'feeling' might constructionism substitute? The 
requirement of constructionism, in order to furnish 
such an account, is to demonstrate that neither qualia 
nor physiological disturbances are necessary 
components of a 'felt' emotion. 
3.4.3.1. Inner crualia and behavioural expression 
Armon-Jones (op cit: 47-48) cites Wittgenstein on 
joy (1981: 487; 1980: 151) in order to support the idea 
that emotion terms, whilst nonetheless having a 
referent, designate neither "inner feeling" nor 
"outward behaviour". According to Wittgenstein, both 
,, the thoughts of happiness" and the behavioural 
expression of joy constitute joyful feeling. Where 
Armon-Jones takes issue with him is in his apparent 
emphasis on the latter aspect. She maintains it is 
possible to 'feel' an emotion whilst giving it no 
external expression whatsoever. All this requires is 
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that the agent entertain the relevant attitudes. 
Suppose I have for some time been hoping for promotion 
in my career. My boss tells me I have been selected 
for a newly-created senior position. What might my 
thoughts be on such an occasion? I believe I am good 
at my job and I evaluate my superiors' decision as 
indicating that others recognize my competence. I 
desire to hold a more responsible and demanding post. 
I am thus delighted (and moreover, proud). In this 
case, the attitudes identified above constitute my 
feelings of delight and pride. I can ascribe these 
emotions to myself purely on the basis of the content 
of my beliefs, judgements and desires, without needing 
to demonstrate my delight even with a smile. There is 
thus a distinction between emotions which are 'overtly 
expressed' and those which are 'covertly entertained' 
(Armon-Jones op cit: 48). Moreover, my delight having 
thus been shown to consist in my possessing the 
relevant attitudes, there is no need to postulate the 
existence of an inner quale to which my delight 
refers. 
3.4.3.11 Physiological response 
Thus far, the constructionist argument that 
neither an inner quale nor any kind of outward 
behaviour are themselves necessary for the attribution 
of emotion feeling, has been outlined. Returning to 
the persistent idea that some physiological 
disturbance or bodily feeling is intrinsic to the 
experience of a 'felt' emotion, a similar argument is 
made. 
Just as in the example above, my feeling 
delighted did not require me to express my delight, so 
too is it possible that I did not find my heart 
beating faster, tremble, feel warm or 'glowing', etc. 
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on hearing the news of my promotion (all of which 
physical responses are commonly associated with 
delight, joy, happiness etc. - cf Wallbott and Scherer 
1988)3. 
3.4.3.111 Intensity of emotional experience 
It might be objected that where such responses 
are lacking, the individual concerned is not actually 
feeling the alleged emotion (cf Perkins op cit). 
Against such an objection, constructionists would 
argue that whether or not a physical response features 
in an emotional experience depends on the intensity of 
that experience. (There are degrees of emotional 
feeling; one can be extremely happy ['euphoric'] or 
merely mildly pleased. ) It might also be argued that 
physiological factors are more typical in 'acute 
episodes' of emotion than in 'chronic emotional 
states'. Thus, the best man at a wedding reception, 
the moment he discovers he has forgotten his speech, 
may well blush, stammer etc. in embarrassment, whereas 
someone with an enduring sense of social anxiety, 
while experiencing the same 'symptoms' when in 
company, will nonetheless be relatively free of 
physiological disturbances most of the time (albeit 
displaying certain non-physical tendencies, such as 
avoidance etc). 
In essence, the objection referred to above 
implies that only an intensely-experienced emotion 
3 Indeed, cross-cultural studies of emotion indicate that cultures differ in the degree of 
attention (if any) given to physiological responses 
and the frequency with which they are mentioned in 
reports of emotional experience (cf Mesquita and 
Frijda op cit : 190) . This appears to support the claim that such responses are not necessary components of an 
emotion. 
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qualifies as a 'felt' emotion. But constructionists 
maintain that 
"'being intensely felt' is not a defining 
feature of emotion feeling. " (Armon-Jones op 
cit 51) 
Nor is it even necessarily true that intensely-felt 
emotions always involve a physical response. For an 
emotion to be described as 'intense', all that is 
required is that the attitudes involved are 
sufficiently powerful: the beliefs, judgements and 
desires must be clear and occurrent, genuine, firmly 
held and they must 
"greatly or totally preoccupy the agent's 
attention" (ibid: 49). 
3.4.3. iv Summary 
The following thus summarizes the constructionist 
perspective on the constitution of emotion feeling: 
a) The expression of an emotion is not necessary for 
its experience; 
b) Emotions can be characterized in terms of 
attitudes ("thoughts", i. e. beliefs, judgements, 
desires), without reference to an inner quale; 
c) A physiological response is not a necessary 
feature of an emotional experience; 
d) It is the intensity of an emotion which 
influences the degree of physiological response 
involved (but intensity of emotional experience still 
need not involve the latter, so long as the relevant 
attitudes are "vivid", "serious" and "consuming" 
(ibid]), and a non-intense emotion is still an 
emotion; 
e) An 'acute episode' of any emotion is more likely 
to involve a physical response, whereas a 'chronic 
state' of an emotion is less likely to involve such a 
response. 
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3.5 The cultural pre- and proscription of emotions and 
the sociocultural functions of emotions 
The constructionist claim that cultures demand 
that certain emotions be felt by their members in 
given circumstances (and that conversely, the feeling 
and expression of other emotions are prohibited) is 
related to the claim that emotions have sociocultural 
functions. 4 There are two possible ways in which an 
emotion may be conceived of as socioculturally 
functional: firstly, 
. It ... the emotion can 
be defined as 
intrinsically functional in that it depends 
for its existence upon its serving a social 
function. " (Armon-Jones 1986b: 61); 
secondly: 
"... it is an aspect of the emotion that it 
serves a social function. " (ibid). 
Clearly, these represent a strong and a weaker 
version of the claim that emotions serve sociocultural 
functions. The former radical interpretation does not 
allow for any other explanation of an emotion's 
existence than a functional one; the latter does allow 
for such complementary explanations and may therefore 
be more acceptable. As Averill notes: 
"... it is true that most persons do not 
become emotional in order to fulfill some 
social obligation. ... any specific episode 
of anger, love, fear, hope, pride etc., may 
meet no social need. But if on the average, 
or over the long run, such emotional 
syndromes conform to social norms, then 
their net result will be functional within 
the social system. " (1980: 337). 
4This is distinguished from the idea that emotions 
have a function for the individual, e. g. survival, as 
was proposed by e. g. Darwin. Cf Averill: 
I' ... the emotions are not remnants of 
previously serviceable habits, as Darwin 
maintained. Rather, they are presently 
serviceable ... " (1980: 337) 
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The functions of emotions suggested by 
constructionists are endorsement and maintenance of 
cultural systems of belief and value, regulation of 
socially undesirable behaviour and 
"the promotion of attitudes which reflect 
and endorse the interrelated religious, 
political, moral, aesthetic and social 
practices of a society. " (ibid: 57)5 
It is because emotions have such functions that 
they are regulated by the culture, i. e. approved or 
disapproved, stipulated or forbidden, encouraged or 
discouraged. 6 The means by which their feeling and 
expression in the correct circumstances is ensured is 
through the process of 'emotional training', during 
which the requisite attitudes involved in emotions are 
learnt by members of a culture as they are generally 
inducted into the belief, value and norm systems of 
that culture (see subsection 3.3 above). 
3.6 Responsibility for emotions. -_ ... 
The responsibility of persons for their emotions 
has been the subject of increasing debate amongst 
contemporary philosophers and other thinkers' during 
the past two decades and this debate is one which 
cannot be entered into in any depth in the current 
context. Nonetheless, since, as indicated above, 
responsibility for one's emotions is one of the major 
5In particular, the so-called 'moral' emotions 
(e. g. shame, guilt, compassion, anger) are so called 
because their feeling and expression in prescribed 
contexts serves to endorse the moral values inherent 
in those contexts (ibid). 
'Cf the fuller discussion of emotion regulation in 
the 'cognitive process' model of emotions proposed by 
Mesquita & Frijda (1992) in subsection 6.2.1 below. 
7cf e. g. Oakley 1992 (Chapter 4 passim); Sabini 
& Silver 1987; Sankowski 1975,1977) 
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implications of social constructionist theory, some 
limited consideration must be given to the arguments 
for its validity. 
Clearly, the idea that individuals may be held 
accountable for their emotions is opposed to the 
Kantian view in which (as noted in the Introduction): 
"... The domain of the moral is the domain of 
the will expressed in action; it is the 
domain of that for which we are responsible. 
Emotions are beyond the will ... " (Sabini & Silver op cit: 165). 
As stated earlier, cognitive theories of emotion, 
which challenge the conception of emotions as 
"brute forces unconnected with higher mental 
functions" (ibid)., 
do allow a role for reason in emotion, but do not 
necessarily imply a similar role for volition. Yet, 
in contemporary philosophical thinking at least, the 
central moral notion of responsibility does involve 
such an idea. What must be established, therefore, is 
how, if "responsibility presupposes choice" (ibid: 169), P 
emotions (which traditionally are seen as involuntary 
and unchosen and as immune to influence by the will) 
can therefore be claimed by social constructionists to 
be related to responsibility. This sense of 
spontaneity cannot be denied, and must therefore be 
accounted for. 
The main argument put forward by constructionists 
to explain how responsibility for emotions can be 
attributed is that despite the very real way in which, 
when experienced, they seem to overcome one, to be 
'forces' to which one is passively subjected, this 
sense that emotions are beyond one's control is 
nothing more than an interpretation of one's behaviour 
(cf Averill 1980: 312), which, moreover, is learned 
behaviour. The constructionist position might thus be 
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likened to a behaviourist view of emotions, i. e., they 
are 'learned responses' to given situations, which, 
once learned, are in effect 'conditioned reflexes' 
which individuals cannot avoid experiencing given the 
appropriate stimulus situation. This would explain 
the sense that the experience of emotion is 
involuntary. Having thus demonstrated that despite 
the sense of passivity, emotions do involve agent 
activity (in the form of interpretation), 
constructionists therefore claim that individuals may 
be held responsible for correctly or incorrectly 
interpreting the situation in line with the culturally 
dictated 'construal' and therefore for 'having' the 
appropriate emotion. However, there are difficulties 
with this, since this is not the same thing as 
asserting that one can choose to 'have' or not 'have' 
a particular emotion at any given time - the 
possibility of which is still not clear, given the 
impression of emotional spontaneity outlined above - 
and therefore be subject to "moral censure or rational 
criticism" (Armon-Jones 1986a: 52) if one does not 
'adopt' the required response. 
It would seem, therefore, that the construction- 
ist interpretation of responsibility for emotions must 
be limited to being responsible for learning the 
appropriate attitudes (and their largely 'automatic' 
application) and cannot reasonably be extended to 
include responsibility for moment to moment emotional 
experience. That is, the locus for the attribution of 
responsibility must shift from the point of emotional 
experience to the point at which appropriate emotion 
attitudes are learned. ' 
BFor other possible interpretations of emotional 
responsibility, cf the authors cited above (see 
footnote 7). 
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4. The implications of social constructionism for a 
cross-cultural analysis of shame. 
In such an analysis, any theory of emotions 
(other than a thorough-going 'naturalism') will seek 
to identify constant and variable components of such 
a phenomenon. If the assumption is (as cognitive 
theories, and by extension, constructionism, maintain) 
that emotions can be characterized in terms of the 
beliefs which give rise to them, and the evaluative 
and appetitive attitudes involved, then what must be 
determined, if attempting to discover possible 
universal structural features of shame and apparently 
similar emotions, is whether the same beliefs etc. 
always and everywhere feature in such emotions. ' 
Moreover, given the importance accorded by 
constructionists to contextual factors in the 
constitution and experience of emotions, it is clear 
that in their view any attempt to subject 'shame' to 
cross-cultural analysis must take into account the 
wider beliefs and values of the societies in which the 
emotion is being studied. 
9However, one should bear in mind the implications 
of the polythetic or Wittgensteinian "family 
resemblances" classification of emotions, discussed in 
the Introduction. In terms of such a classification, 
it is not essential for all instances of e. g. shame 
and similar emotions to have (a) common feature (s) for 
them to be considered as members of a class which we 
might want to call 'shame phenomena'. Thus, for 
example, whereas one instance may involve 'a desire 
not to be seen' and 'a belief that one has failed to 
fulfil one's [self-imposed or socially required] 
expectations', and another may involve the latter and 
'a desire to run away' and yet another may involve the 
latter and 'a belief that one's privacy has been 
invaded', this does not necessarily imply that such instances cannot all be considered as members of the 
class of 'shame phenomena' just because there is no 
single belief or desire involved in all of them. 
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The significance and value of a social 
constructionist perspective in this respect is thus 
that it requires the researcher not only to identify 
the attitudes characteristic of an emotion, but to 
explore the relationship between such attitudes and 
the wider belief and value 'network' of the society in 
which it features and to explain their nature in terms 
of these other sociocultural factors. Thus, where 
cultures vary in their beliefs concerning, for 
example, the self, and responsibility, and in their 
opinions as to the value of autonomy relative to that 
of solidarity with a broader social group, so may the 
complex of attitudes giving rise to and constituting 
'shame' vary. 
However, despite the fact that it allows for the 
possibility that 'shame' or any other emotion may be 
characterized differently cross-culturally, a social 
constructionist perspective does not foreclose on the 
alternative possibility that the same attitudes may be 
characteristic of the emotion in question in all 
cultures. 1° It does, though, have the advantage of 
not assuming a priori that this is the case, and of 
drawing attention to the need to recognize that such 
attitudes do not exist independently and autonomously, 
but are elements in an interrelated sociocultural 
'system'. 
100f course, this assumes (as noted in the 
Introduction) that the requisite equivalence between 
the emotions being studied can be established. This is 
an enduring methodological problem which has been 
identified by others (cf e. g. Mesquita and Frijda op 
cit: 200; Solomon 1984: 230-231). 
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S. Substantive studies: 'shame' in social context 
Having elaborated the theoretical claims of 
social constructionism, in this section, the 
implications of such a perspective for the study of 
shame will be demonstrated. As noted in the 
Introduction, examples of a constructionist approach 
are provided predominantly by researchers in the 
fields of 'psychological anthropology' and 'cultural 
psychology'. However, another significant 
contribution to this kind of analysis of shame, from 
a different disciplinary perspective, pre-dates this 
recent interest by some forty years. In his "The 
Civilizing Process" (1939) Norbert Elias sought to 
demonstrate the correlation between feelings of shame 
and social structure. Where his study differs from 
the later anthropological analyses is in the relative 
attention paid to what may be termed the 
'ethnophenomenology' of shame - the specific ways in 
which shame feeling is constituted by the relevant 
attitudes generated in particular cultural contexts 
(in the manner described in section 2.4 above). This 
was not really addressed by Elias. 
Given both the chronological and theoretical 
primacy of Elias' examination of shame, it will be 
considered first, followed by the anthropological 
studies, which go further in attempting to penetrate 
the nature of the experiential aspect of shame. 
5.1 ELIAS (1939) 
Elias' primary objective is to show how both the 
social and 'personality' structures of a specific 
"figuration" which is both historically and 
geographically (more or less) continuous, gradually 
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change. In particular, he is concerned to show that 
there is 
"a very specific change in the feelings of 
shame and delicacy" (xiii) 
as a society becomes more 'civilized' and as it tends 
towards increased "differentiation and integration" 
(222). Moreover, his work seeks to demonstrate that 
there is an intimate relation between how shame is 
experienced and the form of social structure; a 
relation which is neither coincidental nor causal but 
which derives from the nature of the relationship 
between 'the individual' and 'society' (to be examined 
below). 
Elias sees the shift from the experience of shame 
as consciousness of an external, adverse judgement of 
oneself by others, to an internal, self-directed 
adverse judgement by the self, as associated with the 
division in contemporary social life between the 
public and the private domains. Hence, his 
characterization of shame in 'civilized' society as 
consequent on an internalization of sanctions so that 
they become "self-controls" (190) is implicitly 
Freudian and reflects the view of early 
anthropological 'culture and personality' theorists 
(e. g. Mead op cit; Benedict op cit) that the structure 
of society has a direct correlation with the structure 
of the personality: 
"... the social code of conduct so imprints 
itself in one form or another on the human 
being that it becomes a constituent element 
of his individual self. ... this element ... necessarily changes constantly with the 
social code of behavior and the structure of 
society. The pronounced division in the 
'ego' or consciousness characteristic of man in our phase of civilization ... corresponds to the specific split in the behavior which 
civilized society demands of its members" 
(ibid) 
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[i. e. between that which is permitted in public and 
that which may only be done in private]. 
Further, the shift involved from the notion of 
shame as an appropriate emotion only in the company of 
certain specifically designated categories of 'others' 
(e. g. one's social superiors) (138) to that which 
generalizes the referents of shame so that it may, and 
indeed should, be experienced in given circumstances 
even when alone, is again explained by Elias as 
symptomatic of the shift from a society organized on 
principles of hierarchy to one with an egalitarian 
ideology and structure: 
11... First it becomes a distasteful offense 
to show oneself exposed in any way before 
those of higher or equal rank; with 
inferiors it can even be a sign of benevo- 
lence. Then, as all become socially more 
equal, it slowly becomes a general offense. 
The social reference of shame and-embarras- 
sment recedes more and more from 
consciousness. " (139; emphasis added) 
Such a view also suggests that the structure of a 
particular society has implications for what 'kind' or 
aspect of shame is most salient in it. Thus, again in 
a society where hierarchy is an acknowledged and 
valued organizational principle, so-called 'status- 
shame' (elicited by deviations from the conduct 
expected of someone in a given social position) will 
be dominant. ll Where all are ostensibly equal in 
status, however, (though not necessarily 'the same' in 
terms of ideals and aspirations), as is the case in 
individualistic 'western' society, so-called 
'disgrace-shame' (associated by psychoanalysts and 
contemporary philosophers with failure to achieve 
11(cf Deigh op cit: 234-235) 
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one's own self-imposed standards of excellence) tends 
to predominate. 
5.1.1. Theoretical approach 
The assumptions concerning the relationship 
between 'individual' and 'society' (mentioned earlier) 
underlying the study must now be examined. In the 
Introduction to the 1968 edition of the work, Elias 
explicitly discusses these, in order to make clear 
what is only implicit in its original edition. In 
effect, this Introduction is a diatribe against both 
methodological individualism and what might be termed 
'excessive sociologism' as impediments to 
understanding, or even attempting to investigate, the 
way in which changes in social structure can and do 
give rise to corresponding changes in 'personality 
structure'. 
In its assumption that 'the individual' and 
'society' are two independent and opposed (if 
'interpenetrating') realities, modern social science 
has failed (Elias argues) to recognize that this 
conceptualization of these two phenomena is an 
illusion. The reality is rather that society is 
neither (a) an amalgam or sum of such autonomous 
entities (individuals) nor (b) a sui generis 
phenomenon existing outside and beyond individuals, 
but is in fact a "figuration" of interdependent 
beings; in short, neither 'society' nor 'individuals' 
exist in the sense in which they are generally 
understood (261). Furthermore, in addition to 
reconceptualizing societies thus, Elias criticizes the 
predominant sociological assumption that both 
'individuals' and 'societies' possess static 
structures, arguing rather that these should be 
recognized as dynamic processes (225; 229). Once 'the 
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individual' is thus seen as an element in a 'network', 
and the figuration in its entirety as a process not a 
state, it becomes clearer why one might expect to find 
(and does, according to Elias' empirical evidence) a 
close correspondence between forms of social 
organisation and personality/affect structure. (Hence 
his conclusion that the modern 'western' notion of 
shame as failure of one part of the ego to meet the 
standards and expectations of another, corresponds 
directly with the marked segregation of life into 
private and public spheres. ) 
There is a further implication of this view. In 
societies which possess a more explicit recognition of 
the genuine relationship between individual and 
society (though of course not necessarily expressing 
it in such terms), the way in which emotions 'work' or 
'operate' will be understood (and consequently 
possibly experienced) in a very different way from 
that in western individualistic society. Further, 
'our' commonsense and scientific notions of this split 
between individual and society explain in part why 
emotions, such as shame, are understood as generated 
and functioning within individuals rather than as 
having clearly social origins and referents. 
The emphasis on demonstrating the relationship 
between social structure and personality on the one 
hand, and social structure and 'cases' of shame on the 
other, though interesting and important, leads to a 
neglect of the question as to what is actually 
experienced in a shame-eliciting situation. In not 
addressing this question, Elias presumably either 
assumes that irrespective of (a) what gives rise to 
shame and (b) before whom one should and does feel 
shame, shame itself is a universal and therefore 
unproblematic emotion or alternatively, considers that 
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such questions concerning the essential 'structure' of 
the emotion are less relevant, less interesting, or 
both. Since he does not explicitly state which 
position he takes, this must be left largely to 
speculation. However, he does give some indication of 
his position in the following passage on "the question 
of the limit of the transformability of the human 
personality": 
"Without doubt [the human personality] is 
bound to certain regularities that may be 
called 'natural'. The historical process 
modifies it within these limits. The degree 
to which human life and behavior can be 
molded by historical processes remains to be 
determined in detail ... natural and historical processes interact almost 
inseparably. The formation of feelings of 
shame and revulsion and advances in the 
threshold of delicacy are both at once 
natural and historical processes. These 
forms of feeling are manifestations of human 
nature under specific social conditions. " 
(159-60, emphasis added) 
This passage suggests that Elias does have some 
conception of a 'natural' human propensity for shame 
but recognizes that this aspect of 'human nature' 
nonetheless manifests itself differently in different 
social conditions. Earlier, he has talked of 
"a very specific change in the feelings of 
shame and delicacy" 
stating that 
"the standard of what society demands and 
prohibits changes; in conjunction with this, 
the threshold of socially instilled 
displeasure and fear moves. " (xiii) 
There can be no clearer statement than this that Elias 
considers that contextual factors significantly 
influence the nature of feelings. But what is 
actually meant by "an advance in the threshold of 
shame and revulsion"? Is he referring to the fact 
that as a society ('figuration') becomes 'more 
civilized', more things generate such feelings and 
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that therefore the capacity and tendency of people to 
have such feelings becomes greater? i. e., that the 
'civilized' human personality is one which is more 
given to, and characterized by, a sense of shame and 
revulsion than the 'non-civilized' human personality? 
If so, the question is raised whether this increase in 
susceptibility to shame in turn affects the experience 
of shame12. There is, however, no attempt to answer 
such a question in the work; in short, the 
phenomenology of shame is simply not addressed. 
The overall conclusion of the work is that in 
view of the interdependence of social, and individual 
psychological, structures, seen as intimately related, 
dynamic processes, the latter will vary as do the 
former. 
5.2 Anthropology of shame 
The recent trend to reconsider the emotion of 
shame (and guilt) can only be understood if the 
assumptions underlying earlier anthropological notions 
concerning these concepts are first reiterated. 
The emphasis in earlier studies' views of shame 
and guilt (cf e. g. Mead op cit; Benedict op cit) was 
on their role as agents of 'social control' - that is, 
as means of ensuring that members of communities 
adhered to the norms of those communities. Thus, such 
studies were largely functional accounts" and one 
purpose of theirs was to categorize societies 
12cf Levy's (1984) notion of hyper- and 
hypocognized emotions, to be discussed below (see 
Chapter Three). 
13It is interesting, in view of the discussion of 
the sociocultural functions of emotions above, that as 
early as this, the functional aspects of such emotions 
were explicitly recognized. 
95 
according to the apparent relative significance of 
either emotion. There is no evidence that at this 
time either shame or guilt were regarded as anything 
other than unproblematic, universally applicable 
concepts. 
However, it was later recognized that such a 
dualistic categorization was too simplistic and thus 
inadequate to reflect the complexity of the reality in 
most societies. In particular, the idea that shame 
represented a response to external adverse judgements, 
whereas conversely, guilt represented a response to 
internalized sanctions was quickly repudiated. "' 
Despite such criticisms of the 'shame- 
culture/guilt culture' dichotomy, there has remained 
recognition that societies dg differ in the extent to 
which one or other emotion appears to predominate; 
however, the analysis of such predominance has now 
become more sophisticated, relating it in particular 
to social organization (cf Lebra 1971). 
Perhaps the most notable anthropologist to 
suggest the necessity of a constructionist approach 
(to the emotion of shame in particular) is Michelle 
Rosaldo. Her contention is that, more fundamental 
even than probable cross-cultural differences in 
emotions (due to primarily cultural factors), the 
conception of the 'self' is shaped by 
"the culture and organization of particular 
societies. " (1983: 136). -5 
14cf Piers and Singer op cit; and above. 
15 RosaldoIs claim was of course not original; the 
idea that the self-concept varies not only cross- 
culturally but temporally has received considerable 
attention in a number of disciplines both before and 
contemporaneously (cf for example Carrithers, Collins 
and Lukes 1985; Geertz 1973; Gergen and Davis 1985; 
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The implications of this view for the study of 
emotions in general are considerable; however, given 
the apparently all-important role of the 'self' in 
shame, as its object (indicated by the accounts 
examined in Chapter One), it would appear to follow 
that this emotion, (and the way it 'works') will vary 
in accordance with variations in the self-concept 
(Rosaldo 1984: 149). 16 
5,2,1. Culture and 'Self' 
At this point, it is necessary to consider the 
idea that conceptions of self are culturally 
constituted. 17 It is not possible within the context 
of this study to reproduce the arguments concerning 
the ways in which selves (like emotions) may be 
socially constructed. 19 However, a selection of the 
many ethnographic examples attesting to differences in 
self-concept cross-culturally will be reviewed and the 
implications of these for shame will be considered. 
Hallowell 1967; Heelas and Lock 1981; Markus and 
Kitayama 1991; Marsella, DeVos and Hsu 1985; Mauss 
1985(1938); Shweder and Bourne 1984; Verhave and Van 
Hoorne 1984) and will be examined below. 
1sIn addition, in terms of the general question of 
the relative significance of physiological and 
cultural factors in emotions, Rosaldo argued that 
shame (and guilt) should take priority as objects of 
research: "... we might do well to work from instances 
like these, where the relevance of culture is clear, 
towards cases where it is more problematic... " 
(1983: 136 n. 4) 
17 It is not in dispute that a certain sense of 
separateness from one's environment and other 
organisms, and of some kind of relatively continuous identity, appears to be a psychological and cultural 
universal (cf Hallowell 1955). It is in the 
conceptualization of the 'self' that differences are 
claimed. 
10These 
may be found in e. g. Gergen 1977; Shweder 
& Miller 1985. 
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Before commencing with such a review, some 
considerations regarding the usage of the terms 
'person', 'self' and 'identity' as analytical 
categories must be outlined. 
In similar fashion to the differing 
interpretations given to 'emotion', 'affect' and 
'sentiment' in various emotion theories, so are the 
above terms frequently used in different ways in 
different contexts, notably in ethnographies concerned 
with describing and explaining other-cultural concepts 
regarding ways of 'being-in-the-world/society'. Thus, 
since the application of such terms is not standard, 
a brief indication of how they are variously 
interpreted is necessary. 
The distinction between 'person' and 'self' has 
traditionally been used to describe the social or 
objective human being or 'me' as opposed to the 
individual, subjectively-experiencing 'I' (cf Mauss op 
cit; Mead 1934). 19 
Obeyesekere (1990) has forcefully questioned the 
utility of employing the concept of 'self', as an 
analytical category for purposes of cross-cultural 
comparison, arguing that 'self' is a Western construct 
which cannot with validity be extrapolated to other 
cultures. The Western idea of such a self, (which is 
undeniably reified so that. most 'western' individuals 
have the notion that this self is an enduring entity), 
is in all likelihood a secular 'hang-over' from the 
Christian notion of the eternal soul. In 
Obeyesekere's view: 
19 But some have questioned even this distinction 
(cf Rosaldo 1984: 146; Keeler 1983: 161-162). 
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"The self is something to be explained, 
rather than an explanation of something ... (1990: 248) 
This idea is also expressed by Rosaldo: 
"For us, the attributes of individuals 
describe the core of what we really are .. But our concern with the individuals and 
with their hidden inner selves may well be 
features of our world of action and belief - itself to be explained and not assumed as 
the foundation for cross-cultural study. " 
(1984: 147, original emphasis) 
Obeyesekere suggests that possibly 'identity' is 
a more useful term. Certainly, with regard to the 
implications for shame of the way in which one's sense 
of one's uniqueness is conceptualized, this may well 
be the most salient and universally applicable concept 
with which to work (cf Lynd 1958). 
5.2.1.1 The 'western' concept of self 
For cross-cultural comparison of self-concepts to 
proceed, that which is generally held in the majority 
of Western European and American cultures must first 
be outlined. 20 
Perhaps the most succinct yet encyclopaedic 
characterization of the 'western' self-concept is 
provided by Geertz: 
20Most of the concepts of self to be considered 
below are indigenous accounts documented by 
anthropologists and deriving from cultures which are 
non-literate; there is thus an inherent inequality 
between such accounts and the 'western' self-concept 
outlined here, which is rather the product of academic 
reflection in various disciplines. Such inequality, 
while admittedly a problem, should not however 
preclude attempts to identify points of similarity and difference, although ideally an indigenous 'western' 
self-concept, arising from similar ethnographic 
research 'at home', would constitute a more valid item for purposes of comparison (cf Marcus and Fischer 
1986: 138-139). 
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"... a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive 
universe, a dynamic center of awareness, 
emotion, judgment, and action organized into 
a distinctive whole and set contrastively 
both against other such wholes and against 
a social and natural background ... it (1975: 48) 
This 'self' has been elaborated more fully by 
e. g. Johnson (1985) and its key characteristics may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. It 
"refers to a particular, individual person 
(or person-system) . (93) 
2. It has a bipolar quality, being both subjective 
and objective (97); it is 
". . typically separated 
into 
... self-as- 
subject ['I'] and self-as-object. " ['me'] 
(93). 
In addition, the objective aspect of the self consists 
of two elements: 
"... self as a social object to others and 
. self as a social (and psychological) 
object unto itself. " (ibid, original 
emphasis). 
3. It includes the idea of bodily self. 
4. It 
"refers to the characterization of a 
particular person persistent over time. " 
(94); 
i. e., it relates to one's sense of personal identity. 
In addition to these external or objective 
features of the self, Johnson identifies the following 
qualities as typifying the subjective self: 
a) it is given to an analytic mode of thinking; b) it 
is monotheistic; c) it is individualistic; d) it is 
materialistic and rationalistic. (113-128). 
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5.2.1.11 Person and self in Baining culture (Fa-laus 
1983 
The Baining inhabit New Britain Island, Papua New 
Guinea. According to Fajans: 
"How persons perceive and act in each 
context is part of the continuous 
negotiation of self in Baining society. 
The margins of the self are not fixed ... (171) ; 
and: 
"The social actor is not a rigidly defined 
and delimited entity in the Baining world. 
The boundaries of the individual and the 
definition of the person are neither 
permanent nor immutable, but alter and adapt 
in specific contexts. " (178) 
The predominant continuum along which 
'personhood' varies according to context is one 
between the 'relatively natural' and the 'relatively 
social' (ibid). 21 Thus, a person's 'sociality' varies 
according to such factors as, for example, age and 
social and spatial environment: 
"The measure of how social a person is is 
not consistent throughout all these contexts 
but rather is derived from the situation. " 
(ibid) 
5.2.1.111 The Javanese sense of self/status (Keeler 
1983) 
On Java, according to Keeler, the conception of 
an individual, monadic 'self' which, for purposes of 
21Fajans identifies this (albeit implicit) 
distinction between society and nature as the most 
salient one operative in Baining culture, which 
permeates every aspect of life. In addition, more 
value is attached to the social than the natural (170). 
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social interaction, plays a 'role' which is something 
distinct from that self22, is absent. 23 
For Javanese, by contrast, 'selfhood' is 
generated in and constituted by interaction, and that 
'selfhood' is synonymous with status. The latter is 
". a crucial element in self-definition" 
(163). 
While one has no formal status allocated to one, it is 
negotiated in encounters with others, largely by the 
kind of respectful manners (language, gestures etc. ) 
one is able to engender in them (159). Additionally, 
the Javanese apparently do conceive of a measure of 
spiritual power - kakuwatan batin - attributable to 
individuals, and deriving from ascetic practices such 
as denial of one's own wishes in favour of those of 
others, control of impulses etc. This spiritual power 
is also seen as a source of one's status, but it is 
only manifest in relations with others (160). 
So far as individual traits are concerned, while 
not denied, these are not seen as indicative of a self 
apart from one's socially-negotiated status - they are 
"[r]ather ... either so universal as to be 
presumed or so idiosyncratic as to be 
discounted. " (161-162). 
22This is a familiar notion in certain areas of 
sociological discourse, i. e. symbolic interactionism, 
(cf e. g. Goffman 1959) and to some extent in 'western' 
commonsense ideas about 'selfhood'. 
23Keeler is concerned to refute the claim by 
Geertz (1973) that persons on Bali (and by extension, 
Java) conceive of "a distance between actor and role, 
and so between self and social persona" (Keeler 
1983: 161); that they have "a private self which 
threatens to 'break through to dissolve [their] 
standardized public identity"' (Geertz op cit: 402, 
cited in Keeler: ibid). 
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521 iv Tahitian ideas of self and identity (Levy 
1973) 
Responses to questions designed to elicit self- 
descriptions indicated to Levy that generally 
speaking, his informants had a strong sense of their 
uniqueness and difference from others. They did not 
spontaneously liken themselves to other members of 
their extended families, giving examples of 
resemblances only when explicitly asked to do so by 
the interviewer. However, the idea that the family 
group (feti'i ta'ata) has a number of common 
characteristics which are shared by all members is 
widespread: 
"The ascription of some characteristic such 
as high energy or effeminacy to a group of 
relatives is common in village description. " 
(218-219) 
However, the emphasis in labelling was on people's 
habits or customs (peu), i. e. their ways of behaving, 
rather than on personal qualities, and this way of 
labelling also took precedence over labels deriving 
from ethnic origin or 'blood'. (toto). In addition, 
despite the appearance that the Tahitians stress 
personal uniqueness, this is qualified by the fact 
that what characteristics are seen as possessed by 
individuals were not explained by informants as 
qualities of the individual as such, but of the 
individual in some specific stage of their 
development. Thus, they are not inherent and enduring 
'personality' descriptions, but transient features 
typical of someone in a particular life-stage (221). 
All the above remarks relate to the social 
identity of persons. In terms of the subjective 
'self', this is seen as a 'given'; something which it 
is beyond the power of oneself to influence or change. 
Again, what changes might occur in the 'self' are the 
result of changes in life-stage and responsibility for 
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them is seen as occurring outside (222). Moreover, 
certain 'weaknesses' in the self are also conceived of 
as beyond personal control: 
"... they are simply conditions of the 
psyche, for which one is not responsible. " 
(224) 
Finally, the concept of an integrated, enduring 
'self' also appears to be absent in indigenous 
Tahitian thought (as opposed to ideas influenced by 
the introduction of Christian doctrine about the 
'soul'). The widespread belief that, on death, one is 
transformed into a tupapa'u (spirit or ghost which 
remains earthbound) does not involve the idea that 
this spirit has any relation to the self as it is 
experienced in life (228). 
5.2.1. v Ifaluk notions of 'person' and 'self' (Lutz 
1988 
For the Ifaluk of Micronesia, despite their 
distinction between 'human persons' (yaremat) and 
'spirits' ( ay lus), within the former class there is 
not, as in the 'west', a clearly defined boundary 
between self and other: 
"The point at which the self. stops and the 
other begins is neither fixed nor 
conceptualized as an impermeable wall.,, (88) 
A concomitant of this is the idea that one person may 
(or indeed is often expected to) 'follow' the thought 
and behaviour of another; not in the sense of 
emulation but because their thought and behaviour are 
seen as one and the same. This does not exclude the 
individual will (tip-) as one of the sources of 
behaviour but generally, these are seen as 
"multiple and interpersonal and are not to 
be found exclusively in any independent or 
central part of the self. " (ibid) 
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This interconnection between self and other is 
exemplified in the frequent linguistic use of the 
collective pronoun 'we' rather than 'I' (89). 
Despite the closeness assumed between persons, 
differences are noted, although the number of "trait 
terms" employed to describe other people is limited 
and 
"... it is only in exceptional cases that 
people are consistently or permanently 
identified with particular trait terms. " 
(111) . 
Traits are, however, seen as "enduring 
characteristics". Nonetheless: 
" .. they are not the private property of the self. Rather, they explicitly link 
characteristics of persons to situational 
and social-moral considerations. " (ibid) 
Thus, such terms are used primarily to explain 
behaviour rather than individuals, and further, such 
usage only occurs when a social situational 
explanation of behaviour (the more usual practice) is 
not possible. By contrast, self-ascription of traits 
is apparently rare (90). 
In terms of the sense of 'self', the idea of 
introspection for its own sake is alien to the Ifaluk. 
They do not conceive of the possibility of 
11 ... know [ing] oneself outside the moral and 
social constraints that sometimes make 
introspection necessary. " (91). 
The 'self' is seen as unified, there being no cultural 
distinction between 'thought' and 'emotion'. The two 
terms identified by Lutz as being concerned with what 
might be construed as 'mental events' are nunuwan and 
tip- (see above). (Neither of these has the emotional 
neutrality that the English 'thought' or 'will' 
possesses in the western philosophical tradition 
[94]. ) Whilst they overlap, the former refers to 
"more socially standard personal processes°; 
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the latter to 
"those more individual or idiosyncratic 
(although not therefore of necessity 
antisocial or immoral). " (91-92, emphasis 
added). 
5.2.1. vi The Pintupi aboriginal self-concept (Myers 
197 
The Pintupi are a Central Australian Aboriginal 
people. A key concept in their culture is that of 
walytja or broadly, 'relatedness'. According to 
Myers, this concept 
"asserts a relationship between oneself and 
persons, objects, or places; it recognizes 
as fundamental ... the identity extended to 
persons and things beyond the physical 
individual. " (351) 
As a result, aspects of the external world such as 
possessions, kin and/or ancestors are experienced as 
integral constituents of one's "interior subjectivity" 
or 'self' (ibid). 
A corollary of this in Pintupi ethnopsychology is 
the idea that 
"an individual's internal states [are] 
extensively connected with a 'web' of 
significant others or with 'objects' that 
European observers would describe as 
external to the self" (350) 
Consequently, one has an important capacity to be 
'moved' by others. Indeed, Myers claims that 
"the Pintupi use of concepts of emotions 
frequently does not present an introspective 
view of a person's feelings. " (347) 
Rather, cultural aspects are emphasized, over 
experiences which are peculiar to individuals (348). 
Thus, again, the Pintupi 'self-concept' contrasts 
with the familiar 'western' one outlined above. 
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5.2.1. vii Ilongot notions of 'person' and 'self' 
(Rosaldo 1984) 
As noted above, according to Rosaldo the 
postulation of an enduring 'self' - as distinct from 
a 'persona' being 'presented' in interaction and 
behaviour - is the transformation of an element of 
'western' ethnopsychology into a presumed 
psychological universal and one which has no relevant 
application to other cultures such as that of the 
Philippinean Ilongots, among whom she conducted 
extensive research: 
11 ... Ilongot hearts [rinawa] are not fixed 
entities that stand behind or underneath a 
public world where personhood is both 
affirmed and challenged. ... our notions of 
a constant 'I' - ... - are not found 
in 
tribal cultures in which kinship and 
identity are forever things to be negotia- 
ted in diverse contexts. ... And character is seen less as a product of one's nature or 
experience in life than of the situations in 
which the actor currently is found. .. Correspondingly, among Ilongots, personality 
descriptions are extremely rare ... " (146) 
5.2.1. viii Summary 
In the light of the preceding ethnographic 
examples, it appears that a major distinction between 
'western' conceptions of 'self'/'individuality'/ 
'identity' and more 'exotic' ones lies in the degree 
to which individual differences are emphasized or 
minimized. In all the cultures considered, routine 
descriptions of persons in terms of traits or 
characteristics are markedly rare or even absent. 
While idiosyncratic aspects of persons are apparently 
everywhere noted and accepted, their salience in 
defining those persons' identity is evidently less 
elsewhere than in 'western' culture. The emphasis is, 
rather, on ways of behaving/acting in specific 
situational contexts. Moreover, ideas about the 
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continuity of human persons with their surroundings 
(whether other human persons, such as kin or affines; 
material possessions, or 'the land'), are strikingly 
common. " This again contrasts starkly with 'our' 
very strong sense of the ontological separation of 
individuals both from other people and objects in the 
material world. 
Finally, conceptions of 'self' are evidently more 
fluid and context-dependent in other cultures, 
differentiating them from 'our' tendency to conceive 
of the self as fixed, permanent, enduring and 
unchanging. 
5.2.2 'Self' and 'shame' 
What then are the possible implications of such 
differences in 'self'-concept for the 
conceptualization and experience of 'shame'? As 
noted previously, Rosaldo (1983,1984) is one of the 
original (and extreme) exemplars of the 
constructionist position with respect to such 
concepts. As such, her work, which focuses 
specifically and explicitly on the concept of 'shame' 
as experienced by the Ilongots of North Luzon, 
Philippines and which contrasts this with the 
'western' understanding, will be taken as a 
paradigmatic example of the constructionist 
persuasion. 
24 cf Levy op cit: 213-214 n. 2; Lutz op cit: 94; 
Myers op cit: 350-351 [citing Munn 1970]; Read 1955 
(1967): 206-207) 
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5.2.2.1 Ilongot 'betangj25 (Rosaldo 1983) 
Rosaldo is not concerned to argue that the 
Ilongot do not have a concept of 'shame' which is in 
some ways similar to that with which 'westerners' are 
familiar, only that, in other (more fundamental and 
important) ways, their concept is significantly 
different (148). Thus, she concedes that the 'family' 
of terms in Ilongot which denote a set of concepts 
broadly equivalent to the English shame family, also 
" embrac[e] notions of timidity, 
embarrassment, awe, obedience, and respect. " 
(op cit: 141). 
and are experienced in certain contexts as restraining 
influences (much as fear of shame may sometimes be 
regarded as an inhibiting factor for westerners). 
However, on other occasions 'shame' feelings act as a 
stimulus (ibid: 142,139). 
The main difference Rosaldo identifies between 
the Ilongot concepts and our own, is that whereas 
shame is predominantly interpreted as an 
"affect[] designed to regulate a problematic 
inner self" (op cit: 142), 
"'shame' for Ilongots is less concerned with the 
control of a presocial self than with a set 
of feelings that relate to the conflicting 
claims of hierarchy and 'sameness', or 
autonomy, in Ilongot social life. " 
(ibid: 139). 
These predominant values of "co-operation, 'sameness' 
and autonomy" (141), grounded in kinship bonds, lead 
to the eruption of shame whenever they are 
25This term, and its derivatives, are apparently 
those which may be most closely translated as "shame, 
humility, respect"; "shameful, shy"; "to be ashamed, 
be shameful, humble"; "cause shame". However, other 
terms may be interchanged with these in certain 
contexts, such as kayub ('fear', e. g. of superiors); 
tu'ngan ('humility, respect, obedience') and '' (connotations of 'awe') (op cit: 141-142, n. 10). 
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contravened, as in acts of selfishness or violence 
(ibid). In addition, whenever the ideal of parity 
between equals is threatened by the reality of 
hierarchy (as when "facts of weakness and social 
inferiority" (143) are presented), 'shame' potentially 
ensues. 
Moreover, there are two different contexts in 
which 'shame' is manifested differently: in the first, 
it provides an impetus to 'achievement' (in Ilongot 
terms, that is, "displays of one's capacity and 
' anger' 2611 [1431) ; in the second, it involves 
recognition of constraint in the sense of respect for 
others (145). 27 Rosaldo identifies these as 
corresponding in large part to the shame appropriate 
to youths and mature, established adults respectively 
(ibid). 28 The means by which the transition from one 
to the other is achieved is apparently the Ilongot 
practice of headhunting: 
"The heavy 'shame' of youth becomes, through 
raiding, something more like 
'shame/humility/respect, ' made possible by 
the realization of new poise and 'anger' in 
a boy who can accept his fellows' subsequent 
demands without fear of being vulnerable to 
'shame'. " (146). 
26The Ilongot concept of liget ("anger") is fully 
discussed in Rosaldo (1980) and not explicated in the 
paper currently cited. 
"These two aspects of Ilongot 'shame' resonate 
somewhat with the distinction between 'disgrace-shame' 
and 'discretion-shame' to be discussed below in 
Chapter Three. Also, the idea that 'shame' is 
overcome by achievement, echoes the means by which 
shame is resolved according to the Rawlsian accounts 
considered in Chapter One. 
"This idea that there are differences in 'shame' 
at different stages in the life cycle (and indeed, 
that shame itself may be appropriate at certain stages 
but not at others) is discussed elswhere. Cf also the 
consideration of Freud's evaluation of shame in 
Chapter Three below. 
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In summary, Rosaldo attributes what she sees as 
fundamental differences between 'western' shame and 
Ilongot 'shame' to differences in the moral orders 
within which each operates, and the 'selves' created 
therein. Thus, the Ilongot emphasis on equality, co- 
operation and the avoidance of imbalance results in a 
'shame' which 
". orders relationships ... keeps anger from disrupting the cooperative bonds of kin 
... [and] shap[es] a social space wherein a 
group of would-be equal peers can manage to 
make claims on one another without . 
violating an interlocutor's autonomy. " (149) 
This is different from the 'shame' of the Japanese, 
for example (whose moral order emphasizes the 
occupation of status in a hierarchy - see Chapter Four 
below) and 'western' shame, which as already 
identified, functions to restrain "historically 
shaped, responsible but selfish selves" from conflict 
(ibid). It is, rather, 
"... concerned with selves defined within a 
moral system where relationships are shaped 
much less by hierarchies or histories, past 
desires or social claims, than by a present 
sense of balance and imbalance among would- 
be 'equivalent' adults. " (150). 
5.2.2. ii Javanese 'isin' (Keeler 1983) 
The Javanese, it will be remembered, consider 
'selfhood' and status to be synonymous. A major 
source of 'shame' for them is when one fails to 
command the respect from another which one's status 
should automatically oblige; when the expected 
deference is absent. The concept of isin is used to 
refer both to the fault of the other in not according 
the appropriate respect, and to the experience of the 
slighted individual. Thus, the former "'doesn't know 
i in'O, while the latter feels isin (153). According 
to Keeler, this shared lexical term reflects the fact 
that 'selves' and statuses are interdependent on Java; 
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that "another's style can define one's own status" 
(ibid). Such status is primarily re-negotiated in 
every social encounter, despite some objective 
determinants such as wealth, age and education. The 
language and gestures used in such encounters are a 
major means by which status is defined and 
"if applied improperly, give rise to .. isin because they do not simply reflect status 
but also affect it. " (ibid: 159). '9 
That is, others' disrespect "signals the inadequacy of 
one's own status to compel people's deference. " 
(ibid). This again contrasts with the view of shame 
outlined in Chapter One. 
5.2.2,111 Pintupi 'kunta' (Myers 1979) 
Like the Ilongot concept of 'shame' explicated by 
Rosaldo, the Pintupi concept of kunta also shares a 
number of connotations with that of 'western' shame, 
such as 'shame', 'embarrassment', 'shyness' and 
'respect' (op cit: 361). However, it can only be 
understood in conjunction with the concept of walytia 
('relatedness') discussed above (subsection 5.2.1. vi), 
which as Myers states 
"emphasizes the shared goals of egalitarian, 
closely-cooperative kin. " (362) 
This dominant ideological value is reflected in kunta, 
which functions to ensure that the selves which 
Pintupi present in public show no evidence of 
"egotism, selfishness, individuality, or 
' animality' . 1130 (ibid). 
'There is a complex system of speech levels on 
Java (156) but low Javanese is confined to very early 
childhood, after which a child is expected to learn 
(without being specifically taught) the correct speech 
level appropriate to the person being addressed (in 
the first instance, his or her father and non-kin) 
30cf Fajans (1983), Scheler (19S7 ) and Schneider 
(1977) for similar accounts of the significance of 
shame in relation to our nature as animals. 
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However, despite its range of meaning, perhaps the 
dominant connotation of kunta is 'respect'. Thus, it 
is primarily an inhibitory affect, not in the sense 
(as Rosaldo identifies) of controlling individual 
desires or appetites, but rather in ensuring that 
Pintupi do not assert themselves over others (which 
would contravene the egalitarian ethic). This also 
explains its particular applicability 
"to formal or ceremonious occasions, to the 
etiquette of confronting elders, to the 
subject of sexual relations, to meeting 
strangers, and to highly structured social 
relationships" (362) 
rather than with respect to kin or other familiar or 
intimate associates. 
Kunta thus manifests itself in a number of 
contexts. It prevents Pintupi from speaking up in 
public meetings or from asking for food or hospitality 
from those with whom they are not closely associated 
(364-365); it also figures prominently where sexual 
matters are concerned, suppressing discussion of such 
topics, particularly reproduction - which is regarded 
as too similar to animal behaviour to be admitted as 
a human activity (ibid). Further, it implies respect 
for others' possessions, needs, desires and rights and 
constrains Pintupi from seeking personal advancement 
or wealth. 
In summary, 
"na as ' shame' and kunta as ' respect' are 
two sides of the same coin, in that showing 
'respect' for someone by consulting that 
person's wishes, by not overstepping one's 
bounds, or by 'shyness' in stating claims, 
avoids embarrassment. 'Respect' or 
'shyness' is often expressed by hesitation 
to speak out. Disrespect, ... is conversely, embarrassing. (365) 
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Critique of social constructionist emotion 
theory 
It is clear from the foregoing that the primary 
purpose of a social constructionist perspective on the 
constitution of emotion is to counter the dominant 
traditional naturalist/essentialist/physiological view 
and its inherent limitations. Indeed, many of the 
arguments adduced in support of constructionism's 
claims do successfully demonstrate the significant 
influence of cultural factors in particular on 
emotional experience, which has either not been 
recognized or accorded sufficient weight in 
conventional accounts of emotion. Nonetheless, as in 
many radical expressions of a particular viewpoint 
intended as a corrective to an opposing similarly 
extremist position, the tendency is, in attempting to 
compensate for perceived deficiencies of that 
position, to similarly eliminate different yet still 
crucial aspects of the issue. In the case of 
constructionism, one of the dimensions of emotion 
which suffers this fate is the somatic dimension. 
6.1.1 Emotion and the body 
In seeking to show that culturally conditioned 
cognitions, not physiological perturbations, define 
emotion, constructionists effectively excise the body 
from the emotional equation. 31 Yet this emphasis on 
ideational factors belies and diminishes the 
importance of the way in which, in a very real sense, 
emotions are experienced as involving both body and 
mind: 
31In this respect they are not unlike the 
'essentialists' considered in Chapter One, who 
similarly ignore this aspect of shame. 
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"... purely cultural accounts [are unable] 
to encompass and make sense of emotion in 
lived existence. " (Lyon 1995: 253)32 
6.1.2 Emotion and social structure 
In addition, particularly in anthropology, the 
cultural constructionist perspective in emotion 
research is a legacy of the distinction and tension 
between cultural and social structural approaches (as 
exemplified in the historical difference between 
American and British anthropology in general). " Not 
only does according culture the master role in the 
constitution of emotion relegate the body to a minor, 
subsidiary and even dispensable role, as indicated 
above, it also ignores the significance of social- 
structural relations in such constitution. 
Despite the recognition of the importance of 
social context in the study of emotion identified 
above (section 2.1), the subsequent focus of both the 
majority of constructionism's theoretical claims and 
indeed substantive anthropological studies of shame 
thus still tends to be on the cultural influences on 
emotion constitution. In many cases, the 
consideration of social relations or social structure 
is generally made only in connection with providing an 
ethnographic context in which such constitution 
"Attempts to successfully reconcile seemingly 
incompatible theoretical understanding and commonsense 
impressions in emotional experience may be found in 
Averill's (op cit) 'emotional syndrome' model, which 
explores how emotions can be conceived as amenable to 
rational control, yet simultaneously experienced as involuntary, thus involving notions of passivity 
(hence the term 'passions'). This important 
impression is given equally serious attention by 
Sabini and Silver (op cit) in their consideration of 
the relationship between emotions and responsibility. 
"Lyon 1995: 251-252. 
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occurs, rather than being explored as one potential 
factor in the genesis of emotion: 
"... the very basis of the relationship 
between patterns of social relations and 
patterns of experience and expression of 
emotion are not3p4en explicitly examined. " 
(Lyon 1995: 258) 
6.2 Alternative models of emotion constitution 
It would appear that what is required, in. order 
to furnish an account of emotional constitution and 
experience which is both more comprehensive and more 
reflective of reality than that which either the 
'phenomenological' or the 'social constructionist' 
approaches to emotion are able to provide, is a model 
which recognizes that emotions are indeed constituted 
by a complex combination of multiple elements, yet 
which, rather than making prior assumptions as to the 
relative significance of these elements, seeks to 
determine this (and the degree to which such elements 
are constant or culturally variable), on the basis of 
empirical evidence. One such model is that which 
"views emotion in terms of a series of 
aspects or components that function in the 
relationship of the individual to his or her 
social and material environment. " (Lyon 
1995: 257). 
Examples of such a model include that of Scherer 
(1984) and Mesquita and Frijda (op cit), although as 
noted above, the latter explicitly interprets emotion 
as a predominantly cognitive process (although does 
34cf Mesquita and Frijda (1992: 201): "... little 
attention ... [is] devoted to the role of the actual 
social environment on the course of an individual's 
emotions. That role probably is considerable and an important source of cultural differences in emotional 
phenomena. This subject deserves more attention in 
the future. " 
35Elias' 
study represents an exception to this 
generalization. 
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not exclude the body) and as such is subject to the 
general criticisms of any model which privileges one 
aspect over all the others. 
6.2.1 The 'cognitive process' model of emotions 
According to Mesquita and Frijda, emotional 
experience comprises the following seven component 
elements: a) antecedent events; b) event coding; c) 
appraisal; d) physiological reaction patterns; e) 
action readiness; f) emotional behaviour and g) 
regulation. These will now be explained in more 
detail, while the influence of sociocultural factors 
on all these elements, and the implications of such 
influence on the overall nature of any given emotion, 
will be considered below. 
6.2.1 a) Antecedent events 
This element of the emotional process is self- 
explanatory: it refers to the events which elicit an 
emotion. Different individuals and groups may be 
"emotionally sensitive" to different events, depending 
on the general character of the individual or group. 
(Mesquita & Frijda op cit: 180) 
6.2.1 b) Event coding 
Antecedent events are categorized into a 
culturally recognized type: 
"Event coding implies the recognition of a 
particular, culturally shared meaning to 
events of that type. " (ibid)36 
Examples of an event type are insult, bereavement etc. 
36cf Armon Jones (op cit) on 'construals of 
situations'. 
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Clearly, events of themselves do not generally 
elicit emotions but only as coded, therefore events 
and event types can really only be distingished 
analytically. However, this distinction is important 
as it draws attention to the potential differences in 
coding by different individuals and groups according 
to cultural influences. 
6.2.1 c) Appraisal 
"Events, or events as coded, are appraised 
with respect to their implications for the 
subject's well-being and his or her 
possibilities for coping with the event. " 
(ibid) 
The above three emotional elements function in 
close relation to one another: 
"Events are often coded in a particular way, 
and particular codings often entail 
particular ways of appraising. " (ibid) 
6.2.1 d) Physiological reaction patterns 
Again, these are self-explanatory: they are the 
autonomic changes experienced in connection with an 
emotion (ibid). 
6.2.1 e) Action readiness 
Emotions involve typical changes in potential 
actions, e. g. the action readiness typical of fear is 
self-protection (ibid). Such action readiness may 
result in overt behaviour (see below). 
6.2.1 f) Emotional behaviour 
This comprises both expressive and instrumental 
behaviours. All individuals have a behavioural 
"repertoire"; which specific behaviours occur may be 
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subject to influence "by the availability and expected 
effectiveness" of those behaviours (ibid). 
6.2.1 a) Regulation 
"Emotions are subject to regulation ... 
regulation can affect all emotion components 
... regulation 
is determined by individual 
experiences and by sociocultural norms with 
respect to having and expressing the various 
emotions ... " (ibid, original emphasis) 
Regulation of emotion may take the form either of 
suppression or positive encouragement or even 
obligation (cf Armon-Jones op cit). 
6.2.1 h) Summary 
"Emotional experience ... reflects all of 
the components mentioned; differences and 
similarities in emotional experiences are 
best described as differences and 
similarities with respect to the patterns of 
these components. " (Mesquita & Frijda op 
cit: 180) 
The above model thus precludes the comparison of 
one total emotion with another totality, but requires 
comparison between the constituent elements comprising 
an emotional experience. " 
6.2.1.1 Sociocultural influences on emotional 
components 
According to Mesquita & Frijda, emotional 
components differ in their susceptibility to influence 
by sociocultural factors. Accordingly, there may be 
371t may be readily seen that this model of 
emotions thus also has an implicit affinity with the 
Wittgensteinian conception of "family resemblances" 
referred to in the Introduction and elsewhere. 
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both similarities and differences across cultures in 
all the components discussed. 
6.2.1.1 (a) Antecedent events 
'Being seen defecating/having sexual intercourse' 
appears to be a cross-culturally similar antecedent 
event for shame (whereas 'being seen naked' is cross- 
culturally variable as a shame-eliciting event). 
Another example of a more or less universal emotional 
antecedent event (for grief) is bereavement. As such: 
"Certain major events appear to be prominent 
as emotion antecedents in most or all 
cultures" (ibid: 182), 
There are however many culture-specific antecedent 
events, which are related to correspondingly culture- 
specific living conditions (including social 
conditions) such as the physical environment, mode of 
subsistence, occupation etc. In addition, as 
indicated above: 
"Some of the observed differences suggest 
cross-cultural variations in sensitivity to 
certain events. " (ibid: 183). 
6.2.1. i (b) Event coding 
This emotional component "make[s] a strong 
contribution to cultural emotion specificity", since 
culturally different concerns give rise to differences 
in the content of event types (ibid: 183). Shame again 
constitutes an example of a highly specific emotion 
(in this respect). Events are thus coded differently 
depending on "culturally formed expectations and 
situation definitions. " (ibid: 184). 
In particular, Mesquita and Frijda identify what 
they term "focal" event types (ibid). These 
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°... represent socially defined and shared 
concerns .. clear norms exist 
in the given 
culture on how to interpret such events and 
how to respond to them. " (ibid, emphasis 
added) . 38 
There are focal event types for shame in many 
cultures, but although shame is present in the West 
"... the eliciting situations are not focal 
ones ... They are less well defined, and they are not consistently categorized as 
shame situations. " (ibid) 
However, 
11. . many cultures share distinction of a 
number of less tangible event types. " 
(ibid: l83) 
Examples include injustice and insult (ibid). 
6.2.1.1 (c) Appraisal 
Cultural influence on the appraisal of emotion 
event types is apparently considerable and results in 
either the lack of capacity for and/or avoidance of 
particular appraisals. The primary reason for this 
appears to be the cultural regulation to which 
emotional appraisal is subject. " Such regulation 
takes two major forms: the first is the proscription 
by cultural norms of the 'feeling' of certain 
emotions. In certain cultures, members may be unable 
to interpret a situation as warranting, for example, 
anger, (due to the cultural disvaluing of this emotion 
and its expression). Thus, if 'anger' is not 
'allowed', the situation may be appraised so that a 
different emotion is elicited, such as 'sadness'. 
38Again, cf Armon Jones on the construal of 
situations and the 'prescriptive relation' between 
situations and emotional responses. 
39This supports the social constructionist view 
(identified earlier) of emotions as pre- or proscribed 
by culture. 
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The second form of cultural regulation is 
'reappraisal': 
"Certain groups may also avoid a particular 
mode of appraisal, say, that of the 
attribution of blame" (ibid: 185)40 
This can be achieved by rearranging the emphasis 
of an emotion-provoking situation so as to facilitate 
the experience of one emotion at the expense of 
another 'prohibited' or unacceptable one: 41 
"Events sometimes are not appraised in the 
way that would follow from the nature of 
those events; they are reappraised so as to 
be less painful or more acceptable to the 
person. " (ibid: 188)42 
Notwithstanding the influence attributed to 
culture by Mesquita & Frijda, they acknowledge that 
there may also be similarities in appraisals in 
respect of comparable emotions across cultures; 
however, they point out that such similarities may be 
the result of a form of tautology: 
"The agreement is not surprising, 
because emotion words are translated on the 
basis of, in part at least, such agreement. " 
(ibid: 186). 
40 cf Metge (1986: 33) on the Maori concept of 
whakamaa. 
41This may apply to shame and guilt in 'western' 
culture. Due to the greater acceptability and 
positive valuation of guilt in 'our' culture, it is 
possible that events expected to elicit shame may in 
fact result in guilt feelings (cf Lewis' discussion of 
"bypassed shame" in Chapter One above. This may be an 
example of reappraisal due to the cultural emphasis on 
guilt rather than shame). 
42This is a highly individualistic interpretation 
of the motivation for reappraisal which appears to 
contradict the claim for the cultural influence. 
Presumably it is possible that inditeduals might 
reappraise for personal reasons (though these are 
unlikely to be totally unaffected by culture). 
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6.2.1. i (d) Physiolo4ical reaction patterns 
Although many of the studies reviewed by Mesquita 
& Frijda suggest that physiological reactions to 
different emotions are universal, some cultural 
differences have been observed (189). The major 
cultural influence identified relates to the degree of 
emphasis given to the somatic dimension in the 
conceptualization of emotion. The conclusion is that: 
"Cultural emotion models that include 
physiological symptoms are more likely to 
draw attention to these symptoms than do 
cultural models that do not refer to them. " 
(ibid: 189) 
Thus, apparent cross-cultural differences in the 
physiology of emotions is unlikely to result from 
differences in actual physiological changes (although 
this has not been studied [ibid: 190]) but to 
differential cultural emphases on their perception. 
6.2.1.1 (e) Behaviour 
Whereas the evidence for the universality of 
facial and vocal expression of emotion is apparently 
convincing, there is still room for a degree of 
cultural influence on emotional behaviour. This 
posssibly relates 
"to different behavior repertoires, to 
differential availability of identical items 
in those repertoires, to differences in the 
degree to which the social environment 
provokes or prescribes particular behaviors. 
and to differential regulation of available 
behaviors. " (ibid: 195, emphasis added) 
Thus, as in the case of the physiological component in 
emotion, while universal behaviour repertoires and 
patterns may exist, these are still subject to 
considerable modification and "inhibitory regulation" 
(198) by cultural requirements, for example, 
concerning appropriateness of behaviour in specific 
circumstances. 
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6.2.1.1 (f) Regulation 
Reference to this has already been made in a 
number of the above contexts. 
6.2.1.1 (g) Summary and conclusions 
The influence of culture on many of the component 
elements of emotions, resulting in significant cross- 
cultural differences in those components, has been 
demonstrated. Of these: 
"Regulation processes probably are the most 
widely recognized source of historical as 
well as cultural variation in emotional 
phenomena ... " (ibid) 
and manifest themselves particularly in relation to 
"the feeling and displaying of emotions in particular 
situations" (ibid: 199). Event types also differ 
considerably cross-culturally, resulting in cross- 
cultural differences in appraisals. In particular, 
the "appraisal propensities" of different cultures are 
another source of variation, in all probability 
deriving from differential availability 
" .. due to their frequency of occurrence in the social environment, or their 
embeddedness in, or conflict with, 
prevailing ideology. " (ibid)43 
Finally, the generation of emotional behaviour also 
varies cross-culturally, such differences being 
attributable "to differential availability of 
universal behavior modes" (ibid). 
43This is the element which social 
constructionists emphasize. However, emphasis on one 
element results in a distorted view of the whole, cf Averill (op cit). 
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6.3 The component elements of shame 
It may be helpful at this point to consider the 
concept of shame outlined in Chapter One in terms of 
the above model. 
6.3.1 Antecedent events/event coding 
These are the situations giving rise to the 
experience of shame. As noted in Chapter One, they 
are myriad, and range from the more trivial (such as 
failure to observe conventions of dress, manners, 
etiquette etc. ) to the more serious (such as moral 
transgression). 
6.3.2 Appraisal 
Shameful events are appraised in terms of typical 
beliefs, evaluations/judgements and desires (i. e. 
cognitions). Thus, (cf Taylor's structural account), 
a typical belief may be: "I have been seen/may be seen 
in an inappropriate light". The ensuing evaluation 
is: "I am a lesser person than I thought", accompanied 
by the desire to hide, disappear, run away, etc. 
6.3.3 Physiological response (optional) 
In the case of shame, typical autonomic changes 
would be blushing, raised temperature ('feeling hot'), 
increased heartrate, etc. 
6.3.4 Action readiness and behaviour (including 
facial expression, vocal effects etc. ) 
The action readiness typically associated with 
shame is withdrawal (cf Ablamowicz op cit). This 
manifests itself in: averted eye-contact (i. e. looking 
away); quietness, hesitancy/stammering and 
125 
inarticulateness of speech. Later, shame may give 
rise to aggression (cf Epstein op cit) and/or contempt 
(cf Broucek op cit; Heller op cit; Wurmser op cit) . 
These are closely associated with the reappraisal of 
shame-eliciting events so that the experienced emotion 
is rage/anger (cf Lewis op cit; Loughead 1992). 
6.3.5 Regulation 
Shame appears to be subject to cultural 
regulation primarily in that, as noted above (cf Lewis 
op cit, discussed in Chapter One and below in Chapter 
Three), its availability is suppressed due to its low 
cultural evaluation. 
6.4 Emotions: universal or culture-specific? 
One of the purposes of this Chapter and the 
preceding one has been to look at two opposing 
perspectives in the debate as to the universality or 
cultural specificity of emotions. It remains to 
consider, in the light of these two chapters, whether 
any (firm) conclusions may be drawn in respect of this 
question. 
As Mesquita & Frijda note, 
"The issue of the universal versus cultural 
nature of emotions does not allow 
satisfactory solution unless the findings 
from the different research traditions are 
integrated into an overall framework. " (op 
cit: 179) 
By examining these findings in terms of the cognitive- 
process model of emotions outlined above, such 
integration is attempted. 
The conclusion is that on the above view, it 
becomes impossible to speak of the universality or 
cultural specificity of an emotion in its entirety: 
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°. . global statements about cross-cultural 
universality of emotion, or about their 
[sic] cultural determination, are 
inappropriate. " (op cit: 198) 
Rather, only the universality or cultural specificity 
of certain aspects of emotions can be assessed. 
However, given that, as Averill (1985: 97) notes, 
differences in one or more of the constituent elements 
of an emotion may fundamentally change the overall 
character of that emotion, it would appear that some 
degree of cross-cultural difference may be claimed for 
many emotions, while assertions of universality would 
have to be restricted to emotions in which no cross- 
cultural variation in any of the component elements 
could be found. 
Having explored contemporary understandings of 
shame in 'western' culture, and in particular, two 
major conflicting perspectives on the constitution of 
this emotion and concept and thus its nature and 
status in terms of universality or cultural 
specificity, attention will now be turned to the 
question of shame's salience and cultural evaluation. 
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SECTION B 
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND VALUE OF SHAME IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND MORAL LIFE 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE AND VALUE OF SHAME 
In this Chapter, attention moves from the 
question concerning what is understood by shame, to 
the role, if any, it plays in contemporary social and 
moral life and the related question as to the relative 
benefits and disadvantages of any such role. There 
are thus two 'debates', concerning i) the current 
significance and ii) the value of shame. 
At this point, it is necessary to make an 
important distinction, which has not yet been explored 
in this study, between two different interpretations 
of shame. It was noted in Chapter One that in 'our' 
society, the most common interpretation of shame is 
that which views it as an emotion. However, in earlier 
periods another, complementary, interpretation was 
equally accepted. This may be termed the disposition 
towards or sense of shame (cf Schneider 1977: 18-22). 
It is the latter which is most often seen as having 
ceased to play an active role, while a corresponding 
rise in its opposite, 'shamelessness', is identified. 
Nonetheless, there are also those who consider that 
the emotion of shame is no longer an important one for 
adults in our society. 
Structure and method 
This Chapter will be divided into three sections, 
in each of which, each of these "two faces of shame" 
(Schneider op cit) will be considered separately. In 
the first section, the question as to whether shame is 
still salient in late twentieth century 'western' 
society will be addressed. Perhaps inevitably, there 
are two opposing views on this. On the one hand, it 
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is claimed that shame has disappeared. On the other, 
it is claimed that the emotion of shame continues to 
be highly influential, yet the tendency is for it to 
be unacknowledged or denied. The views of 
representatives of each position will be examined, 
with the emphasis on attending to the empirical 
evidence for each. 
In the second section, based on the premise that 
shame is still a significant element in our 
experience, the question is explored whether it should 
be eliminated or encouraged, and why, i. e., the 
respective arguments for the negative and positive 
value of shame are considered. In addition, the 
related debate as to the moral value of shame, and 
indeed, whether shame can in any way be conceived of 
as a moral concept, is examined. 
The third section is concerned with summarizing 
and evaluating the various positions. 
The subject matter of this Chapter again dictates 
that consideration of the works of various individual 
representatives of each side in each 'debate' will 
figure prominently, especially where a certain author 
makes a particularly significant contribution to such 
a debate. Comparisons and contrasts between these 
will be made where relevant. However, on some of the 
more general issues arising from such consideration, 
the approach will be more discursive, drawing on a 
selection of sources as appropriate. 
, ti 
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SECTION 1: SHAME'S SIGNIFICANCE 
1.1 The influence of Freud 
As indicated in the Introduction, it is believed 
by some that the views of Freud on shame were to a 
considerable extent responsible for the lack of 
intellectual attention given to this concept. What is 
not clear is whether the influence of Freud has 
contributed to an alleged decline not only in the 
attention it has received in various intellectual 
disciplines but also in the actual experience of shame 
by individuals in society. 
To present a detailed account and criticism of 
Freud's own writings on shame would require a degree 
of expertise and specialist knowledge of his general 
thought not possessed by the current author. In 
addition, in keeping with the general approach adopted 
throughout this study, reconsideration of 'classic' 
texts on shame which have already received substantial 
academic attention has been limited, to allow 
concentration on more contemporary and revisionary 
studies which may be less familiar, particularly to 
philosophers. As such, this section will be 
restricted to a consideration of the influence of 
Freud on the perception of, and attention given to, 
shame by subsequent contributors in the psychoanalytic 
tradition and beyond. To this end, a number of 
secondary sources will be drawn on. 
A number of authorities are agreed that Freud's 
own attention to shame was limited and that his 
various ideas as to its origins, nature and value were 
inconsistent (cf Broucek op cit: l1-12; Hazard 
1969: 262-263,267; Lansky op cit). Various 
possibilities have been put forward as reasons for 
Freud's general neglect of shame in favour of 
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concentration on anxiety and guilt. For example, 
according to Broucek, Freud's inattention to shame was 
not accidental but an inevitable consequence of the 
fact, noted by several writers (Mannoni 1982; Morrison 
1989; Tomkins 1963), that shame issues were highly 
salient in Freud's own personal early development and 
personality (Broucek op cit: 17). 
In addition, Broucek speculates that the 
conformity of Freud's "circle of disciples" to his 
ideas rested on shame anxiety, and specifically the 
threat of expulsion from the group (cf Piers 1953). 
He sees this dependence of the psychoanalytic 
movement's solidarity on such shame anxiety as a 
further reason for shame's neglect by Freud and his 
successors (Broucek op cit: 18). 
Such reasons are necessarily speculative. 
Regardless of the relative plausibility of such 
interpretations, there is however a general consensus 
that Freud failed to retain shame as a central focus 
of concern' and that, given that Freudian theory has 
also largely become 'folk theory' in much of western 
culture', his omission in this respect led not only to 
the neglect of consideration of shame in 
psychoanalytic theory but also to a general cultural 
3 neglect of and disrespect for shame. Freud's legacy 
lcf Lansky op cit: 1077-1079. 
2Thrane (op cit: 140) refers 
incalculable cultural influence 
teachings. "; Broucek (op cit: 148) 
enormous influence of Freudian ideas 
community, the intelligentsia, and tho 
in the first half of this century .., 
to "... the 
of Freud's 
refers to "The 
on the artistic 
educated public 
3But cf Lutz (1988: 222) on the "dialectical 
relationship between academic and everyday thought" 
and the absence of "a one way structuring influence 
from social science to everyday thought". Cf also 
subsection 3.3.1 below on the factors influencing the 
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in terms of the evaluation of shame will be considered 
in more detail in subsection 2. l. ii below. 
1.2 The disappearance of shame 
Claims that shame, however it be interpreted, has 
'disappeared' from contemporary life tend to originate 
from writers who are primarily concerned to argue that 
shame has a positive value which has been overlooked 
by the majority of contemporary thinkers. Whilst the 
question of shame's value will be discussed below, in 
Section Two, the concern of this subsection is to 
assess the validity of the above claim. 
1.2. i The disappearance of the 'sense of shame' 
As noted above, it is the contemporary absence of 
a sense of shame which is most often claimed (and 
lamented) by commentators. Perhaps the most notable 
of these is Schneider (op cit). Schneider classifies 
his approach as "philosophical anthropology" (op 
cit: x); however, even within the psychoanalytic field 
(traditionally concerned with the 'intrapsychic' role 
of shame the emotion), there have also been recent 
calls for a revival of this aspect of shame (cf 
Broucek op cit). 
1.2. i. a) Schneider (1977) 
One of the greatest achievements of Schneider's 
work is to retrieve the alternative interpretation of 
shame from near extinction and to distinguish it from 
that in common usage. By broadening the referents of 
his enquiry to include more than just the emotion of 
shame, Schneider achieves a more comprehensive and 
'fall and rise' of shame in 'our' culture. 
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adequate characterization of shame than many other 
twentieth century commentators on shame in psychology, 
anthropology and philosophy. Having done so, however, 
the emphasis from then on is on this interpretation, 
to the extent that the emotion of shame is given 
little attention. Nonetheless, in bringing out the 
distinction between the emotion of shame and other 
aspects which may be described as more 
'dispositional', Schneider does alert one to the way 
in which shame may be differentially valued, according 
to which aspect is under discussion. 
Schneider reminds the reader that whereas all the 
Indo-European languages have at least two words to 
express the idea of shame', English has only the one, 
which, as noted above, nowadays almost exclusively 
denotes the emotion (18). This lack of a specific 
term to convey the idea of something other than, yet 
related to, the emotion of shame coincides with the 
alleged demise of the unnamed attitude itself. 
4For example, the French terms are pudeur and 
honte; cf Lynd (op cit: 24): "Pudeur ... is associated particularly with the covering up of sex; it is 
modesty, bashfulness ... Pudeur may keep one from an 
act ... "; "Honte adds to these disgrace, a loss of honour in the eyes of others ... honte may be felt 
after an act. " Greek and Latin have even more 
lexical items to denote the variants of the family of 
shame phenomena: in the former, the most well known 
are is dos (reverence, awe, respect, shame) and 
aischyne (shame, dishonour) in addition to aeikes, 
entrope and elencheie; in the latter, pudor (the 
feeling of shame, modesty) is coupled with verecundia 
(shame, modesty, shyness, awe), and includes the less 
common macula and turpitudo (Schneider op cit: 18,145 
[notes 1,2 & 4]). Lynd and Schneider are in 
disagreement as to the position with regard to German: 
Lynd identifies only one word connoting shame (Scham) 
(Lynd op cit: 24), whereas Schneider mentions both this 
and Schande, the former most closely resembling 
modesty, the latter dishonour or disgrace (Schneider 
op cit: 18,145 [note 3]). 
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What then is the 'sense of shame' and how does it 
differ from shame the emotion? Schneider expresses 
the distinction in terms of one between a forward- 
looking disposition, operating "as a positive 
restraining influence" (18) to prevent one from doing 
that which may provoke a retrospective feeling of 
disgrace. Thus, the sense of shame is equivalent to 
discretion, while the emotion of shame is equivalent 
to disgrace. Such a distinction does not, however, 
reflect the complexity of each "face of shame" and 
their interrelationship. 
In previous eras in English society (e. g. the 
Victorian era), the sense of shame was a recognized, 
highly valued and powerful disposition or attitude. 
Its primary manifestation then was as modesty (which 
is probably the word in the English language which 
came closest to being a synonym for the sense of 
shame), particularly with respect to sexual matters 
(cf Ellis 1936). 5 However, this is by no means its 
sole application. The sense of shame may also work to 
protect one from the violation of one's privacy 
(Schneider op cit: chapter 5); to prevent exposure of 
the more 'animal' aspects of existence, such as eating 
and elimination (chapter 7); to afford a sense of 
dignity to the dead and dying (chapter 8) and to 
maintain an important reverence or respect in 
religious matters (chapter 10). 
Schneider contends that there is a general belief 
in contemporary twentieth century society (most 
notably amongst social scientists - especially 
psychoanalysts and feminists) that shame is an 
5 In current usage, however, the term 'modesty' 
has all but lost its earlier connotations, now being 
understood more as conveying "images of femininity, 
self-effacement, prudishness, and bourgeois inhibition. " (Schneider op cit: 146, n. 8. ) 
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essentially negative and repressive emotion/concept, 
hampering individual fulfilment, and that therefore it 
should be eliminated: 
"The contemporary estimate of shame is 
negative; shame and the realm of the private 
are perceived primarily as obstacles to be 
overcome, along with all oppressive forms 
and structures. "(xiii)6 
According to Schneider, the disappearance of 
shame is the legacy of 
6But cf Richards (op cit) who maintains that there 
is a desire amongst several moral philosophers for an 
'enlightened morality' based on a sense of excellences 
and the associated emotion of shame, to replace a 
'guilt morality'. 
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"... the Enlightenment ideals of reason and 
individual autonomy ... The practical 
consequence of this ideal was a determina- 
tion to remove shame from human experience 
in order to prove the point that reason 
could triumph over custom, tradition, and 
shame, and lead to human liberation. " (1) 
As noted above, it is Schneider's purpose to 
demonstrate that such a view is mistaken and 
misguided, since shame is in fact valuable. His 
arguments concerning what constitutes shame's positive 
value will be considered in Section Two below. 
1.2. ii Disappearance of shame the emotion 
Claims in the literature on the emotions of shame 
and guilt that shame has disappeared tend to be 
unsubstantiated by reference to empirical evidence, 
and appear rather to derive from the personal 
intuitions of individual writers. This again 
highlights the value which consideration of empirical 
research (such as that conducted by phenomenologists, 
e. g. Ablamowicz [op cit], and anthropologists, with 
their emphasis on ethnographic fieldwork) into the 
emotions actually experienced by people in their 
everyday lives would have in giving validity and 
authenticity to such claims. Furthermore, such 
generalized assertions fail to take into account 
possible differences in the experience of certain 
emotions between different sectors of the population 
(e. g. class and gender differences) and in different 
contexts (e. g. 'total institutions', c. f. Goffman 
1961). Thus, while shame may apparently be an 
infrequent emotional occurrence among male academics 
in philosophy or social science', this does not 
necessarily imply that its experience is similarly 
7Although cf Ablamowicz's study of PhD students, 
cited in Chapter 1 above. 
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rare amongst, for example, infertile women, or members 
of the Armed Forces. 
In addition, the frequency with which references 
to shame once occurred in literature is often cited as 
evidence of its erstwhile salience (cf Lynd 1958), 
with the implication that an apparent paucity of such 
references in modern texts is an indication that shame 
is indeed less relevant in contemporary life. 
However, in more than one recent novel (cf Fine 1994; 
Mackay 1992; Piercy 1995; Trollope 1989), shame- 
inducing situations and shame experiences are 
explicitly described. Similarly, in recent years 
there have been a number of newspaper headlines 
featuring the word 'shame '. 8 Such explicit public 
usage of shame terminology suggests that far from 
having ceased to feature in the lives of late 
twentieth century 'western' individuals, shame is in 
fact still very much 'alive and kicking". ' 
Finally, and notwithstanding the possible 
instances of shame given above, the idea that shame 
has all but 'disappeared' from the Western 'emotional 
repertoire' may derive from the apparent lack of 
'Both the incident in which Chancellor Lamont was 
discovered to have used a government credit card in an 
off-licence, and that in which the footballer Eric 
Cantona caused grievous bodily harm to a spectator at 
a match, gave rise to such headlines in the popular 
press, as did the conviction of a Bristol doctor on a 
charge of drug abuse. 
9Usage of such expressions as ' it's a shame', ' for 
shame! ' and 'you should be ashamed of yourself' is 
also still common. However, it is possible that these 
function more as exclamations denoting general and 
diffuse disapproval than as genuine indicators of a 
significant and meaningful conception of 'shame 
proper'. 
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explicit reports of it as a frequent element in many 
individuals' emotional experience. 10 
The debate as to whether shame actually has 
disappeared, or just become less visible in our, 
culture, strongly resonates with the contention of 
Levy (1984: 219,227) that in every culture, certain 
emotions are "hyper-" or "hypocognized". li 
Hypercognition refers to those emotions which 
constitute an important focus in emotional life 
and which consequently receive great cultural 
elaboration and "culturally provided schemata for 
interpreting and dealing with [them]. " (ibid: 219). 
Conversely, hypocognition refers to those emotions 
which receive a minimal degree of such cultural 
attention and schematization. 12 
The forms such hypocognition takes are multiple; 
they include linguistic aspects (cf Scheff 1990a: 17). 
Thus, in 'our' culture, it may be that the feelings of 
shame, for example, are no longer described 
""This raises the question as to whether it is 
only those emotions which are overtly recognized and 
discussed which may be experienced, or whether it is 
possible to experience emotions without giving them 
such recognition. Cf Levy (1984: 228): °I am not ... 
positing a simple Whorfian situation in which it is 
sufficient that the un-named cannot be thought. " 
11cf Mesquita and Frijda 1992: 184-185 on the 
"focality" of certain emotion "event types". Which 
emotions come into which category is dependent on the 
degree of cultural value which attaches to those 
emotions, cf the social constructionist claim that 
there are cultural rules according to which certain 
emotions are prescribed or proscribed; see Chapter Two 
above. 
"Examples of the former in Tahiti (the culture in 
which Levy's fieldwork experience engendered these 
notions) include 'anger' and 'shame'; examples of the latter include 'sadness' and 'guilt'. 
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specifically as such but translated into generalized 
terms such as anxiety, discomfort, awkwardness etc. 
(Scheff 1988: 401). 13 In addition, as noted above, 
they include moral or ethical aspects, i. e. valuation. 
Adoption of this 'hypocognition thesis' would 
thus imply that the 'disappearance' of shame referred 
to by some authorities is in fact an illusion; what in 
fact has happened is that (for reasons to be explored 
below) there is, rather, widespread cultural and 
individual denial of the emotion of shame. 
Levy does not (in the paper cited) address the 
question as to why certain emotions are so emphasized 
or minimized; in particular, he does not consider 
possible historical variations in the differential 
emphasis on certain emotions. "' However, if his 
theory is correct, it may be that shame, once a 
"commanding concept" in our society (Braithwaite 
1989: viii) has gradually become hypocognized in favour 
of guilt, which is now hypercognized. Possible 
explanations for such a situation will be considered 
below. 
1.3 The denial of the emotion of shame 
13Cf Levy (op cit: 234, note 7, citing Silvan 
Tomkins [personal communication]) : 11 ... a distinction has to be made between culturally induced 
hypocognition and the cultural mislabeling of an 
emotion. Both the cultural nonrecognition of the 
relational causes of an emotional feeling and a set of 
substitute explanations, which may or may not be 
elaborated, are aspects of the same stance toward the 
emotion-generating situation, namely, denial. " 
14cf Harre & Finlay Jones (1986) on "Emotion Talk 
Across Times". 
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Lynd was one of the earliest to observe the 
atrophy of the use of shame terminology: 
"The word shame - or talk of being ashamed 
of ourselves - does not occur as frequently 
in conversation today as it did, for 
example, in the conversations of Tolstoy's 
characters . But 
it is doubtful whether 
the sense of shame has disappeared from 
actual experience to the extent that it has 
disappeared from our speech and from the 
forefront of our consciousness. It may be 
that the experience is no less common than 
at some other periods but that it is more 
elusive and that we are more loath to 
recognize it. " (op cit: 19) 
Despite this observation, however, Lynd did not make 
any serious attempt to explain shame's apparent 
decline. 
This idea that rather than having disappeared, 
shame is denied in our culture, and the possible 
reasons for its denial, is given the fullest 
exploration by two authorities from different 
disciplinary perspectives. Of these, the work of 
Lewis (1971), in the field of psychopathology and 
psychotherapy, is the earlier, and has been outlined 
in Chapter One above. The sociological theory of the 
denial of shame expounded by the other, Scheff (1990a) 
is based on, and is an extension of, Lewis's findings 
concerning the individual denial of shame. 
1.3.1 Lewis (1971) 
A brief recapitulation of Lewis' views on the 
denial of shame is necessary here. 
As noted in Chapter One above, Lewis's major 
discovery was that, although the emotion of shame was 
rarely, if ever, directly recognized or verbally 
reported as such by clients, their behaviour was 
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manifest evidence that they were indeed experiencing 
shame. 
Lewis identified two variants of the 'denial' of 
shame in her clients (op cit: 196-197): a) "overt, 
undifferentiated shame" and b) "bypassed shame". 15 
The first refers to shame which, whilst clearly 
being painfully experienced (as evidenced by 
behaviour) was nonetheless either mis- or un-named by 
the client: 
"In the first pattern of denial, shame 
affect is overt or available to 
consciousness but the person experiencing it 
either will not or cannot identify it. " 
(Lewis op cit: 196) 
Moreover, it appears that in a situation in which 
a person simultaneously experiences guilt an shame 
(the former for some action or omission, the latter 
for thus failing to meet expectations), the guilt 
tends to dominate awareness, absorbing the shame 
feeling, however strong (ibid: 197). 
The second refers to what might be classified as 
shame "denial" proper, or the avoidance of the pain of 
shame (Scheff 1988: 402). It involves 'diverting' or 
'transforming' the potential emotional experience of 
shame into a different 'mode', so that while 
"antecedent events" (Mesquita and Frijda op cit) 
recounted by the client were such that it might be 
expected that the emotion aroused would be shame, the 
result was not shame but rather ideation which Lewis 
terms 'obsessive', that is, 
15These two aspects of the denial of shame, albeit individual denial, clearly correspond to Levy's points 
about cultural emotional mislabelling and "hypocogni- 
tion" respectively (Levy op cit; see footnote 13 
above). 
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"hyperactive thought, speech, or actions" 
(Scheff op cit: 402), 
often specifically translated as guilt (Lewis 
1971: 233). Lewis calls this variant "bypassed" shame 
because 
°... the affective component of shame 
experience is what is bypassed. " (ibid); 
in other words, the expected emotion does not occur 
because its denial makes it unavailable (197). 16 
1.3.11 Scheff (1988; 1990a) 
Scheff interprets Lewis' findings as evidence of 
a wider, cultural denial of shame. He stresses 
shame's near-invisibility in our culture (1988: 398- 
402) and argues that painful emotions, such as grief 
(or "distress-anguish" [Tomkins 1963]) and shame are 
defended against by disguising them as, or replacing 
them with, other emotions. Thus, distress or sadness 
is frequently transformed into anger; likewise, shame 
is transformed into, for example, rage and/or guilt. "' 
Where Scheff's work extends Lewis' is in its 
attempt to discover the reasons for the cultural and 
individual denial or avoidance of shame. Whereas the 
emphasis in psychological and psychoanalytical 
writings about shame is on the intrapsychic pain of 
its experience for the individual as the reason for 
its avoidance, Scheff, while not disputing this pain, 
explains shame's denial as symptomatic of a threat to, 
or actual disintegration of, social bonds. 1° He 
16This looks very much like an example of "reappraisal" as discussed by Mesquita & Frijda (op 
cit). 
"'Again, cf the discussion of "reappraisal" in 
Chapter Two above. 
l"Scheff contends that this notion of a social bond has itself not been fully analyzed (1990a). 
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considers that in our society, social bonds have 
become either threatened or actually severed as a 
result of the destruction of community caused by rapid 
industrialization and modernization (cf Tonnies' 
[1887] on the rise of Gesellschaft and the demise of 
Gemeinschaft). The cultural response to this 
situation is to deny the importance of the social bond 
and the associated emotions of pride and shame (seen 
as indicators of the state of such bonds, i. e. pride 
= intact bond; shame = threatened or severed bond: 
1990a: 15). Such denial takes the form of the adoption 
of the ideology of individualism, with its insistence 
on the individual's autonomy and self-sufficiency. 
This is thus a "defensive myth" (12), rationalizing an 
unavoidable situation and effectively 'making a virtue 
out of a necessity'. 19 
Thus, it may be seen that, whereas psycho- 
analytical interpretations of shame avoidance are 
instances of methodological individualism, Scheff's 
account of this phenomenon takes a sociological 
perspective, emphasizing the influence of wider 
sociocultural factors on the denial of shame. 
SECTION 2: THE VALUE OF SHAME 
As noted above, a number of authorities consider 
the current prevailing valuation of shame in both its 
guises to be a negative one (Ablamowicz op cit: 32; 
19Schneider too identifies the rejection of shame 
as symptomatic of the rejection of "radical sociality" 
which prevails in Anglo-American culture: "Our age 
rejects shame because it rejects our bond with the 
Other. " (op cit: 135-136). He argues that it is our 
"doctrinaire individualism" which leads us to desire 
the excision of shame. Unlike Scheff, however, he 
does not explain the denial of such solidarity as 
something not freely chosen, but a necessary means of 
self-preservation in the face of genuine isolation 
from others as a result of social change. 
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Broucek op cit; Schneider op cit: xiii). Accordingly, 
the nature of this view of shame will be explored 
first, followed by an examination of the alternative 
position which emphasizes the unrecognized or 
unacknowledged positive aspects of shame and the sense 
of shame. 
2.1 The negative value of shame 
2.1.1 The sense of shame 
Again, Schneider is probably the authority who 
shows up most clearly the devaluation of the sense of 
shame by many twentieth century writers. This will be 
returned to after a brief consideration of Freud's 
influence on the evaluation of the emotion of shame. 
2.1.11 The emotion of shame 
As identified in subsection 1.1 above, Freud's 
neglect of shame is regarded as a major contributory 
factor in the overall neglect of shame in academic 
fields and its general diminishment in importance 
during a large part of this century. However, it is 
sometimes suggested that Freud's influence extends 
further. There is a general consensus among 
psychoanalysts that Freud viewed shame as primarily a 
negative concept and that this has coloured the 
perception and evaluation of shame not only by 
subsequent practitioners and theorists within the 
psychoanalytical tradition but also more widely in 
society as a whole. 
However, the implication that Freud viewed shame 
purely negatively may be an oversimplification. In 
keeping with his various (apparently inconsistent) 
thoughts about shame, Freud's views as to the 
"utility" of shame (Hazard op cit: 256-258) also appear 
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to vary depending on the context in which he discusses 
it. 2° 
Hazard considers that Freud possibly viewed shame 
as both good and bad, in that at the appropriate phase 
of life (i. e. 
"up to the time of sexual maturity and the 
genital integration of the sexual instincts 
characteristic of adults" [ibid: 263]) 
shame is beneficial, but after that time it is 
inappropriate and bad, since the mature character 
should be able to resist instinctual temptations 
without the aid of shame (ibid: 264). 
If shame is thus seen as an appropriate and 
beneficial force at certain stages of development, 
but its persistence into maturity as inappropriate and 
unwelcome, it thus becomes clearer why Freud appears 
to have primarily regarded it negatively. 
20Hazard identifies a number of ways in which, 
according to Freud, shame may be seen as positive and 
beneficial, both for the individual and for society. 
Firstly, in relation to sexuality (particularly in 
childhood prior to puberty, i. e. the "latency 
period"): "Shame functions, ... , to control instincts 
that are perverse and to hinder these [sic] that are 
unutilizable. ° (ibid: 256). In addition, shame aids in 
the development of an integrated personality "... by 
restricting sexuality until such time as it is able to 
be directed towards its normal object -a mature 
person of the opposite sex. " (ibid: 257) and a normal 
character (understood as "the collection of ... permanent modifications of the ego, which we have 
acquired in the course of reaching maturity. " 
[ibid: 264]) - since shame is one of the mechanisms by 
which such modification is achieved. 
The social value of shame is that being one of 
the means by which sexual inclinations are diverted 
from their natural fulfilment (i. e. "sublimated") into 
other channels, such as cultural creativity, it thus 
helps to ensure the preservation of civilization 
(ibid: 258). 
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It is in relation to the psychoanalytical process 
itself that the idea that Freud regarded shame as 
negative is perhaps most justified. Indeed, Lansky 
begins his historical account of the role of shame in 
psychoanalytical theory with the recognition by Freud 
(in collaboration with his colleague Breuer) that in 
his clinical work with hysterical patients, shame was 
"... a psychical force ... [which] ... I have had to overcome .. ° (Breuer & Freud 
1893-1895: 268-269, cited in Lansky op 
cit: 1076). 
As Lansky notes: 
"This view of shame (as a motive for 
defense) puts defense against painful 
awareness at the center of psychoanalysis. 
Repression, the generic word for defense at 
the time, is the expulsion from 
consciousness of any awareness that would 
evoke painful affect, the foremost of which 
is shame. " (ibid) 
Given the aim of psychoanalysis, namely the 
assistance of the healthy integrated functioning of 
the patient's ego, through the bringing to 
consciousness of that which is repressed, shame thus 
constitutes a barrier to its achievement and 
inevitably becomes something which is regarded as 
undesirable and harmful. It is thus not in dispute 
that in this respect, Freud viewed shame negatively, 
seeing it as a repressive force and an obstacle to the 
analytic process (Broucek op cit: 12). 21 Later 
21It is important to note that shame is related to 
repression in two ways. Firstly, according to Freud, 
it functions as a mechanism of repression, i. e., as a 
"reaction-formation" or "mental dam" it is "one of the 
mechanisms used in th [e] denial ... of perverse and 
unusable instincts" (Hazard op cit: 256) which are 
painful. Secondly, shame itself is subject to 
repression by individuals because shameful experiences 
are themselves painful. It is repressed shame to 
which writers such as Lewis (op cit) and Loughead 
(1992) refer, and which is seen by many contemporary 
therapists as the 'evil which must be routed' for the 
psychic health of the individual. 
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psychoanalysts have, until relatively recently, 
persisted in such a view (cf e. g. Loughead 1992) and 
in the belief that shame also interferes with the 
normal, healthy psychic functioning of an individual. 
In keeping with this, the current emphasis in 
psychoanalytical and counselling practice is thus on 
helping patients to rid themselves of so-called "toxic 
shame" (ibid). 
2.2 The positive value of shame 
2.2.1 The sense of shame 
According to Schneider, shame is valuable for two 
reasons. The first is that the capacity for shame is 
in part what constitutes our humanity: 
"Shame is the partner of value awareness; 
its very occurrence arises from the fact 
that we are valuing animals. " (p. xiv - xv) 
Also: 
" [Shame is] a universal and intrinsic aspect 
of human nature man possesses the 
faculty of shame; other animals do not; we 
may define man, therefore, as the animal 
capable of shame. '" (6, citing Soloviev, 
"The Justification of the Good", 1918 
translation) 
The second reason is that shame has a dimension which 
is either overlooked or not recognized by those who 
seek to eradicate shame, but which Schneider sees as 
a highly positive one. 
As indicated before, Schneider's primary 
objective is to refute the negative valuation of 
shame. Thus, his conclusions reflect his claim for the 
positive value of shame. They are simple: shame 
(particularly the "sense of shame") works in a 
beneficial way (for the individual at least: Schneider 







and we ignore 
detriment. 
of shame as it relates to the 
i, in particular, on its role in 
the private sphere from 
[xi]), 
or attempt to overcome it to our 
It is this idea of the protective role of the 
sense of shame and the corresponding idea of a private 
realm of life and experience which requires 
protection, on which Schneider places perhaps the 
greatest, and most repeated emphasis throughout his 
work. Having identified the root meaning and 
associations of shame in covering and exposure 
(Chapter 4), he proceeds to argue that all cultures 
designate certain things as not for public 'display' 
(despite variations in what those things are): 
"There is [a] category of phenomena that are 
not negatively valued or seen as discredit- 
ing [as in the objects of "disgrace-shame"] 
but that arouse shame by the act of their 
mere exposure" (36); 
11... there are some matters that properly 
should not be displayed and call forth shame 
when they are. " (37). 
The sense of shame is what actively ensures that that 
which should not be exposed a indeed covered. 
Schneider identifies three sub-categories of 
phenomena which require the protection of shame: 
firstly, those "whose display alters their basic 
character" (e. g. prayer, 'goodness'/charity, secret 
adverse knowledge); secondly, those that are 
"specially symbolic of an individual" (e. g. names, 
faces, the body and possessions) and finally, those 
"in which either the physical or emotional 
aspects of existence appear to pre-dominate" 
(43). 
Of these, it is the latter to which Schneider pays 
most attention, devoting three chapters to a detailed 
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consideration of specific cases (i. e. sex, eating and 
elimination, and death) where the sense of shame 
functions to protect those private spheres which 
should not be violated. His concentration on this 
sub-category reflects a recognition (which others have 
also made) of the apparent connection between shame 
and beliefs concerning, and attitudes towards, the 
relationship of 'nature' to 'culture', 'body' to 
'spirit' or 'animalitas' to 'humanitas'. Schneider 
calls this "the equivocal self-body relation" (49). 
Earlier, he quotes Soloviev: 
"[Shame] 'determines man's ethical relation 
to his material nature. Man is ashamed of 
being dominated or ruled by it", (6). 
Schneider adds to this being "reduced" to it: 
"As symbol- and meaning-creating beings we 
experience a distinctive tension between 
being a body and yet transcending that body. 
We clothe our naked physical acts with these 
symbols and meanings. The body stripped of 
its human [symbolic] meanings is only a 
denuded part. The open display of bodily 
functions ... threatens the dignity of the individual, revealing an individual 
vulnerable to being reduced to his bodily 
existence, bound by necessity., (49) 
This idea that shame is intimately linked to 
humanity's awareness of its uniquely ambivalent 
position (in terms of both being part of, yet also to 
some extent transcending, 'nature') is thus one of 
Schneider's central preoccupations, together with the 
related idea, referred to earlier, that shame is thus 
the distinguishing mark of the human. 22 
The category of the private, of which bodily 
functions are just one member, is Schneider's other 
main concern. Privacy (like shame) is, according to 
Schneider, undervalued in contemporary society: 
22This dimension of shame is a prominent feature 
of the 'metaphysical' shame accounts of e. g. Hegel and Scheler, to be explored more fully in Chapter 5 below. 
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"Privacy ... is equated with uninvolvement 
with one's neighbor's needs ... Privacy is interpreted as either 'a fall from a primal 
condition of social communion or personal 
wholeness', or as an escape from social 
responsibilities. For the idealist, 
privacy deprives human beings of their 
essential communal nature. For the realist, 
private man is selfish, and must be 
restrained for the common good. In either 
view, privacy is immoral ... This view is 
widely held in our'society. It is, however, 
an inadequate and shortsighted analysis of 
privacy. " (41) 
He proceeds to cite or paraphrase various authors who 
have demonstrated the value and necessity of privacy 
"both for the maintenance and the 
improvement of self and society" (ibid). 
In particular, privacy is seen as 
"allow [ing] for backstage areas and 
remissive spaces where it is not always 
incumbent upon individuals to maintain their 
proper roles. " (41: paraphrasing Merton 
1957). 
Privacy is also essential "for achieving certain 
aesthetic, scientific, and spiritual ends" 
and is "an operative principle" in personal relation- 
ships which "depend on an excluding condition" (42). 
His investigation of the private is, however, 
ultimately related to that of the value of shame for 
its protection. 
Evaluation 
What may be said about Schneider's preoccupations 
and the assumptions they embody? Firstly, in his 
treatment of shame and privacy, it is clear that 
Schneider is writing from a perspective which regards 
(and values) the individual as the fundamental entity, 
with rights and needs which demand and deserve 
protection. Therefore, despite his attempt (which is 
to be applauded) to incorporate anthropological and 
historical data in his investigation, he fails to 
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follow through the implications of doing so, which are 
that other-cultural concepts, beliefs and values (e. g. 
concerning the relation of individual to society) may 
be different and thus have an important bearing on how 
shame is conceived and 'works'. 
The same criticism may be applied to his (very 
ethnocentric) notion of privacy. The assumption is 
that privacy is a universally relevant and important 
concept. Admittedly, Schneider allows that the 
content of 'the private' may vary cross-culturally 
(40), but he then goes on to define that content very 
specifically (43) without making it clear that he does 
not intend his definition to be considered a universal 
one. In addition, he does not take into account the 
fact that where privacy is either impractical, or not 
highly valued, (or both), the claim that shame plays 
this extensive, vital and specific role is possibly 
suspect. It must be conceded that he makes reference 
to the fact that the ancient Greeks regarded the 
private as 
"a diminished, if not degenerative, mode of 
existence" (42), 
which was held in 
"contempt as the sphere of mere animal 
existence. ... the public was indisputably the more valued realm for the Greeks. " (153, 
n. 10). 
However, he then proceeds with his insistence on the 
value of privacy, as though such a difference in view 
is insignificant or irrelevant. In particular, the 
idea that 'individuals' have separate 'roles' which 
may be 'shed' in private is, as extensive cross- 
cultural research has shown, (cf Chapter Two above), 
also highly ethnocentric and therefore suspect. 
So far as the idea that shame is closely linked 
to a specific view of the animalitas/humanitas 
relationship is concerned, this too is open to 
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confirmation or refutation after empirical 
investigation, rather than capable of being stated 
unequivocally. While it is possible that peoples 
everywhere place a differential value on the 'natural' 
and the 'social/cultural' aspects of their existence, 
it cannot be automatically assumed that the latter is 
always favoured over the former. It is even possible 
that this dualistic conception is absent in some 
cultures, which would have important implications for 
Schneider's (and others') claims. It is interesting, 
however, that the Greek view just referred to 
resonates with this disvaluing of the "animal", as do 
the beliefs of the Baining of Papua New Guinea (c. f. 
Fajans 1983). However, if one wishes to claim a major 
association between such views and the function of 
shame, it is important to investigate just what those 
views actually are. 
The main weaknesses of Schneider's study are 
inherent in his potentially invalid assumptions, 
already discussed. However, since he is arguing for 
the value of shame in 'our' society, it may be argued 
that it is legitimate only to concern himself with how 
it relates to 'our'notions of the individual, privacy, 
etc. (although it is suspect to introduce partial 
evidence from other cultures intended to support his 
claims and then generalize about shame on the basis of 
his own cultural presuppositions). 
A major strength of Schneider's work is his 
incorporation of material concerning shame in other 
cultures (albeit in a limited way and notwithstanding 
the criticisms already made of his shortcomings 
concerning his method of dealing with cross-cultural 
data). This has the effect of showing that current 
conceptualizations and analyses of shame are too 
narrow, and restrictive of a full understanding. 
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In addition, by paying careful attention to 
specific cases of shame (in his treatment of various 
bodily functions), Schneider demonstrates his 
recognition of the significance of these for an 
appreciation of the value and function of shame. 
Thus, Schneider's study makes an important and 
valuable contribution to the understanding of shame, 
despite its normative position which necessarily leads 
to an emphasis on the positive dimension (which may in 
itself be a valuable corrective, given the one-sided 
nature of other treatments of the subject). 
In addition, in opening up questions such as 'what is 
shame? '; 'what 'kind' of shame is prevalent in a 
society (and why)? '; and 'what has shame meant/does 
shame mean in other historical periods/cultures? ' - 
Schneider's work is of immense value. 
2.2.11 The positive value of shame the emotion 
The view of shame examined in section 2.1. ii 
above is, as various commentators have noted, now so 
pervasive that the idea that shame could have a 
beneficial aspect is almost impossible for many people 
to conceive. Nonetheless, a number of researchers 
have independently identified that shame in fact has 
an ambivalent nature (cf Tomkins 1967: 137), the 
apparently overwhelming negative aspect being 
countered by an aspect which works in a way which is 
of value from both an individual and a social 
perspective. These two different perspectives will be 
examined in turn. 
2.2.11 (a) The value of shame for the individual 
Not surprisingly, despite his emphasis on the 
value of the sense of shame, Schneider also considers 
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shame the emotion to have its (albeit overlooked) 
positive aspect. He points out, following Tomkins (op 
cit), that although 
"The immediate awareness in shame is often 
the sting of self-negation; a more sustained 
look reveals an underlying core of positive 
belief and self-valuation. " (Schneider op 
cit: 28) 
Thus, shame is only possible if one still cares about 
oneself; even if one's actual self falls short of 
one's ideal self, that ideal self remains: 
"In shame, the object one is alienated from. 
one also loves still. " (ibid, original 
emphasis) 
This is in contrast to the case when one does not 
value oneself; then, contempt or disgust are the 
resulting emotions, not shame (27). 
Ablamowicz also stresses the 
" [p] ositive potentials inherent in the shame 
experience" (1992: 31), 
noting that the respondents in her empirical study, 
whilst feeling keenly the painful, undermining 
elements of shame, also recognized the experience as 
ultimately "a learning experience"; a step in a self- 
improvement process and above all, a natural, 
inevitable, universal and humanizing condition 
(1984: 110; 1992: 41,46). Likewise, Lynd's study (op 
cit) on the role of shame in identity formation 
emphasizes this positive dimension: 
" ... it is possible that experiences of 
shame if confronted full in the face may 
throw an unexpected light on who one is and 
point the way toward who one may become. 
Fully faced, shame may become not primarily 
something to be covered, but a positive 
experience of revelation. " (ibid: 20) 
2.2.11 (b) The social value of shame 
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There are many who consider that the 
effectiveness of shame as a means of social control, 
well documented particularly in classical 
anthropological studies (cf Mead op cit; Benedict op 
cit), is itself an indication of its negative value. 
But, given the necessity of achieving widespread 
adherence to the prescribed norms and values of a 
society, the idea that shame, far from being a 
repressive means, is in fact a more benevolent and 
beneficial method than certain alternatives, is 
regaining popularity. 
One notable protagonist of this view is the 
criminologist Braithwaite (op cit), whose work 
focuses on shaming and crime control. In contrast to 
punitive sanctions against offenders (such as 
imprisonment) which, he argues, stigmatize individuals 
and create a criminal 'master-class' and other 
undesirable subcultures, the practice of shaming, 
provided it is performed in such a way as to ensure 
the reintegration of the 'victim' into the community 
against which s/he has offended, achieves the desired 
end without any such negative 'side-effects'. 
2.3 The moral value of shame 
The preceding subsections have considered the 
positive individual and social benefits of shame. 
There remains, however, a further dimension of shame 
whose value is disputed by some philosophers. This 
concerns its status vis a vis morality. For some, the 
idea that shame has any connection with morality is 
suspect; others consider its moral significance and 
value to be substantial. It is necessary, therefore, 
first to establish on what basis claims for shame's 
moral dimension are made, before considering the 
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precise way(s) in which it is believed that shame 
operates in morality (and ethics). 
2.3.1 Is shame a moral concept? 
2.3.1.1 Responsibility and morality 
One authority who argues vehemently against the 
view that shame has a moral aspect is Lamb (op cit). 
Recall that in Chapter One, it was noted that Lamb's 
preoccupation is with the relationship between shame 
and responsibility, and that in common with other 
analysts of shame, he concludes that (unlike in the 
case of guilt) it is not a necessary condition of the 
experience of shame that an agent be, or even feel, 
responsible for whatever it is that gives rise to the 
emotion. Similarly, neither are the notions of blame, 
punishment and atonement, cognates of the notion of 
responsibility, relevant to the experience of shame 
(335-336). The implication of such conclusions, Lamb 
believes, is that shame is thus excluded from the 
sphere of morality, just because these concepts of 
individual agency and responsibility, blame etc., are 
fundamental elements of the latter: 
"... guilt has logical connections with a 
central moral notion, 'responsibility', that 
shame does not have. "(342; original 
emphasis) 
In addition: 
"Blame. punishment, and atonement are, 
formally and materially, notions and 
activities which are crucial to the 
operation of anything recognizable as the 
'institution of morality' ... these notions and beliefs, all of them clearly crucial to 
the functioning of the moral enterprise, 
have no logically necessary role to play 
within the feeling of shame ... 11 (ibid) 
Thus, Lamb's entire argument against the moral aspect 
of shame rests on this fundamental assumption that a 
necessary and indeed definitive condition of anything 
which may justifiably be called morality is that it 
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accords pride of place to the concept of 
responsibility. 23 It leads him to conclude that the 
idea of a 'shame-morality' (Morris op cit: 3) is 
unintelligible. Rather, "a shame-based system of 
regulating behaviour" (Lamb op cit: 345), while valid 
and indeed often highly effective, remains only that, 
and cannot be elevated to the status of 'morality' 
(346). 
It is clear that Lamb' s conception of morality is 
thoroughly grounded in Kantian notions; however, it is 
disputable whether such a conception is either 
accurate or adequate. It may be correct to exclude 
shame from matters moral where such a conception 
prevails; however, it seems questionable to evaluate 
shame's moral status in general on the basis of a 
particular view of morality. It should, rather, be 
recognized that whether shame is evaluated as moral or 
otherwise depends on the understanding of morality in 
relation to which it is being considered. 
"However, Lamb's conception of responsibility is 
also a restricted one. It refers only to individual 
responsibility and ignores other conceptions such as 
that of collective responsibility (cf Fauconnet 1920), 
which can take on a new form which is not necessarily 
incompatible with a modern 'liberal' ethic. 
There are further reasons why Lamb dismisses shame as 
a 'moral' concept. These include the fact that the 
act of shaming (albeit with serious intentions) can be 
performed by such means as laughter and ridicule, seen 
by Lamb as inappropriate to the exclusively serious 
matter of morality (336-337; 343); moreover, according 
to Lamb, shaming does not 
.. necessarily 
induce in 
... others beliefs 
about their moral responsibilities in any 
matter. " (343) 
In addition, in Lamb's schema, another condition of 
anything's being granted the status of 'moral' is that 
it satisfy conditions of objectivity (op cit: 339). 
Nonetheless, such factors are apparently accorded less 
importance in moral matters than responsibility. 
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2.3.1.11 Alternative conceptions of morality 
The opposing view, that shame is indeed a moral 
concept (if not the supreme moral concept) is 
expressed by a number of authorities', with the 
recognition that it goes hand in hand with a somewhat 
broader idea of what constitutes morality: 
"There is no reason to deny that shame in 
all its occurrences is a moral emotion, 
provided that morality is not thought of 
just in terms of adhering to or breaking 
moral rules, but is taken to include 
personal morality, a person's own view of 
how he ought to live and what he ought to 
be.,, (Taylor op cit: 77) 
Indeed, a 'virtue ethics' or morality of excellences 
demands shame as a corollary. 'S 
2.3.2 Shame's positive moral value 
Having established that shame may indeed be 
considered a moral concept/emotion (given an 
unrestricted definition of morality), it remains to 
examine the views of those who therefore argue for its 
moral value. Such views range from what may be termed 
the 'stronger', i. e., those which consider shame to be 
the primary motive for moral behaviour, to the 
'weaker', which regard shame as important, but in 
conjunction with other factors. 
Exponents of the 'stronger' view include Aldrich 
(op cit) and Thrane (op cit). To the question as to 
what motivates individuals to act morally, both give 
the answer 'because they would be ashamed not to,. 
24Aldrich 1939; Heller op cit; Rawls op cit; 
Richards op cit; Thrane op cit. 
25The views of certain earlier philosophers on the 
relationship between shame and morality will be 
considered in Chapter 5 below. 
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For Aldrich, it is neither convention nor custom, 
nor the existence of self-evident axioms or maxims of 
conduct, nor the anticipation of consequences (op 
cit: 58-59) which operate to guide our conduct, but 
conscience (the meaning of which, for Aldrich, is not 
the conventional one, but is itself the feeling of 
shame [op cit: 59]). His position is thus in effect a 
tautology; since he equates shame with morality - 
"It is an attendant shame only which gives 
to actions their peculiar moral quality... 
where there is no shame there is only 
nonmoral conduct ... " (op cit: 60) 
- it is not possible that there could be any other 
motivation for moral behaviour. 26 
Aldrich's reasons for according shame the 
privileged position of being the foundation of 
morality are that conventions, for example, can, in 
certain circumstances, change their character and 
assume a different value from usual. Thus, lying or 
stealing, conventionally disapproved, may be 
considered a right action or even a duty when some 
greater moral principle is at stake (64). By 
contrast, one's capacity to feel shame is a reliable 
guide to conduct and not subject to such variation. 
Likewise, Thrane considers that 
"moral feelings ... are the only sure 
control on the moral behavior of men. " (op 
cit: l39)27 
"This of course is not to say that there are not 
other motives for behaviour, only that such other 
motives are nonmoral - and indeed that much of the 
time, they outweigh the shame-motive (76; cf Thrane op 
cit: 159). 
"This echoes the view of Hume that passions 
generate the motivational source of the virtues 
(including the artificial virtue of justice) 
[1957: 102-3], and stands in direct contrast to the 
Rawlsian concept of 'reflective equilibrium' and the belief that emotion 'clouds judgement'. 
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However, of shame and cruilt, it is the former which 
Thrane considers 
" the only truly moral motivation. " 
(ibid) 
This is because to act from fear of consequences (cf 
Aldrich, above) - whether external punishment, or 
internal, such as guilt feelings - is 
"cowardice in the face of the 'bite of 
conscience'. " 
and 
"Those who merely dread their punishing 
conscience do not appear to love virtue. " 
(Thrane op cit: 157-158) 
Whereas those who are motivated by shame have a sense 
of their own worth and thus also of honour (ibid). 
Heller (op cit), agrees with both Aldrich and 
Thrane that shame is 
°... the moral feeling par excellence ... " (6) 
- 'moral' because 
"it is a response of approbation or 
disapprobation" (ibid). 
This is despite the fact that, as most commentators 
are at pains to point out, 
" .. we often respond with shame to types of disapproval which we do not consider to be 
related to moral issues. " (ibid: 6-7). 
She also considers it to be the only innate moral 
feeling (6) . 
28 
"According to Heller, affects are "empirical 
human universals, inborn in every healthy specimen of 
our species ... not acquired but 'natural' feeling- 
responses to fairly complex structures of stimuli. " 
(1985: 5) What is important to note is that, of all 
the 'affects' she identifies, shame is singled out as 
being the only one which "cannot be conceived of prior 
to culture. " (ibid) This makes it unclear why she 
therefore classifies it as an affect rather than an 
emotion. Heller's distinction between affects and 
emotions is one which cannot be explored here, but cf her "A Theory of Feelings" (1979). 
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Despite her view that shame is a more fundamental 
moral feeling than conscience (Heller's substitute for 
guilt in her typology) (5)29, she nonetheless 
recognizes that it cannot, unless certain conditions 
prevail, be the sole means of moral regulation. 
Instead, it must be supplemented (but not replaced) by 
conscience. 
Heller elaborates a complex typology of 
conscience and its 'role in ethical regulation, 
comprising three major categories with ten 
subdivisions, which cannot be reproduced here. 
However, the type of conscience involved is extremely 
important, because according to Heller, when over- 
dependence on one particular type occurs, the "pillars 
of that same regulation" are eroded (2). By this she 
means that far from eliminating external authority, 
new external authority is created, which, unlike that 
it replaces, is irrational, not prerational. The 
purpose of her argument is thus to show that a 
reliance on conscience as "the sole arbiter in 
practical decisions"(45, emphasis added) - i. e., the 
Enlightenment ideal, embraced by Kant, for example, of 
human autonomy and the replacement of God by 
conscience, leading to "the moral perfection of 
29j... shame and guilt cannot sensibly be related 
to the same genus proximum. Guilt is the perpetuation 
of either shame or the pangs of conscience; it is the 
consciousness of a moral debt which has to be 
repaid. "(2) (cf Lebra 1971]. Shame and conscience are 
differentiated, however, by reference to the authority 
involved in each. Following Freud's distinction 
between two types of guilt - one concerned with the 
fear of external authority, the other with the fear of 
internal authority - Heller notes that external 
authority is social custom, while internal authority 
is practical reason, this being the tool employed, 
where heterogeneity of norms has developed, to select between alternative norms potentially applicable to 
apparently similar situations. Conscience, therefore, 
is "the voice of practical reason" (27). 
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humankind" [17]) - far from increasing individual 
autonomy, in fact extinguishes it. 
Instead, Heller maintains that conscience as "the 
ultimate arbiter of human conduct" (44, emphasis 
added) is an ideal to be desired, since there remains 
a role for external authority and thus shame. 
SECTION 3 SUMMARY AND EVALIIATION 
This Chapter has examined both the question as to 
whether shame has disappeared from contemporary social 
and moral life or merely 'gone underground', and the 
related question as to its individual, social and 
moral value. 
The prevailing contemporary view, that both the 
sense of shame and shame the emotion are unnecessary, 
undesirable and illiberal concepts, has been examined, 
together with the countering view that closer 
examination of shame reveals a positive dimension 
which renders it beneficial and ultimately, an 
experience which is not to be avoided. 
While individual criticism of the various 
authorities involved in the debates examined has 
already been made, this Section will appraise these 
debates in general. 
3.1 The absence of the sense of shame 
The idea that contemporary ('western') society is 
'shameless', in that it is generally accepted that 
very few areas of life are nowadays regarded as 
'taboo' and exempt from public exposure, examination 
and discussion, does not seem open to serious dispute. 
Perhaps the most obvious example is that of sexuality, 
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despite the apparently paradoxical situation whereby 
on the one hand it is considered permissible to openly 
discuss matters of sex, yet on the other, such matters 
are deemed to belong to some 'private domain' (in 
liberal terms, i. e. that there is an area where what 
individuals do is their own affair, so long as no harm 
is done to others). 
However, the main difficulty with any generalized 
view of the morality of a culture is that it fails to 
recognize the subtle differences which may pertain to 
various subcultures. As noted above, empirical 
investigation into the norms governing the lives of 
specific groups of individuals may reveal that the 
'sense of shame', or even 'modesty', persists in the 
face of its broader cultural devaluation. This 
criticism illustrates the possibility that purely 
intellectual descriptions of a culture's moral 
standards may in fact represent an attempt by an elite 
minority in society to impose an ideal or utopian 
morality on the culture, i. e., there may be a division 
between what is 'legislated' by 'high' culture and 
what is actually empirically experienced by 'low' or 
'folk' culture. However, it is not clear by what 
process such an elite could implement such an 
imposition. 
3.2. Freud 
There seems little doubt, too, that 
misunderstanding of, or insufficient careful attention 
to, certain of Freud's views on shame have contributed 
to its neglect. As noted above, however, the ensuing 
cultural 'conspiracy of silence' surrounding shame has 
not, as the work of Lewis (op cit) appears to 
demonstrate, resulted in its elimination from personal 
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experience, even if it has become disguised. 3° As 
already noted, in a sense, Lewis 'rediscovered' shame 
for psychoanalysis. Indeed, implicit in most recent 
psychoanalytical writings on shame is the idea that it 
is a common, almost inevitable feature of 
psychological life, even though the predominant 
evaluation of it is still as something to be overcome, 
if not removed entirely (cf Loughead op cit). This 
is in marked contrast to the apparent denial of the 
existence of shame evident in some other disciplines, 
which appears to be more an implication by omission. 
Thus, in their concentration on guilt, many twentieth 
century philosophers, for example, have implied that 
shame is no longer salient. Only those philosophers 
who have analyzed shame, overtly recognize its 
significance. 
3.3. Devaluation and denial of shame 
The argument that shame is culturally devalued 
and therefore denied in contemporary life, is, 
however, more convincing, again given the evidence 
which Lewis's work in particular constitutes. The 
Enlightenment ideals of reason and autonomy as 
replacements for irrational obedience to social 
custom, identified above, have clearly been embraced 
at least by intellectuals. This rejection of shame 
by, for example, Enlightenment intellectuals, 
Freudians and post-Freudians etc., and the ensuing 
"attempt to eradicate it" (cf Schneider op cit); the 
apparent gradual 'going underground' of shame (in 
30It is not altogether surprising that the 
discipline of psychoanalysis should place emphasis on 
the denial of shame; it is, after all, generally 
concerned with the 'unconscious', and what is 'hidden' 
and 'repressed'in the psyche. Nonetheless, this does 
not preclude the validity of the claim that shame j 
denied, which appears likely on the face of the 
evidence. 
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terms of cultural and individual denial, cf Levy, 
Lewis and Scheff), all point to the potential validity 
of the social constructionist argument that emotional 
experience is culturally constrained, and provides a 
good potential 'case study' of a specific emotion for 
'testing' aspects of the constructionist thesis. 
Thus, the history of shame's cultural evaluation and 
its individual experience since the Enlightenment is 
an interesting one, which deserves a closer and more 
detailed examination than is possible within the scope 
of this study. 31 A limited degree of speculation is 
all that is possible. 
3.3.1 The 'fall and rise' of shame in 'our' culture 
Even a brief consideration of the view of shame 
within our own culture since the Enlightenment 
demonstrates the differential evaluation of this 
emotion and concept in various historical periods. 
Thus, as Schneider points out, in keeping with their 
ideals of reason and autonomy, Enlightenment 
intellectuals (and their successors) recognized the 
apparently limiting nature of shame and decided it 
should be removed. With the advent of the Victorian 
era, however, as evidenced in the works of Darwin 
(1965) and Ellis (op cit), an attempt was made to 
'recover' shame. Its significance and influence, 
primarily in its manifestation as modesty, was 
considerable for a number of years, until, as 
indicated earlier in this Chapter, the influence of 
Freud apparently again encouraged a negative 
perspective on shame to prevail. Finally, in the 
current climate, we are once more being urged to 
31cf Harre and Finlay-Jones (op cit) on accidie 
and melancholy. Of course, Elias's study of the history of manners (op cit, see above) is concerned 
with just such a project; however, it could be further 
developed. 
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reconsider the positive value of shame and foster its 
utility in our lives. It can thus be seen that this 
cultural evaluation may well be a significant factor 
in the extent to which shame is both experienced 
and/or acknowledged. The possible relationship 
between such evaluation and changes in social 
organization and culture is, however, open to 
investigation. Candidates as potential explanations 
are multiple and vary across disciplines. Thus, the 
'social bonds' theory of Scheff (op cit) in sociology; 
the 'cultural constructionist' perspective in 
anthropology; the rationalist, liberal and 
individualist ideology embraced in philosophy and the 
capitalist interpretation in economics (cf Broucek op 
cit: 138-139) are all offered. What seems most 
plausible, however, is that the relationship between 
sociocultural conditions and individual emotional 
experience is not a simple, causal one, but a complex, 
dialectical intermeshing of various factors, which 
interact to create a climate in which shame is now 
valuable, now harmful. On this view (which owes much 
to that of Scheff), the explanation of the current 
state of affairs is that the situation 'on the 
ground', i. e. modernization and industrialization, 
occurs and creates a threat to social bonds; this 
threat gives rise to the rationalization of the 
situation in the ideology of individualism and denial 
of 'radical sociality' (cf Schneider op cit). Such an 
ideology devalues shame and demands that it be 
removed, leading both to its 'hypocognition' in the 
culture and its individual denial (cf Lewis), since 
its experience itself becomes shameful. Inevitably, 
such 'stages' are not sequential but neither do they 
occur simultaneously; rather, they overlap and react 
on each other. 
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3.4 Implications of the argument for shame's value 
It is essential when discussing the valuation of 
shame - in particular the view that shame is a concept 
which should be retained and encouraged - to be 
absolutely clear as to what 'kind' of shame is being 
referred to, since it has already been noted that the 
various interpretations of shame (as an emotion or a 
disposition) result in differential evaluations, 
(moral or otherwise). Thus, to argue that we should 
restore shame to its former, culturally endorsed 
position of potency in our lives - if this also 
entails the retrieval of the lost feeling of disgrace 
felt by those who, through no personal fault of their 
own or through the mere contingent circumstances of 
their birth are (for example) physically imperfect or 
occupy a particular social position or fixed status - 
may be to implicitly endorse an illiberal perspective 
on shame which has no place in the humanistic ethic 
contemporary western society purports to embrace. The 
evaluation of shame cannot be divorced from this 
fundamental idea of respect for persons. 
Bearing this in mind, the question as to shame's 
value is now considered. 
3.4.1 Individual and social value of shame 
It appears that from an individual point of view, 
a 'normal' or 'healthy' person can suffer experiences 
of shame and benefit from them, despite their initial 
negative reaction. It is when, through persistent and 
repeated shame-inducing episodes, " a person becomes 
shame-prone, so that s/he is in a more or less 
"cf e. g. Lansky op cit: 1086-1088, on "the type of 
childhood trauma ... which leave[s] the traumatized 
person with what is often a lifelong legacy of shame. " 
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permanent state of shame, that the latter becomes 
pathological (the emphasis on which is evident in 
earlier and many contemporary psychoanalytic writings, 
largely due to the nature of the discipline which is, 
ultimately, concerned with psychopathology). Thus, 
clarification of the distinction between what is 
'good' and what is 'bad' shame (and in what contexts) 
is essential when deciding whether it should be 
retained or discouraged. 
With respect to the social value of shame, it 
seems plausible that, given the need for some means of 
'social control', "reintegrative" shame sanctions 
(judiciously applied) may be beneficial in a society 
such as 'ours'. 33 In addition, it may be that such 
shame is more potent and effective in complex, 
industrial societies than has previously been assumed, 
due to the multiplicity of potential 'audiences' to 
which an individual is exposed as a result of the 
segregation of roles which is typical of such 
societies (cf Braithwaite 1993: 12-15). 
3.4.2 Moral value of shame 
As indicated earlier, the view that shame is not 
moral can only really be sustained in the context of 
a specific, narrow view of morality which, while it 
may be typical in late twentieth century (academic 
philosophical) opinion, is nonetheless not unanimously 
"Braithwaite (op cit) distinguishes between 
"reintegrative" and "stigmatizing" shaming . The former is effective since it shames the offending individual or group while retaining the bond between 
them and the community of which they are a part, which is restored once 'payment' for the breach (such as 
apology) has been made. By contrast, the latter is 
absolutely punitive; it makes an 'outcast' of the 
offender, who can no longer take their place in the 
community. 
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held. The calls for a restoration of an ethics which 
values personal qualities over obedience to rules 
(identified by Richards [op cit]) and which relies on 
shame as the stimulus to moral behaviour rather than 
fear of punishment, need not be illiberal, so long as 
the necessary precautions are taken to avoid the 
stigmatizing shame of status or defect referred to 
above. 34 This may be linked with the current revival 
and reconstruction of an ethics of virtue and the 
liberal-communitarian debate. 
This exploration* of the present position 
concerning the social and moral evaluation of shame 
concludes the first Part of this study, which has 
examined the dominant preoccupations of contemporary 
philosophers, social scientists and social theorists 
in relation to this concept and emotion. As indicated 
in the Introduction, the next Part will extend this 
exploration of shame by taking a cross-cultural 
perspective and considering the way 'shame' is 
interpreted elsewhere than in the Anglo-American 
tradition. 







SHAME ABROAD: OTHER-CULTURAL ACCOUNTS 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the work of anthropologists, 
psychologists and philosophers researching into 
aspects of the concept of 'shame' operative in other 
cultures will be considered. For this purpose, two 
major 'culture areas'1, in which 'shame' has been 
identified as particularly salient, have been 
selected. They are: Japan and China and 'The 
Mediterranean'. In addition, the concept of whakamaa 
of the New Zealand Maori will receive attention, 
since, as Scheff notes, the work of Metge (op cit) 
constitutes probably "[t]he most detailed discussion 
of the shame lexicon of a traditional society ... 
(1995b: 1054). 
1.1 Selection criteria 
The choice of the above culture areas was made on 
the basis that there exists the greatest volume of 
available data (ethnographic and other) on 'shame' 
relating to them. 
Although in recent years there has been a 
proliferation of individual accounts of shame-like 
concepts in a number of cultures, ' all yielding 
interesting insights, it was felt that by 
lcf the discussion of the culture area concept in 
the Introduction. 
2Cf e. g. Parish (1987); Strathern (1975); 
Valentine (1963). 
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concentrating on those cultures which have attracted 
the widest span of scholarly attention, a more 
comprehensive portrayal of such concepts could be 
achieved. 3 Such attention has come from diverse 
sources, representing a variety of theoretical 
perspectives within anthropology, psychology and 
philosophy. This variety of perspectives has a 
further, methodological implication, which is that 
rather than attempt to synthesize a number of accounts 
in order to present a definitive view or 'true 
picture' of 'shame' in any particular culture, it 
again seemed best to consider the work of individual 
authors separately. 
Certain of the accounts to be considered here 
differ from those examined in Chapter Two in that, 
although related to another culture, they do not 
attempt to convey the indigenous understanding of the 
relevant 'shame' concept. Indeed, some scholars' 
studies have been excluded, on the grounds that they 
demonstrate uncritical application of some variant of 
the 'western' model of shame (and thus implicitly 
suggest probable conceptual equivalence). ' 
Accordingly, only those which, by demonstrating 
unfamiliar and/or unusual features of 'shame', 
significantly broaden the 'western' understanding of 
this concept, have been included. s Thus, for example, 
3Metge' s account is obviously an exception, but is 
included owing to the particularly valuable 
contribution to the clarification of the 'shame' 
concept of another culture which it represents. 
4Despite its satisfaction of this general 
exclusion criterion, Ng's study (see subsection 2.4 
below), is nonetheless included (see footnote 5 
below). 
5Ng's study (op cit) falls into this category, 
despite its potential rejection on the grounds 
discussed above. 
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explicitly psychoanalytical anthropological analyses 
have been rejected, ' as have psychological studies 
employing methods such as factor analysis. 7 
Similarly, detailed consideration of the so- 
called 'classic' studies of Japanese and Ancient Greek 
'shame' by, for example, Mead (op cit), Benedict (op 
cit), Adkins (1960) and Dodds (op cit), and to which 
many of the current authors refer, has also been 
omitted. If and when reference to anthropological 
research is made by philosophers writing about shame, 
it tends to be to such works. Thus, since one of the 
purposes of many contemporary (anthropological) 
accounts is often the revision or disputation of 
certain claims of such seminal works, it is hoped that 
by concentrating on more recent studies, similar 
revision of philosophical thinking about shame will be 
stimulated. 
1.2 Structure 
The various accounts, under their culture-area 
headings, will be critically examined first. Where 
relevant, any significant points of comparison or 
contrast between them will be made. Finally, they 
will be considered in relation to the concepts of 
'shame' already outlined in the first Part of the 
study, particularly where their content appears to 
have implications for such questions as, for example, 
similarities between such emotions (or their elements) 
across cultures. 
6cf e. g. Epstein 1984, Nachman (op cit). 
7cf e. g. Hashimoto and Shimizu (1988); Hong and Chiu (1992); Johnson et al (op cit). 
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2. JAPAN AND CHINA 
The anthropological interest in shame in this 
culture area probably dates from the work of Benedict 
(op cit) on Japan. Her world-famous distinction 
between so-called 'shame-cultures' and 'guilt- 
cultures', although now largely discredited, continues 
to stimulate discussion of both the nature of 'shame' 
and its salience in Japan, both by anthropologists and 
Japanologists (cf Creighton 1990, Hamaguchi 1982, 
Sakuta 1967). 
2.1 Lebra (1971: 1983) 
Lebra's accounts of 'shame' ( a'i) and 'guilt' 
(sumanai; moshiwakenai; ki ga togameru)e in Japan 
constitute both a significant advance in their 
understanding generally and in particular, of their 
relationship with wider social factors (see subsection 
1.1.6 below). 
Here, aspects of haji (and to some extent 'guilt' 
also) will be examined in comparison with the 
structural account of the English emotions of shame 
and guilt given by Taylor (op cit, see Chapter one 
above) . The purpose in doing so is to look for points 
of similarity which possibly lend support to Taylor's 
claim for a 'universal structure' of shame, or any 
aspects on which the Japanese empirical evidence 
appears to lay such a claim open to doubt. 
11 
"I ... three commonly used expressions ... closest to 'guilty'... " (Lebra 1971: 243). Lebra gives no indication as to possible contextual differences in 
the usage of these terms; cf Wilson (1973) (see 
subsection 2.5 below) with regard to Chinese 'shame' 
terminology. 
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2.1.1 Shame and status 
According to Taylor, it will be recalled, shame 
is essentially concerned with a fundamental and 
absolute degradation of the agent's status. In 
Lebra's view, based on her empirical research in 
is indeed bound up with matters of status, Japan, haji 
but contrary to Taylor's view, it is not loss of 
status which is the essence of a'i but rather 
incongruency between the agent's actual behaviour, 
attributes etc. and that expected of someone occupying 
the agent's particular status: 
"... shame is generated or triggered ... in 
conjunction with 'status' occupancy. It is 
assumed here that an actor is vulnerable to 
shame when and where he poses as a status 
occupant. Shame results from whatever 
happens to undermine or denigrate the 
claimed status by revealing something ... of the claimer which is inconsistent with the 
status. " (1971: 246) 
It is important to remember that the sense in 
which 'status' is construed by Taylor is that 
concerning the individual self and this term may 
perhaps more accurately connote 'worth' (cf Rawls op 
cit). By contrast, Japanese social structure 
emphasizes more 'objective' status, in the sense of 
'social category'. Thus, Lebra's concepts of "status 
occupancy" and "status incongruency", operative in 
Japan, have less to do with a 'fall' in standing of an 
individual self and more with failure to meet with the 
expectations of an occupant of a specific social 
position. '" 
90f course, this does not exclude the possibility 
that a 'western' agent may also experience shame for 
such failure in his/her capacity as a 'social status 
occupant'. The interesting question, given Lebra's 
contention, is whether or not shame is ever 
experienced by Japanese individuals when they are not 
posing as such an occupant. Lebra suggests that it is 
not; she identifies a clear demarcation between "on- 
176 
2.1.2. Shame and 'norm violation/deviation' 
Further, for Taylor, in the idea that shame 
entails being seen (potentially at least) in a 
different and deficient way from that in which the 
agent believes s/he ought to be seen, the idea that 
shame requires visible violation of, or deviation 
from, some norm is implicit: 
"The agent is seen as deviating from some 
norm, and in feeling shame he will identify 
with the audience's view and the consequent 
verdict that he has lost status. " (Taylor op 
cit: 57) 
In her earlier paper, Lebra does not discuss the 
question of norm violation in relation to shame and 
'status incongruency'; indeed, she explicitly 
disregards the specific aetiology of shame: 
"What kind of undesirable state brings about 
... a status-incongruent situation is not 
essential to our delineation of shame ... " (1971: 246) 
In this, she is clearly close to Taylor's argument 
that the myriad potentially different "cases" of shame 
have no bearing on the structure of shame itself. 
However, in her later paper she states that shame 
occurs when: 
stage formality constrained by shame and ... off-stage informality allowing for shamelessness" (1983: 200), 
the latter being a period during which "free, 
personal, uninhibited self -disclosure" (ibid: 199) is 
permitted. 
10Cf also the point about 'whole status shame'; 
see Chapter One, subsection 10.3.1. 
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"a Japanese individual ... seriously fails in living up to an expected level of 
ability, knowledge, performance, rectitude, 
propriety, or any other value. Inherent in 
this shame is the exposure of a distinct 
norm violation. " (1983: 194)11 
Thus, on this point the two accounts are in agreement. 
2.1.2.1 'Shame/Embarrassment' 
Where Lebra seems to depart from Taylor' s view on 
the necessity of norm violation for shame is in her 
discussion of "surface-level shame affecting the outer 
self only" and "the exposure sensitivity of the outer 
self", or "embarrassment" (ibid). 22 Apparently, 
Japanese experience haji simply when exposed to an 
audience, irrespective of whether any wrong-doing has 
occurred: 
"... one feels haji when subjected not only 
to ridicule but to praise. What gives rise 
to ha ji here is the fact that one is exposed 
to the concentrated attention or 'gaze' of 
others, whether it is malevolent or 
benevolent. " (ibid). 13 
"This discrepancy may be explained by the fact 
that in the first paper, her aim is "to delineate a 
[social] mechanism which conceptually differentiates 
guilt from shame" (1971: 242), whereas in the second, 
the purpose is to "concentrat [e] on the psychocultural 
dimension of shame and guilt. " (1983: 192, original 
emphasis). 
12The Japanese term haji covers both this and what 
might be termed 'shame proper'; there is no lexical 
distinction between the two, as in English. 
Consequently, Lebra contends that they do not 
constitute two separate categories for Japanese. 
Moreover, Taylor's definition of embarrassment, as 
resulting from an inability to respond to a demand for 
action in a social situation (1985: 69), is very different from Lebra's. 
13Cf Metge op cit: 16-17; see section 4.5e)below. 
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Moreover: 
"Exposure sensitivity is not only a 
spontaneous response but a culturally 
desirable and even prescribed attitude. 14 
What underlies this is the modesty code 
whereby the self is supposed to remain 
hidden, unexpressed, or inconspicuous. One 
is thus expected, when exposed or about to 
be exposed, to behave as if one were 
embarrassed or shy. " (1983: 197; emphasis 
added) 
Thus, for this 'shame/embarrassment', 
"norm violation is not a necessary 
condition. " (ibid). 
However, given that there is this cultural 
proscription on self-exposure (where this means 
disclosure of aspects of one's private self e. g. 
opinions, desires, tastes etc. ), any instance of such 
exposure 
"itself can be said to amount to a norm 
violation. " (1983: 197) 
Despite this exception, it may be seen that on 
the whole, in Zebra's view: 
"among the Japanese norm violation is not a 
necessary condition for giving rise to 
shame" (ibid: 192-193). 
2.1.3 Shyness and "stranger anxiety" 
Related to "embarrassment-haji" (ibid: 194), 
according to Lebra, are r ru and hanikamu ("shy", 
used of "gestures, behavior styles, or speech 
patterns", ibid: 197)15 and hitomishiri or "stranger 
14Cf the social constructionist claim (see Chapter 
Two above). 
"It is interesting that Lebra also refers here to 
" other untranslatable equivalents of 'shy'. " 
(ibid). If something is "untranslatable", can it be 
said to be "equivalent"? (cf the discussion of 
conceptual equivalence and translation in the 
Introduction). On the contrary, the implication would 
seem to be that the unnamed terms to which Lebra 
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anxiety". 16 All these terms thus appear to be 
elements in a complex of concepts which may be 
described as the broad category of shame phenomena. 
2.1.4 Shame and responsibility 
The generally accepted understanding among 
Western philosophers, identified in Chapter One, that 
one need not be personally responsible for the action, 
condition etc. giving rise to shame, is not disputed 
by Lebra. Indeed, in her discussion of 'social 
sharing of shame' in Japan, she demonstrates the 
necessary connection between the deeds of others and 
the self's shame which is implied when shame is viewed 
as status contingent: 
"... shame is vicariously experienced by 
others who share the same status because 
what is shamed is not an individual person 
but the status itself.,, (1971: 251)17 
Thus, any member of a group or social category can 
cause shame in another member of that group or 
category in virtue of their common membership. In 
Japan, where the relationship of shame to status is so 
close and so clearly demonstrated, this social sharing 
of shame is culturally recognized and "institutional- 
ized" (ibid). 
refers denote something extremely culture-specific. 
Unfortunately these are not discussed. 
16cf Javanese isin identified and discussed by 
Keeler (op cit); see Chapter Two, above. 
17This represents an interesting contrast to the 
'whole shameful status' aspect of some 'traditional' 
cultures discussed earlier, in that in this case, the 
status is 'shamed' even though it is not normally 
negatively evaluated. 
180 
2.1.5 Guilt and responsibility 
According to many western accounts, this question 
of responsibility is one of the most important 
features distinguishing shame from guilt. In order to 
feel guilt, an agent must see him or herself as at 
least causally responsible for a wrong, bad or 
undesirable state of affairs (Taylor op cit: 91). It 
appears, however, that Japanese experience guilt 
"when they see their kin or other 
significant persons suffer ... regardless of their responsibility for these sufferings. " 
(1983: 204-205) 
Presumably, on Taylor's account, in such a case it is 
not guilt which the agent experiences but some other 
emotion; or if it is guilt, then there must have been 
some action or omission of the agent which has had the 
indirect effect of producing others' suffering. This 
is because Taylor maintains that 
"feelings of guilt ... cannot arise from the deeds or omissions of others" (91) 
and thus, to preclude the experience of guilt by one 
agent, "whatever causal chain there may be" must be 
broken by the agency of another (92). 
2.1.6 The social mechanism: asymmetry and reciprocity 
As indicated above, in her earlier paper, Lebra 
identifies a "social mechanism" which she sees as 
constituting the fundamental difference between shame 
and guilt. According to Lebra: 
" ... there are two types of social structure in both of which we get involved in every 
society. One is identified as 'reciprocal' 
and the other as 'asymmetric'. ... Guilt relates to reciprocity ... while shame involves asymmetry. " (1971: 243) 
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The asymmetric social structure comprises such 
elements as social status and status occupancy. As 
has already been established, these concepts, and the 
associated idea of "status incongruency", are 
essentially involved in 'shame'. Further, in any 
'shame' situation, there is the sense of exposure, not 
necessarily just in front of one individual 'Other', 
but potentially before unlimited others (see below). 
By contrast, guilt is based on the principle of 
reciprocity, i. e.: 
"... the rule by which two actors in 
interaction, Ego and Alter, expect of each 
other to maintain a balance between mutual 
rights and duties, social assets and 
liabilities, debt and payment, give and 
take. " (ibid) 
Thus, in an ideal situation, a benefit (whatever it 
may be) donated by one party must in some way be 
returned by its recipient to the donor, in order to 
restore the balance between them. However, a 
disturbance in this balance between debtor and 
creditor, giver and receiver (in such circumstances 
as, for example, where a debt turns out to be 
unrepayable), creates the occasion for the occurrence 
of guilt . 18 Thus : 
".. guilt hinges upon tension between the 
lost balance of reciprocity and the pressure 
to restore it.,, (ibid: 246) 
2.1.6.1 Cultural variation 
Although they are present in all societies (Lebra 
maintains), it is in relation to these twin structures 
that cultural variation exists, on a number of points. 
Firstly, in the case of 'shame', in Japan there is an 
18This aspect of guilt's nature is reflected in 
the German terms "Schuld" and "schultig««, which not 
only mean 'guilt' and 'guilty' but also 'debt' and 
'indebted' (cf Lewis op cit: 76). 
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emphasis on a sense of exposure before a diffuse, 
unspecified 'audience' rather than just the immediate 
"eyewitnesses" to the situation. Lebra calls this the 
"extensibility of the scope of exposure" (1971: 250) 
and identifies its source in the inextricable link 
between status and 'shame' in Japanese social 
structure, which is such that 
"... Ego's status can be identified by a 
large collectivity... " (ibid). 
Secondly, in the case of guilt, Lebra claims that 
this also need not only be felt in relation to a 
specific other but may be felt towards a symbolic 
other representing all potential actual others19, or 
to any of a number of relatively specific or general 
others in between (ibid: 244) . She further claims that: 
"... there is cultural variation in the 
degree of specificity of the Alter who 
appears injured by Ego... " (ibid: 244). 
In the Japanese case, the other does tend to be 
relatively specific, contrasting clearly with the 
situation as regards 'shame', indicated in the 
previous paragraph. 
2.1.6.11 'Shame-cultures' and 'Guilt-cultures' 
There is further cultural variation between 
aspects of 'shame' and 'guilt' (and which of the two 
is apparently prevalent in any given society), which 
relates to what Lebra identifies as a distinction 
between "monotheistic" and "sociocultic" cultures 
(1971: 253). In the former, Lebra claims: 
" .. guilt ... is more generalized in terms 
of ubiquitous and unlimited debt to the 
single, universal creditor [i. e. God] .., (1971: 252); 
whereas: 
19The symbolic generalized other is, of course, 
"God". 
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"Shame ... tends to be more specifically 
confined ... " (ibid) 
In a sociocultic culture, 'Society' replaces God, and 
the opposite is true, i. e., as indicated above, guilt 
tends to be experienced vis a vis a very specific 
Other, whilst shame is felt towards the generalized 
collectivity which is 'Society'. According to Lebra, 
Japan is such a sociocultic culture. 
2.2 Creighton (1990) 
Creighton's paper is primarily concerned with 
this 'neo-Benedictine' question of cultural variation 
in the prevalence of 'shame' or 'guilt'. Whilst a 
large part of her argument is devoted to contesting 
criticisms of Benedict20, in the course of her defence 
she illuminates a number of interesting aspects of 
Japanese 'shame', particularly its relation with other 
key aspects of Japanese culture and social 
organization. In this, her approach is similar both 
to Lebra's and to that of the 'social 
constructionists', an example of whose account of 
'shame' in another culture was considered in Chapter 
Two. 
20Creighton is not concerned to argue that 
Benedict's distinction between 'shame-cultures' and 
'guilt-cultures' was correct but rather to present a 
re-interpretation of Benedict, which indicates that 
she did not in fact hold certain views which are 
mistakenly attributed to her and for which she has 
most frequently been severely criticized. In 
particular, she attempts to counter the accusation 
that Benedict displays ethnocentric tendencies (by 
implying that cultures in which shame regulation of 
behaviour predominates are in some way 'inferior' to 
those predisposed to guilt). She argues that, to the 
contrary, Benedict herself was one of the earliest 
champions of cultural relativism and eschewed the 
practice of judging other cultures according to the 
values of one's own (282-285). 
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2.2.1 Creiahton's model of 'shame' 
The influence of Piers (op cit) and the 
psychoanalytic characterization of western shame is 
again evident in the model adopted by Creighton: 21 
"Shame involves the awareness of inadequacy 
or failure to achieve a wished-for self- 
image which is accompanied by, or originally 
arises from, the fear of separation and 
abandonment" (1990: 285) 
This is in contrast to guilt, which is 
"generated whenever the boundaries of 
negative behavior are touched or 
transgressed. " (ibid: 286) 
and which is associated with fear of punishment. 
Creighton contests criticisms of this model22 and 
defends her adoption of it by citing various Japanese 
scholars who have endorsed this characterization, 
despite their rejection of certain aspects of 
'western' culture (e. g. the ideology of individual 
autonomy) which have been influential in the 
formulation of psychoanalytic theory. For example, 
21Her account is nonetheless included, since she 
does not adopt this view uncritically but rather, 
explicitly justifies her employment of it by reference 
to indigenous views. 
22cf e. g. De Vos 1973. His primary disagreement 
is with the psychoanalytic model of guilt = trans- 
gression. He claims that for Japanese, guilt arises 
from harm done to another (typically a parent) as a 
result of failing to fulfil obligations (147). 
Clearly, the idea of harm to others inherent in guilt 
is not exclusively Japanese (cf Rawls op cit, Taylor 
op cit); thus his claim for "a specifically Japanese 
pattern of guilt" is questionable. Moreover, as 
Creighton points out: "... his argument that guilt 
among Japanese results from a failure to achieve 
positive goals may be a matter of interpretation. It 
seems quite possible that 'nullification of parental 
expectation' (De Vos op cit: 148) may in the Japanese 
case constitute not just the failure to attain a 
positive ego-ideal but the transgression of a negative 
limit. " (1990: 304-305, n. 6). 
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Sakuta (op cit) identifies a further variant of 
Japanese 'shame', shuchi, which is disregarded by 
Benedict and other non-Japanese scholars and which 
"... arises in circumstances when people 
cause harm to a group member or to others 
they have relied on. " (Creighton 1990: 288). 
Hamaguchi (op cit) asserts that it is the latter 
concept which has been misinterpreted as 'guilt' (by, 
for example, De Vos [loc cit]). It seems possible 
that the 'western' association of 'harm to others' 
with 'guilt' (cf footnote 22) may be responsible for 
this misinterpretation. 23 
By implication, Creighton thus appears to endorse 
the idea that Piers' characterization of shame is 
relatively culture-independent. 
2.2.2 The relation of 'shame'/'guilt' to other 
aspects of culture 
It is Creighton's account of the correlation 
between other significant cultural values and 
practices and the prevalence of either 'shame' or 
'guilt' which represents her most significant 
contribution in terms of a greater understanding of 
the overall concept of 'shame'. 
Creighton asserts that whilst it is unlikely that 
a society could function without some social control 
in the form of shame and guilt (1990: 291), optimal 
'efficiency' is achieved neither when one is dominant, 
nor when there is "absolute symmetry" between the two, 
but when there is an "asymmetrical balance" (ibid: 292- 
293). She also asserts that a correspondence between 
"This understanding of shuchi would seem to invalidate claims for the primacy of guilt made by 
subsequent scholars such as Lebra (1983: 206,207) who, interestingly, cites Sakuta in her earlier paper (1971: 248) but makes no reference to this term. 
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wider social processes and individual moral 
development is likely. "' Given such a correspondence, 
it follows that there should be consistency between 
elements of the cultural environment and which of the 
moral emotions is emphasized; such consistency 
Creighton then demonstrates for Japan. 
The three aspects of Japanese culture she selects 
for this purpose are: 
i) the general philosophy of human nature; 
ii) the greater value accorded to the group over the 
individual; and 
iii) the method of child-rearing (1990: 293-294). 
2.2.2.1 The Japanese view of human nature 
Creighton identifies a contrast between the 
'western' view of human nature (influenced 
significantly by the Judeo-Christian tradition) and 
the Japanese view, and a corresponding distinction 
between the conceptions of ethics accompanying such 
views. The former emphasizes our "inherent evil", 
which has to be restrained. 'Guilt' sanctions are the 
means by which such restraint is achieved (296). In 
addition, morality is viewed as a set of absolute and 
universal principles of right and wrong, embodied 
(ideally at least) in God. 
24The precise nature of this interrelationship 
between 'external' social factors and "interior mental 
structures" (Edwards 1981: 522), whether it is 
deterministic or dialectical, etc., is of course a 
matter for dispute, and this question echoes the 
preoccupations of the 'culture-and-personality' debate 
in early psychological anthropology. Cf Elias (op 
cit), who (like his social constructionist successors) 
argues that the structure of the psyche directly 
reflects the social structure; also cf Heller (op cit) 
on the homology of external and internal authority 
structures. 
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Japanese, however, view humanity as essentially 
good or neutral. Thus, the emphasis here is on 
"shaping human beings into a socially desirable form" 
(ibid: 297), for which a sense of 'shame' is required. 
This is in keeping with the Japanese ethical position, 
according to which conduct is assessed by reference to 
its appropriateness to the circumstances and its moral 
evaluation, as either 'good' or 'bad', is thereby also 
determined. In this "situational" conception of 
ethics (ibid), the definition of a 'wrong action' is 
thus possible only in general terms. So, while the 
potential for feeling 'guilt' in certain situations is 
not excluded, Creighton posits that the dominant moral 
sanction is likely to be 'shame', accompanying the 
impetus to conform to the clearly defined demands of 
one's particular roles and status. 25 
2.2.2.11 Group and individual 
In Japan, greater value is placed on the group 
than on the individual. However, this distinction is 
not as clear-cut as it may appear, since the Japanese 
sense of 'self' is less rigidly defined than that with 
which 'westerners' are familiar and indeed is bound up 
with the social group. In fact: 
"The Japanese word for 'myself' is jibun, 
literally meaning 'my part' of some larger 
whole. " (1990: 294) 
Thus the identification of a Japanese 'person' with 
the collectivity of which s/he is a member (whether 
the family, workforce, etc. ) is such that s/he does 
not in any meaningful way conceive of him/herself as 
an 'individual' apart from the group. 
25This emphasis on arubekiyo or ' the way one is 
supposed to be' (Minami 1953: 197) seems to further 
undermine the assertion (cf Lebra op cit) that 
'guilt', not 'shame', is predominant in Japan (see 
footnote 23 above). 
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According to Creighton, this emphasis on group 
solidarity results in a corresponding emphasis on 
'shame' sanctions (ibid: 295). This is in keeping with 
the definition of shame given above, in which the 
threat of estrangement from one's 'significant others' 
(parents, peers etc. ) is paramount (as opposed to fear 
of punishment, which is typical of guilt). 
2.2.2.111 Child-rearing and socialization 
The value accorded to group solidarity and the 
emphasis on interdependency between 'individual' and 
group (given the qualifications to these terms 
identified above) is also reflected in the way in 
which Japanese (mothers) socialize their children into 
acceptable behaviour. This in turn relies heavily on 
instilling a sense of social disapproval through 
practices which also emphasize the sense of 
estrangement and ostracism inherent in the experience 
of shame. For example, in contrast to the common 
'western' practice of inflicting punitive sanctions 
(such as restricting privileges and/or freedom), or 
even in some cases physical punishment, both of which 
are supposed to encourage the recipient to reflect on 
the 'wrong-ness' of his/her conduct, a Japanese mother 
will ignore a child who has behaved in an unacceptable 
way and effectively deny that child's existence 
(ibid: 298). 
The effectiveness of such different sanctions 
lies in their reinforcement of the prevailing cultural 
emphasis on either independence or interdependence 
discussed above: 
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"The painful message that Western parents 
convey to their children ... is that they 
are still not independent or autonomous yet. 
The threat behind maternal ostracism is 
abandonment, the same threat that Piers 
describes as the essence of shame. The 
painful message Japanese mothers give their 
children is that they are not absolutely at 
union, they still risk rejection or 
abandonment. " (ibid: 299) 
It is not only the way in which children's 
behaviour is sanctioned which resonates with the 
cultural emphasis on harmonious union with others. 
The practice of co-sleeping, by which parents and 
children share not only the same room but initially 
also the same bed, also reinforces the dependency on 
others which is valued, not disdained, in Japanese 
culture, as does the peculiarly Japanese sentiment 
amae (cf Doi 1973). 
2.3 Asano-Tamanoi (1987) 
For comparative purposes, Asano-Tamanoi's 
research straddles two (geographically distant) of the 
above-mentioned 'culture-areas': Japan and 'the 
Mediterranean'. In this sub-section, her conclusions 
concerning aspects of Japanese haji will be 
considered, while the implications of her Catalonian 
data will be examined below, in the section on 
'Mediterranean' anthropology. 
Perhaps the most important claim made by Asano- 
Tamanoi concerns the multiplicity of meanings of haji 
identified even within a single village (pseudonym 
'Minn'). Thus, haj i has both 
"... a variable 'surface' as well as an 
immutable 'deep' meaning. " (105). 
In Japan, the latter abstract level of meaning relates 
to the ideal of household (. je) continuity, achieved 
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through "impartible inheritance" by a single heir. 26 
It is coupled with the equally abstract concept of 
'name' or na: 
"Na, in the village context, refers to the 
family name of the household. Every 
Japanese carries a single family name, 
paternal (if one's father is a successor) or 
maternal (if one's mother is a successor). 
... household continuity is symbolized and 
expressed in the continuity of the same 
family name ... " (111) 
At this level, then, haji thus refers neither to 
specific individuals, nor to their conduct, but rather 
to a state of affairs - in this specific case, to the 
absence of household continuity. 
By contrast, the concrete, particular meaning of 
a'i relates to the failure of individuals to fulfil 
their obligations as household members, i. e. to 
properly play one's role. The concept which is 
coupled with haji in this case is 
mi V021 or 'honour', which is bestowed on people who 
successfully meet their obligations to the household. 
However, such obligations also relate to the 
perpetuation of continuity; thus the abstract and the 
particular 'meanings' of ha-ii and its counter-notions 
are in fact also related. This is because the quality 
of na can be changed through the conduct of family 
members; it can be "raised" (na o ageru) or "polluted" 
(na o kegasu): 
"'An ie is constituted by the members of a single 
family claiming shared descent from a common ancestor. 
The household property and family wealth is passed on 
to one descendant only (ideally the eldest son but in 
practice any suitable member of the next generation, 
whether a blood relation or not). 
"cf Lebra (op cit) . 
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" 'rippana na' or 'meiyo-aru na' (honorable 
or honored name) refers to the state of 
household continuity that has been realized 
through honorable conduct of its members. 
Honor is subsumed under the notion of na but 
makes its appearance only when people .. 
evaluate men and women's conduct in terms of 
their respective obligations as household 
members. " (113) 
It might be argued (cf Taylor op cit) that Asano- 
Tamanoi's description and interpretation of Japanese 
ha- i does not reveal a significantly different 
structural understanding of what it means to feel 
'shame', since the different "meanings" to which she 
refers are in fact no more than differences in the 
substantive content of the emotion. Nonetheless, her 
conclusions do appear to confirm Lebra's recognition 
that for Japanese, the defining characteristic of hall 
is the supreme importance of one's role (in this case, 
as a family and household member), over and above 
one's own individual standing. This in itself 
demonstrates a different cultural emphasis in Japanese 
haji from that with which many of us in the 'west' are 
familiar in our own concept of shame. 
2.4 Ng (1981) 
In this example from China, an indigenous concept 
of shame is not elaborated, as noted in the 
introduction to this Chapter. 28 Rather, the Western 
structural definition of shame as 'failure to match 
the Ego-Ideal' (Piers op cit) is applied to Chinese 
culture. Nonetheless, an interesting point emerges 
from Ng's paper, in that she identifies an aspect of 
"Indeed, no Chinese terms to which the 
translation 'shame' refers are given. From this, it 
might be inferred that in Ng's view, the concept to 
which the English word 'shame' relates is in many ways 
similar to the Chinese concept she discusses but does 
not name. 
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'shame' which she sees as characteristically 
Chinese . 
Z' 
2.4.1 Shame and the 'ideal self' 
According to Ng, the 'ideal self' is not limited 
to an internalized image of a parent figure (77), 
either generally, or particularly in the Confucian 
Chinese concept of shame. Rather, it is any exemplar 
of a standard of conduct or value to which an 
individual aspires. Thus, in the culture under 
consideration: 
" .. the 
ideal self is given the name of 
'the princely man', chun-tse. Its opposite 
is the 'small people', hsiao yen, that is, 
the common people. " (ibid) 
The 'princely man' is not only socially but 
morally elite and the nature of 'shame' reflects this 
elitist principle30: in aspiring to emulate the 
'princely man', an individual seeks to exceed what is 
expected of the majority of people in terms of 
character and conduct (although it is recognized that 
achievement of this ideal is extremely difficult). 
Thus, in Confucian Chinese culture, shame derives from 
membership (actual or desired) of an elite, not only 
when the ideals and/or standards of that elite are not 
met (which may anyway be inevitable) but most 
importantly, when an individual believes himself, for 
whatever reason, to be unworthy of membership of that 
elite (84). 
29This does not, however, imply that it is unique 
to the Chinese, as is made clear by her reference to 
the parallel with the Christian ideal of 'saintliness' 
(79). 
30The evident influence of this context of elitism 
on the interpretation of shame results in an important 
cross-cultural difference in the relative emphases in 
Confucian Chinese shame and 'western' shame. 
193 
2.4.2 Shame and the 'audience' 
Another important point identified by Ng concerns 
the audience involved in shame. (79) The actual 
audience before whom the individual who aspires to the 
ideal of the 'princely man' conducts himself is the 
'common people'. They, however, are not those "to 
whom he is answerable for his conduct", that is, they 
are not the salient, judging audience (although 
presumably it is important to successfully maintain 
the example of 'princely man' before them). The 
judging audience is that which is selected by the 
individual (i. e., others whom he perceives as 
embodying the ideal) through his aspiration to be like 
them. 31 
2.5 Wilson (1973) 
In contrast to Ng's account of Confucian Chinese 
'shame', Wilson's consideration of the concept does 
indeed at least attempt to elaborate the multiple 
levels or degrees of 'shame' operative in Chinese 
society and the varying usages of the Chinese terms 
which denote these 'calibrations' of shame. '2 
31cf Thrane (op cit: 148) on "wished-for 
identifications" and 154: "The community in which one 
judges oneself is ... not necessarily constituted by 
those who happen to be around. It is rather the group 
one identifies with. " See the discussion above in 
Chapter One. 
3211 It is important to point up these distinctions, 
for direct translations from the Chinese frequently 
by-pass the points of reference and the level of 
emotional content implied in any specific Chinese 
tern. " (1973: 435) This is a significant observation 
and criticism which well applies to Ng's otherwise 
valuable study, but which equally well applies to the 
translation and discussion of the concept of shame and 
related concepts (e. g. 'honour') in many other 
cultures (notably in 'Mediterranean' anthropology, see 
below). 
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However, whilst this examination of Chinese shame 
terminology and its applications is careful and 
thorough, the focus of his paper is more on the use of 
shame and shaming in socialization as a means to 
ensuring conformity and in particular, political 
loyalty (to the Communist Party). Nonetheless, his 
work highlights the complexity of Chinese 'shame' and 
its salience in the culture as a whole. 
There are seven different terms in the Chinese 
language by means of which aspects of the concepts of 
(embarrassment and) shame may be expressed. These can 
be seen as points on a continuum between mild and 
extreme. In addition, certain of these terms are used 
only in written Chinese while others are confined to 
verbal usage. There are differences, too, in the 
terms which may be applied both to the self and to 
others, to 'private' and 'public' actions and those 
which are reserved for self-reference only. Finally, 
the degree of moral censure implied in the different 
terms varies also. The terms are as follows: 
i) hsin-li-pu-shu-fu This is the mildest expression, 
conveying "slight unease or very mild embarrassment" 
and literally meaning "to be uncomfortable in the 
heart". It is a less common and less 'strong' 
expression than 
ii) pu-hao-i-szu, used in both written and spoken 
Chinese, referring both to one's own actions or 
thoughts and those of others and the nearest 
equivalent in meaning to the English 'embarrassment'. 
iii) The phrase tiu-lien ("to lose face") is, 
apparently, one of the commonest expressions and 
closest, in terms of intensity, to the English 
'ashamed'. 
iv) "More severe, and used only in self- 
reference, is the expression ts'an-k'uei 
which denotes a sense of deep shame. " (cite) 
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The final three terms are those in which moral 
condemnation is implied. Of these, 
v) hsiu-ts'an, although not in common use, 
"when used with reference to the self ... is 
indicative of a state of utter mortifica- 
tion. " 
Apparently, the degree of emotion indicated by this 
phrase is more usually expressed 
"through the addition of an intensifier to 
a less acute notation for shame ... 
[e. g. ] 
chen-ts'an-ku'ei (to be really or truly 
ashamed) or ts'an-ku'ei-szu-li (ashamed to 
death). " 
vi) pu-vao-lien and 
vii) wu-ch'ih (the former used colloquially in speech, 
the latter more literary, though not exclusively so), 
both refer only to the actions of others. Their 
closest English equivalent is "to be totally 
shameless" and, as noted above, they both indicate 
that the person(s) so described is morally 
reprehensible. 33 
3. THE 'MEDITERRANEAN' 
As mentioned in the Introduction, 'honour and 
shame' have long been regarded by anthropologists as 
key concepts in a value system which is believed to 
characterize a number of cultures collectively known 
as 'the Mediterranean'. The putative ubiquity of the 
'honour/shame complex' has, indeed, been considered 
"Interestingly, Wilson claims that the term 
'shame' is an inadequate translation of such phrases, 
because it "is closer to being simply descriptive of 
an emotional state without normative overtones" (435). 
As indicated in Chapter Three, this is a typical late 
twentieth century interpretation of shame but its 
validity is not universally agreed. The trend towards 
such a psychological rather than moral interpretation 
of shame, and the possible reasons for it, are 
considered in Chapter Six. 
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one of the defining characteristics of this 'culture 
area'. 
The seminal studies of honour and shame include 
Pitt-Rivers (1961) and Peristiany ([ed. ]: 1965). In 
these works, focusing on Spain, Greece and Egypt, 
among other cultures, the analytical emphasis tended 
to be placed on the former concept, and its 
counterpart was frequently regarded as relatively 
unproblematical. However, since the publication of 
these studies, anthropologists of this area have 
reconsidered their validity in the light of the more 
'interpretive' perspective taken in recent 
anthropology. In particular, many of the papers in a 
more recent collection (Gilmore [ed. ]: 1987) both draw 
on and develop criticisms of the honour-and-shame 
'model' inherent in the older studies, already made 
by, for example, Herzfeld (op cit) and Wikan (1984). " 
They represent a closer and more 'particularistic' 
approach and focus on the indigenous concepts of 
honour and shame in various communities. In addition, 
they question the earlier assumption that these 'twin 
values' are the supreme moral concepts in 
Mediterranean life. They indicate that in certain 
cases, shame is in fact the more salient of the two, 
and that in others, some other value, for example, 
hospitality or honesty, is accorded greater importance 
than honour. However, a serious attempt is also made 
to analyze what, if anything, is peculiar to the 
'Mediterranean' honour and shame concepts which may 
distinguish these from other apparently similar 
concepts elsewhere. 
34They also, to some extent, question the validity 
of the 'Mediterranean culture area, assumption. 
However, this question will not be addressed here. 
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It is from this collection that the majority of 
the following material is drawn, for the purpose of 
illustrating the evident diversity of the so-called 
'honour/shame complex' within this geographical 
region. 
For the sake of continuity, Asano-Tamanoi's 
description of vergonya in Catalonia, which she 
compares with Japanese haji (as outlined above) will 
be considered first. 
3.1 Catalonian 'verQonya' (Asano-Tannanoi op cit) 
The variations in 'meaning' of 'shame' identified 
by Asano-Tamanoi in the Japanese village of Mino are 
reproduced in the Catalonian village of Belunya 
(pseudonym). That is, once again there appears to be 
both 'superficial' and 'deeper' meanings of vergonya. 
In addition, according to Asano-Tamanoi, it is again 
in relation to the maintenance of household (casa) 
continuity that the concept of vergonya is most often 
employed, and again, the ideal principle of 
"impartible inheritance" is the means by which such 
continuity is to be achieved. However, in this case, 
it is the 'surface' meaning of shame which refers to 
failure by household members to fulfil domestic. 
obligations: 
"Fathers and mothers who do not fulfill 
their obligations vis a vis their children, 
husbands who do not fulfill their 
obligations vis a vis their wives and vice 
versa, or heirs who do not fulfill their 
obligations vis a vis their households as 
groups, are thus people without shame and 
their conduct is shameful. " (1987: 108) 
One way in which such failure manifests itself is 
in indulgence in extra-marital affairs. The 
individuals who engage in these, through neglecting 
their familial obligations, lose respec (respect), 
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which is the concept which is coupled with vergonya at 
this level. However, according to Asano-Tamanoi, such 
affairs have a further significance in terms of the 
ideal of household continuity, which lies in the 
threat of the introduction of illegitimacy which they 
represent. Thus, whilst it is acceptable to bring in 
outsiders as potential heirs by legitimate means (e. g. 
marriage or adoption) in order to ensure the 
succession of the household: 
"The 'illegitimate sexuality' of illicit 
liaisons should never be allowed to intrude 
in the household sphere ... household 
continuity should be the extension of 
contacts between legitimate partners as 
'physical persons'. ... The sanction of 
shame is resorted to whenever illegitimate 
blood is brought in the sanctity of the 
household sphere ... " (ibid) 
At this level, vergonya is coupled with the 
traditionally emphasized concept of honra (honour) and 
the latter is bestowed on both men an women who, 
through their legitimate union, produce many "good" 
offspring. According to Asano-Tamanoi: 
"Catalonian shame of illegitimacy thus 
constitutes the deeper meaning of shame. " 
(ibid: 110) 
(even though, unlike the situation in Japan, the shame 
here still attaches to actual "physical persons" (109) 
and is not an abstract concept as in the haji/ga 
complex). 
Despite the many similarities she perceives 
between the Japanese and the Spanish notions of 
'shame' and their relation to the household, the 
differences between them can be traced, Asano-Tamanoi 
speculates, to the difference in the degree to which 
the influence of the state in each country has 
penetrated the household (ibid: 114-116). In positing 
such an explanation, she thus also makes a case for 
the significant influence of wider social factors on 
the concept of shame. 
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In Belunya, despite government attempts to take 
over aspects of village life, state influence has 
apparently been successfully kept at a distance. This 
is in keeping with the historical nationalism and 
separation of Catalonia from the rest of Spain. In 
Japan, however, the ideology of the nation as one ig 
with all individual ie as branches, coupled with the 
successful integration of all aspects of households in 
to the overall Japanese 'system' were such that 
"The traditional notion of household 
continuity and the state's family policies 
during industrialization meshed in a 
particular way .., mutually reinforcing each 
other. " (ibid: 114). 
Thus, in Japan, the state ideology emphasized the 
maintenance of household continuity, whereas in 
Catalonia, the only aspect of the state to have had 
any real influence was the ideology of state religion, 
particularly "the idea of 'legitimate sexuality"' 
(ibid: 115). 
Asano-Tamanoi identifies a further, gender- 
related difference between the two nations. The 
Japanese upholding of the abstract ideal of household 
continuity is largely adopted by men, while women, it 
appears, still attach a great deal of importance to 
the actual behaviour of specific individuals. By 
contrast, in Catalonia it is women who, by their 
greater identification with Catholic ideology, uphold 
and perpetuate the ideal of sexual legitimacy. Thus: 
"... while women represent the total social 
system in Belunya, men represent it in Mino; 
but in both villages, women are the main 
evaluators of honor and shame through their 
powerful gossip. " (ibid: 116). 
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3.2 Shame, Honesty and Honour in Andalusia (Gilmore 
1987) 
Gilmore's paper is largely a study of the 
components of male status. Although the traditional 
association in much Mediterranean anthropology is of 
honour with men, shame with women (Brandes 1987: 122, 
Gilmore 1987: 90), this association is modified by 
Gilmore, in that he emphasizes the inadequacy of such 
a generalized view and attempts to identify the 
relevance of a variety of different values in the 
lives of men in the Andalusian town of Fuenmayor 
(pseudonym). 
According to Gilmore, in Andalusia honour is 
the dominant moral concept applicable to men, at least 
not in the sense in which honour is understood in the 
traditional pioneer studies. These portray honour as 
an aggressive, primarily masculine quality acquired in 
competition with other men for domination and 
precedence, particularly in "erotic contests" 
(1987: 90). This "emphasis on flamboyant sexual 
rivalry" has obscured the fact that male honra is 
actually a much more complex and "richer" value 
concept, comprising other elements such as integrity 
and honesty (ibid: 91). 
Indeed, Gilmore states categorically that the 
traditional terms for 'honour' "are virtually 
obsolete" in the town in which he conducted his 
research and that 
"The operative evaluative conception for 
both men and women today - at least that 
which bears a linguistic label - is 
verguenza, or shame. "(ibid: 93)35 
"Thus, it would appear that in Andalusia, 
verguenza is an , experience-near" concept whilst honra 
is "experience-distant" (Geertz 1974). Cf Wikan (op 
cit) on shame in Cairo and Oman. 
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The counterpart to verguenza is honradez (honesty), 
particularly, but not exclusively, in money matters: 
°... honesty is social ethics, demanding 
scrupulous compliance in social commitments 
... Its yardstick 
is shame ... (ibid: 94, 
emphasis added) 
It follows that 
"... the unethical, dishonest man is 
shameless" (sinverguenza) (ibid). 
3.2.1 Reciprocity 
Gilmore identifies an underlying principle which 
governs honesty and shame relations in Andalusia: 
"Its [honesty's] internal mechanism and its 
social (thus measurable) manifestation is a 
punctilious - though implicit - reciprocity, 
usually balanced and predictable. " (ibid)36 
If this reciprocity principle is violated, 
particularly if one enters into an implicit 'exchange 
contract' with another with no intention of 'keeping 
one's side of the bargain', one may be labelled 
sinverquenzon ("a big shameless") (ibid: 95). Such a 
label is the ultimate censure. 
As noted above, it is not only in the realm of 
economic contracts that the notions of honesty and 
shame, based on reciprocal obligations, have 
application. These pervade every aspect of life. 
Thus, one is also bound to fulfil one's obligations 
with respect to one's spouse and dependants, or one's 
peers: 
"It is interesting to contrast this account of 
the significance of the reciprocity principle in 
Andalusian 'shame' and honesty with Lebra's account of its relevance to guilt, particularly in Japan. 
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"In every case one acquires an implicit 
contract; a marriage, a wage agreement, a 
friendship, a loan, or a representative 
position. In each case to be 'honorable', 
that is, to be virtuous before the eyes of 
the community, one pays one's debts in a 
gracious manner, one 'complies. ' Honor is 
the respectful adherence to community 
tradition, conformity to cherished norms. " 
(ibid: 99). 
4. NEW ZEALAND: The Maori concept of 'whakamaa'(Metae 
1986) 
"Whakamaa is a word standing for a concept 
which Maori use in the process of organising 
and talking about their experience of being 
human. It cannot be matched with any one 
English word but covers a range of meaning 
that is divided among several. It suggests 
a way of thinking about interpersonal 
relations which is different from that 
expressed in and reinforced by the English 
language. " (ibid: 17) 
In her work on whakamaa, Metge explicitly eschews 
the use of 
"concepts and theories developed within 
Western scholarly disciplines [e. g. 
anthropology] to order and explain the 
experience and concepts of other cultures. " 
(21-22). 
Rather, she attempts to explicate the indigenous view 
of the Maori concept of whakamaa by reference to 
numerous detailed descriptions by Maori informants, on 
the basis of which she constructs a model of this 
concept with a minimal amount of interpretation other 
than that necessary for clarification or summarizing. 
This is therefore extremely valuable for the purpose 
of considering shame in cross-cultural perspective, 
since it represents an example of perhaps the nearest 
possible thing to a genuinely indigenous understanding 
of a similar concept in another culture. 
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In "A Dictionary of the Maori Language" 
(Williams 1957: 161, cited by Metge op cit: 18) the word 
whakamaa has the following explanations: "to whiten" 
(transitive verb); "shame, abasement" (nouns) and 
"shy, ashamed" (adjectives). Whakamaa feelings and 
behaviour are distinguished. 
4.1 Feelings 
The range these cover is extensive and includes 
the following connotations: shyness, embarrassment, 
inadequacy, inability to act effectively, depression, 
feeling ashamed. Uncertainty, fear and hurt are also 
represented by whakamaa (pp 28-30). 37 
Despite this comprehensive range of feelings 
associated with whakamaa, according to Metge, the most 
common translations into English are nonetheless still 
'shyness', 'embarrassment' and 'shame' (ibid: 30). 
However, these are not . interchangeable. Dependent on 
context, their improper usage is misleading (31). 
4.2 Behaviour 
The behavioural manifestations of whakamaa are 
primarily "unresponsiveness" and "withdrawal from 
communication with others" (ibid: 25, cf Ablamowicz op 
cit). In particular, the severance of visual 
communication, through turning the back or covering 
the face for example, is typical (ibid: 27). In 
addition, restricted movement, silence and aural 
'shutdown' appear to be common (ibid: 26). In extreme 
cases, 
"Aspects of the archetypal interpretation of 
' western' shame gre thus represented in this range (for 
example as inadequacy). 
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11... whakamaa is occasionally manifested in 
actual physical flight, running away and 
hiding body as well as feelings. " (ibid: 27) . 
4.3 'Whakamaa' and 'mana' 
According to Metge, all the disparate meanings of 
whakamaa are united by their common concern with the 
central Maori concept of mana. This is fully 
discussed by Metge (Chapter Four passim); however, the 
present exposition of this concept and its relation to 
whakamaa must necessarily be summarily brief. 
There are two predominant interpretations of 
mana, one social, one spiritual; the first associated 
with Pakeha (non-Maori New Zealanders), the latter 
with Maori. The meanings given are, variously, 
'prestige', 'standing', 'power' and 'authority'. 
According to Metge, for Pakeha the emphasis is on the 
first two, whereas Maori 
... place the primary stress on 'power' and 'authority', see 'prestige' and 'standing' 
as derived from the demonstrable possession 
of power and authority, and in many cases 
identify the power involved as being of a 
spiritual, supernatural kind. " (62) 
However, even amongst Maori the understandings of mana 
are multiple (63) . 
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Mang is also related to 'self-image', but 
although Maori accept this as one of the 'meanings' of 
mans, the latter "has a spiritual dimension which is 
lacking in that of self-image. " (75). In addition, 
while self-image (in 'western' thought) has a human 
basis, 
"'mana comes ultimately from outside the 
individual, from spiritual sources ... of (ibid). 
38These correspond to tribal, generational, rural 
and urban subcultural differences. 
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and is, as identified above, an "empowering" quality 
(76) : 
"To have mana is to succeed in the 
undertakings for which it is supplied, so 
much so that success itself is taken as 
evidence of having mans of a particular 
kind, and failure to achieve a goal or 
overcome disadvantage as evidence of having 
lost some or all of one's mana or not having 
had much to begin with. Thus loss of mana 
involves more than mere reduction in self- 
esteem. It means loss of power and the 
capacity for achievement ... 
it adversely 
affects a person's relations with other 
people, causing him to draw back from those 
he no longer has the power to control or to 
deal with as equals ... " (ibid). 
A decrease in one's mans or self-image as a 
result of others' undermining causes whakamaa. 
Further, this reduced mana or self-image itself makes 
one more susceptible to whakamaa (ibid); the latter is 
"both product and expression of lower or lowered mana" 
(78). Whakamaa is thus 
"bound up with the lack or loss of mans in 
relation to others" and 
"always involves an implicit if not explicit 
comparison with other people in which the 
person who is whakamaa comes off second 
best. " (31-32). 
4.4 Other characteristics of 'whakamaa' 
Whakamaa may be slight or intense, fleeting or 
longer lasting, and is experienced both privately (as 
when others are unaware of one's feelings) and 
publicly: 
"the presence of witnesses nearly always 
increases the intensity of whakamaa"" (33). 
Different categories of 'audience' create different 
degrees of whakamaa; thus, in front of one's family, 
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it is usually minimal, whereas before strangers it 
increases significantly (34). "' 
Moreover, whakamaa does not only result from 
demeaning exposure but can be experienced through fear 
of success as well as of failure in an undertaking 
urged by others (ibid). 
There are varying degrees of whakamaa depending 
on one's age and 'status': 
"The older a person is, the more status he 
has, the more wounding his criticism [thus 
the greater the whakamaa he can create in 
another] and, conversely, the more deeply he 
himself is wounded by whakamaa. " (35)'0 
Finally, whakamaa, like shame, can be felt for 
others, both individuals and through shared group 
membership, especially ancestral and kin groups. 
4 .5 Causes of 'whakamaa'al 
Metge classifies the causes of whakamaa into six 
substantive categories which are associated with three 
overall 'types' of its experience (for oneself or on 
39cf Japanese hitomishiri (Lebra op cit) and 
Javanese isin (Keeler op cit). 
"This is reminiscent of the situation in Java 
according to Keeler (op cit). 
*"Inevitably, 'essentialists' would argue that 
such causes are irrelevant and any cross-cultural 
differences immaterial since they do not affect the 
actual experience of 'shame'; however, in attempting 
to gain an overall view of the nature of ' shame' in 
another culture, one cannot ignore such causes and 
their implications. Indeed, as the cognitive process 
model of emotions outlined in Chapter Two above 
dictates, differences in antecedent events, event 
coding and appraisal may legitimately be regarded as 
differences in significant aspects of an emotion as a 
whole and therefore essential for adequate 
understanding. 
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others' behalf; generated by self or others; as a 
result of "wrongdoing" or not [38]). These causes are: 
a) Inferiority in relation to others, particularly 
perception of lower status: 
"whether in general terms or in respect of 
some valued quality, such as senior descent, 
age, knowledge, schooling, wealth or 
occupational status. " (39); 
b) "Uncertainty and confusion" (44), e. g. when in 
doubt as to the demands of a situation, course of 
action required, etc. 
c) "Recognition of fault" (46), whether 
"breach of ... social conventions, the 
community's moral code, the law, or simply 
[one's] own standards. " (47) 
d) Humiliation or 'belittlement' of self or one's 
achievements, whether explicitly or implicitly (i. e. 
by others "failing to recognise [one's] presence and 
status" (ibid). The whaka m as experienced in this 
respect is particularly exacerbated if the 'audience' 
in the situation is large or if strangers are present 
(48) ; 
e) "Being singled out" (51) whether the highlighting 
is for negative or positive reasons or just due to 
some difference; 
f) On behalf of close associates (e. g. kin or 
friends), either for them (when they themselves are 
whakamaa) or due to the reflection of their whakamaa 
on oneself (52). 
The above causes relate primarily to individual 
whakamaa; however, whole groups are also susceptible 
for similar reasons but particularly when in a 
position of unfavourable comparison with other groups 
and as a result of the faults of individual members of 
the group (58). The main groups concerned are 
ancestral and kin groups; however, whakamaa is also 
generally felt by Maori in relation to Pakeha (60). 
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4.6. Effects of 'whakamaa' 
Unrelieved experiences of whakamaa may result in 
the sufferer "holding back" (108), "running away" 
(111) , or "hitting out" (112) . The first of these may 
manifest itself as total inhibition of effective 
action, reducing one to "virtual immobility, for 
minutes, hours, days or even longer. " (109, of section 
4.2. above on the behavioural manifestations of 
whakamaa). The second is most common when whakamaa- 
inducing accusations are publicly made (111), unless 
one's high mana dictates that one resist by turning 
the whakamaa back on the accuser (112). Aggressive 
behaviour as an expression of whakamaa is apparently 
rare; 42 'getting back at' someone usually takes the 
form of verbal attack, often by finding fault with the 
other person's speech or behaviour in return (ibid). 
4.7 Relief of 'whakamaa'. 
Whakamaa is conceived by Maori as "an affliction" 
(94), i. e. although it may occur due to an 
individual's own action, behaviour, etc. it is 
experienced as being visited upon one from without. 
As such, unless the whakamaa is minimal, people are 
unable to rid themselves of it unaided and are 
dependent on others' forgiveness and help (ibid). Its 
relief is effected in different ways depending on its 
source and the readiness of others to assist in the 
process is also related to such considerations. Thus, 
where "wrongdoing" has occurred, the only way out is 
through "atonement", the making of restitution to the 
42"From experience I am sure that whakamaa often 
involves anger, but that in most cases it is suppressed 
and turned in on the self [cf Lewis op cit]. However, 
if a person who feels whakamaa is pushed past a 
certaLn point his whakamaa is likely to surface 
suddenly in violence. " (30) 
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offended party [ies], "confession and reparation" 
(95). 43 In such cases, help may be witheld until the 
appropriate move to atone has been made. 
In addition, the experience of whakamaa is itself 
considered to be 
"part of the reparation, at once admission 
of fault, apology and expiation" (98). 
Where the offence is a private matter, such 'payment' 
is also private, but in cases of public offence, 
public acknowledgement of one's wrong, confession and 
apology are expected (97). In the past, such 
'punishment' was followed by reacceptance into the 
community. " 
If one has committed no identifiable offence, the 
help of others in overcoming one's whakamaa is more 
immediately forthcoming (98). This often takes the 
form of expressions of aroha. `5 
According to Metge, most experiences of whakamaa 
are temporary and 
"accepting the proffered expressions of 
aroha may be all that is necessary to 
restore someone emerging from whakamaa to 
full participation in normal social 
relations .. " (103), 
but often complete 'recovery' takes much longer, the 
feelings outliving the outward signs, and an increased 
"However, in cases of extremely severe offence, 
even this may not be possible to repair the breach, in 
which case total ostracism from the community is 
likely (94). 
44cf Braithwaite (op cit) on "reintegrative 
shaming". 
45"To approach someone closely is to express 
aroha. Aroha is commonly translated as 'love', but it 
is a special kind of love, caring love, and it 
includes the ideas of 'feeling sorry for someone', 
sympathy ('feeling with') and forgiveness. " (10l) 
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susceptibility to further experiences being possible 
(ibid). 
Summarizing, Metge identifies the corresponding 
concept to that of lack or loss of mans as the cause 
of whakamaa to be such demonstration of aroha (ibid) 
as its 'cure': 
" ... mana separates and sets people against 
each other, creating the potential for 
whakamaa. In contrast, aroha links and 
binds people together .. It does not cancel 
out status differences, but bridges and 
mediates them. " (104) 
Finally, laughter is identified as both an 
expression of whakamaa and a contributor to its 
relief, as when others laugh with the person feeling 
whakamaa as an affirmation of their solidarity with 
and aroha for them (107). 
4.8 Evaluation of 'whakamaa' 
The primary emphasis in the evaluation of 
whakamaa is on its negative consequences, leading to 
its characterization as 
"undesirable, involving much personal pain, 
disruption to social relations and both 
short and long term inhibition of 
achievement. " (114) 
However, judiciously managed, it may have positive 
benefits and functions. These include reinforcement 
of social order (primarily within the Maori community; 
with respect to Maori-Pakeha relations the situation 
is more complex); conciliation between disputing 
parties, and stimulus to achievement (although this is 
not common, the more usual effect being inhibition as 
indicated above) [114-117]. 
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S. Comvarisons and conclusions 
It is hoped that the general aim of this Chapter, 
to illustrate the nature of 'shame' in a number of 
unfamiliar cultures, and thus to make clearer where 
the similarities and differences lie between these and 
the interpretation of shame delineated as the 
'western' concept earlier in this study, has been 
satisfied by the inclusion of a range of disparate 
ethnographic examples and various perspectives. 
Historically, in comparative anthropology, 
(particularly in the 'Mediterranean'), such comparison 
has tended to be limited to "societies that share a 
longstanding historical-linguistic tradition" (Brandes 
1987: 124) and anthropologists have largely been wary 
of global comparisons. However, it is possible that 
the juxtaposition of concepts deriving from 
geographically distant communities may be just as 
illuminating in assessing the extent to which (and 
precisely which) elements of 'shame' are shared or 
unique. As such, at this point an attempt will be 
made to highlight such areas of similarity or 
difference. 
5.1 'Shame' and 'status' 
One way in which some of the cultures resemble 
one another is in the apparent concern with shame in 
relation to 'status'. Allusion has already been made 
in the preceding text to the fact that in both Java 
and New Zealand, j gin and whakamaa respectively are 
tied up with issues of the affirmation of status 
(kakuwatan batin/mana, to some extent seen as a 
subjective, fluid and negotiable quality) and respect 
by others. In Japan, the interpretation of status is 
somewhat different, emphasizing more objectively 
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determined, fixed social category", occupancy of such 
status and incongruency between it and the occupant's 
demeanour. Furthermore, the data on Catalonian 
vergonya suggest, a similar preoccupation with meeting 
the obligations of one's role and status as a 
household member. In addition, as noted earlier, 
accounts of the 'western' concept of shame relate it 
to a more ambiguous meaning of status, having to do 
with 'worth' rather than 'role', and a reduction in it 
resulting from negative assessment by self and others. 
It can be seen therefore, that although the data 
suggest that in a number of different cultures, shame 
is intimately linked with this issue of status, the 
way this concept is interpreted varies and thus has a 
differential effect on the related interpretation of 
'shame' in this respect. 
5.2 'Shame' and 'embarrassment' 
There are similarities between the "exposure 
sensitivity" and "audience anxiety" of the Japanese 
and Javanese, and the fear of being "singled out" (for 
good or ill) of the Maori. However, in the first 
case, as Lebra identifies, this is due to the cultural 
demand for concealment of the 'self' behind prescribed 
roles and their attendant requirements, the risk of 
exposure of which causes the anxiety when publicly 
exhibited. In the Maori case, it is the demonstration 
of difference between oneself and others which results 
from being highlighted which creates the discomfort. 
The situation in Java more closely resembles the 
Japanese, both i in and hitomishiri apparently 
46But cf Metge (op cit: 77) on one different Maori 
interpretation of mana in terms of 'status'. 
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expressing the same kind of diffidence in relation to 
strangers. 47 
5.3 'Shame' and 'responsibility' 
The notion that not only need one not be 
personally responsible for the attribute or action 
inducing 'shame' on one's own behalf, but that one can 
feel shame for or on behalf of others with whom one is 
closely associated, appears to be present in all the 
examples of 'shame' concepts considered. What is 
cross-culturally variable, and which would appear to 
relate to matters of social organization, is the 
degree to which this 'shared shame' is emphasized. 
Thus, although in the 'west', as Thrane (op cit) 
points out, "' one can still feel shame for one's 
family, country etc., this tends to be less common, 
and arguably less keenly felt, than shame on one's own 
behalf, whereas in those cultures where solidarity 
with various social groups is more salient than 
individual autonomy, the capacity for 'shared shame' 
is probably greater. 
5.4 "Antecedent events" (Mesauita & Frijda op cit) 
A number of the causes of shame appear to be 
similar in the cultures considered. Thus, for 
example, the whakamaa resulting from the perception of 
inadequacy or incapacity to act to some extent echoes 
the Piers/Rawlsian idea of shame as failure to meet 
standards of competence. However, such similarities 
do not render whakamaa and shame the same; witness the 
emphasis in the former on disparity and unfavourable 
47 Cf also Buss (1980) on self-consciousness and 
social anxiety. 
48Cf also Walsh 1970. 
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comparison between the 'self' and 'others', expressed 
in 'shame' at perceived inferiority - an aspect of 
shame which is rarely highlighted by writers in the 
'western' philosophical and social scientific 
traditions. 49 In addition, public humiliation would 
seem to induce some kind of 'shame' in most cultures. 
5.5 Reciprocity 
The Andalusian example highlights a discrepancy 
in the perception of the relative significance of the 
reciprocity principle in shame and guilt between this 
region of Spain, and Japan and the 'west'. The 
emphasis in most `western' accounts of guilt is on 
this idea of two parties in relationship requiring a 
balance or equilibrium in terms of rights and duties 
(cf e. g. Rawls op cit). This is echoed by both Lebra 
and Creighton in their discussions of 'shame' and 
'guilt' in Japan. However, it will be recalled that 
for Andalusians, failure to maintain the requisite 
balance between oneself and one's opposite gives rise 
to 'shame', rather than 'guilt'. 
5.6 Social organization 
Certain issues relating to differences in social 
organization have already been alluded to. The 
significance of elitism in China identified by Ng, and 
the differential degree of state penetration of the 
household in Japan and Catalonia highlighted by Asano- 
Tamanoi represent further manifestations of the 
influence of social structure, mediated by cultural 
values, affecting the interpretation of 'shame'. 
"Though this of course does not preclude the 
experience of shame for this reason in 'westerners', 
it only suggests that this is not so explicitly 
culturally affirmed and validated as a source of shame 
as it is in Maori culture. 
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5.7 Resolution of 'shame' 
Perhaps the clearest example of a cultural 
difference is that between the ways in which 'shame' 
is believed to be effectively discharged. In the 
'west' , it will be recalled, the emphasis is on the 
individual's own efforts in 'making good' the 
'defects' s/he has demonstrated by replacing failure 
with success. Although this is an element in the 
resolution and 'healing' of Maori whakamaa, it is only 
appropriate in very specific circumstances, tends to 
take the form of restitution and 'payment' to the 
injured party, "' and even then complete 'cure' is only 
achieved in conjunction with the help and support of 
others. There is thus quite a stark contrast, which 
clearly also relates to the differential value placed 
on individual autonomy and self-sufficiency on the one 
hand and social solidarity on the other. 51 
5.8 Conclusion 
This survey of 'shame' abroad has provided an 
opportunity for the reconsideration of aspects of 
shame with which 'westerners' are familiar in the 
light of sometimes subtle, sometimes dramatic 
differences (and similarities) evident in the concepts 
employed by people of other cultures. This limited 
exercise in cross-cultural comparison will be 
5'A situation which in the 'west' tends to prevail 
in the case of guilt and remorse rather than shame, cf 
Taylor (op cit) on "repair work". 
S1cf Brandes (op cit) on the resolution of 'shame' in Monteros (Spain): "The individual who has been 
shamed, or who has acted shamelessly, has sufficient 
command over his or her life to be able to overcome 
the temporarily shameful condition. Shame, therefore, 
is an individual quality ... [t]he shamed or shameful person has to be perceived as existentially in command 
... " (129). 
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supplemented in the next Chapter by a similar 
consideration of such potential examples of 
convergence or divergence between accounts of 'shame' 
originating in the work of a number of Continental 
philosophers in the previous century and the earlier 
part of this one, and that outlined in the first Part 
of this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SHAME'S METAPHYSICAL SIGNIFICANCE: 
19TH & EARLY 20TH CENTURY VIEWS 
1. Introduction 
So far, the (philosophical) accounts of shame 
considered in this study have been limited to those 
originating in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. As already noted, such accounts treat shame 
almost exclusively as an emotion. In this respect, 
they resemble the 'traditional' accounts of shame as, 
variously, an impression, affect, etc., given by e. g. 
Aristotle, St. Thomas and Spinoza. However, such 
interpretations of shame focus on one level of this 
phenomenon only and as Rotenstreich notes, 
"... we may speak about over-partialization 
in this case ... some implications and 
presuppositions of shame are not 
sufficiently brought forward once we speak 
about the feeling of shame, though in the 
current usage nobody would argue against 
this presentation of the phenomenon. " 
(1965: 83) 
However, it is not the distinction between the emotion 
of shame and the 'sense of' shame, identified in 
Chapter Three above, to which Rotenstreich refers. 
Rather, it is one between views of shame as an 
individual feeling or disposition and those which also 
see it as a fundamental feature of the general human 
situation. 
Thus, in this Part, attention turns to accounts 
of shame given by certain philosophers in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition 
to considering the 'feeling' or 'sentiment' of shame, 
such thinkers also explore shame's ontological status 
and its significance in terms of ideas about the 
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nature of humanity's position in relation to the world 
and other beings, i. e., cosmological considerations. 
Such accounts thus represent a significantly different 
perspective on, and interpretation of, shame from 
those with which this study has previously been 
concerned and with which, arguably, contemporary 
philosophers (and social scientists) are most 
familiar. It is hoped that this inclusion of accounts 
of shame originating in a different philosophical 
tradition from the analytical approach which 
predominates in Anglo-American philosophy, i. e. the 
European phenomenological/existentialist tradition, 
will provide a further opportunity to demonstrate the 
differences and/or similarities in accounts of shame 
across cultures and historical periods. 
1.1 Selection criteria 
Those philosophers who considered shame in this 
period include Hegel, Nietzsche, Scheler and Sartre. 
In keeping with their more 'holistic' perspective on 
shame, identified above, their accounts tend to be 
more deeply embedded within their general philosophies 
than those of more contemporary thinkers, although the 
degree of such 'embeddedness' varies. For example, 
both Hegel and Nietzsche contemplated the significance 
of shame, but in a somewhat fragmentary way and as 
tangentially related to other issues of more central 
concern in their philosophies. ' Thus, in order to 
lcf Emad (1972: 370): "Nietzsche ... has profound insight into "shame" ... yet ... [it] is by no means 
an adequate and exhaustive account of this feeling. 
... What attracts his attention is not shame qua shame 
.. he did not study shame as such but elaborated on 
shame's relevance to man's central concern with self- 
esteem. " Also Schneider (1977: 22): °... Nietzsche's 
comments on shame, while seemingly haphazard, 
occasional, and even contradictory, on closer reading 
emerge as intentional and consistent. " For a 
comprehensive yet concise appraisal, see Schneider 
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extract their view of shame and relate it to their 
broader philosophical position, a considerable degree 
of specialist knowledge of their thought is really 
required. The current author is not such a 
specialist. As such, it is primarily a consideration 
of the work of Max Scheler, together with that of 
Jean-Paul Sartre (in both of which the discussion of 
shame is at least conducted more explicitly and 
systematically, making it easier to analyze) which 
will constitute the majority of this Chapter. 
1.2 Methodology 
Once again, it seemed most appropriate to 
consider individual authors' shame accounts in turn, 
before attempting to identify common themes, points of 
divergence etc. Thus, a summarized exegesis of the 
thinker's position will be presented, followed by a 
critique. The accounts will then be compared and 
contrasted, both in considerable detail with each 
other, and more generally with the contemporary 
accounts examined in Chapter One. Finally, their 
implications for, and any questions they raise 
concerning, the broader questions which this study as 
a whole seeks to explore (e. g., the 
universality/specificity of shame across cultures and 
historical periods) will also be considered. 
Notwithstanding the above remarks concerning 
Hegel, since both Scheler and Sartre do, however, draw 
on his philosophy in the formulation of their own 
positions, in order to provide the background against 
(loc cit) . 
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which the latter are situated, a condensed outline of 
the Hegelian view of shame will be given first. 
2. Hegel2 
As noted above, it is not possible with this 
author's level of expertise, nor within the context of 
this study, to explore Hegel's philosophy, within 
which his account of shame is situated, in detail. 
Nonetheless, as has already been argued above in 
connection with Taylor's criticisms of Sartre (Chapter 
One, subsection S'. 2.1), a particular view of shame 
cannot be understood nor criticized without taking 
into consideration the context of the broader 
philosophical position of the commentator, since 
" .. the description of the phenomenon of 
shame is interwoven in philosophical systems 
and interpreted according to the concepts of 
the respective systems. " (Rotenstreich op 
cit: 66). 
It must suffice to note that: 
" .. the general trend of Hegel's philoso- 
phy .. [is] ... the analysis of the dialectical movement from that which is 
immediately given to that which is reflec- 
tively mediated ... " (Rotenstreich op 
cit: 61) ; 
i. e., the transcendence of Nature by Ppirit. For 
Hegel, shame is engendered whe'. this gradual 
transcendence begins, at 
"The hour when mail leaves the path of mere 
natural being ... " (Wallace 1892: 57); 
thus 
'Owing to the author's inability to read German, 
it was not possible to gain access to the original 
writings of either Hegel or Scheler. As such, 
references in the section on Hegel are to the English 
translation by Wallace (1892). 
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"... the sense of shame bears evidence to 
the separation of man from this natural and 
sensuous life. The beasts never get so far 
as this separation, and they feel no shame.,, 
(ibid: 56) 
The meaning of shame, for Hegel, lies in its 
signification of the way in which nature is morally 
evaluated. Thus, dress (which is an expressional form 
of shame, cf Scheler op cit below) originates from the 
recognition by man of his dual nature as both animal 
and spirit (ibid). His spiritual nature being seen as 
his destiny, and evaluated more highly than his animal 
nature, clothing serves to conceal the body which is 
seen as symbolizing the latter, and thus as improper 
(Hegel 1955: 684). 3 
3. Scheler* 
3.1 Phenomenological method 
Scheler's essay on shame is, those commenting on 
it note (cf Emad op cit; Hays Williams(1941/2); 
'The physical need for dress, presumably as 
protection for the body, is a secondary consideration 
(Wallace op cit: 56). 
4As noted above, this author does not read German. 
Since there exists no English translation of Scheler's 
essay (originally published in 1913), in this section, 
all quotations, as well as the author's (original) 
English translations and paraphrases, refer to the 
French translation by Dupuy (1952). The title of this 
translation, "La Pudeur", might suggest that the focus 
of Scheler's account is the "sense of", rather than 
the "emotion", shame ("honte" in French, as noted 
above in Chapter Three). However, although in large 
part Scheler is concerned with this aspect of shame, 
the original German title is in fact ""über Scham und 
Schamgefiihle" (Scheler 1957), indicating that he also 
pays attention to feelings of shame. Indeed, as will 
become clear below, his lengthy Appendix is 
predominantly concerned with just this facet of shame 
and its relationship with other feelings. The French 
translation's title is thus perhaps misleading and 
somewhat inadequate, although presumably chosen to 
reflect the overall bias of Scheler's account. 
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Rotenstreich op cit), a good illustrative example of 
his general phenomenological approach. That is, 
empirical questions such as what gives rise to shame 
and what forms its expression takes, are put aside and 
attention is focused on elucidating its essence. In 
Scheler's own words: 
"in the phenomenological attitude ... what 
is meant... Is intuited. It is not 
observed. " (Scheler 1957: 388, cited by Emad 
op cit: 361) 
That is, he explicitly rejects the methods of 
empirical sciences 
Scheler's 'intuitive insights' concerning shame 
are achieved in a progressive way, beginning with an 
attempt to identify in general when and where shame is 
possible and to determine those conditions which are 
prerequisites for its occurrence. He concludes that 
shame, unlike certain other sentiments (such as fear, 
anxiety, disgust and even jealousy), is peculiar to 
the human species and cannot be felt by animals of a 
lower order. The reason for this is humanity's 
transcendence, through its more highly developed level 
of consciousness, of its purely animal nature (while 
remaining rooted in it) and the fact that humanity has 
awareness of a conflict between what is peculiar to 
itself (i. e. "1'esprit" - thinking , intuiting, 
desiring, loving) and that which it has in common with 
other animals and which differ only in degree - "leg 
sentiments vitaux". Further, the feeling of shame is 
characterized by Scheler as grounded in an awareness 
of an opposition between some ideal and actual 
concrete reality: 
SScheler 
was totally opposed to the "naturalistic 
conception of man and his works" and "his 'philosophical anthropology' was designed to provide 
an alternative" (Farber 1958: 393). 
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"conscience dune opposition entre quelque 
'devoir-etre' ideal et la realite 
effective"' (12), 
that is, shame clearly has ethical connotations which 
prevent it being attributable to 'lower' animals. 
Further, shame is uniquely human and no more 
attributable to higher beings (i. e. the divine), 
because it is the tension arising from being both 
animal nature and 'higher consciousness' which creates 
shame; the divine, being purely spirit, do not 
experience this tension. Humanity is thus conceived 
of as a 'bridge' between "two orders of being" (and by 
virtue of being such a bridge is bound to feel shame, 
not merely capable of it). 
3.2. Bodily and spiritual shame 
Scheler makes a distinction between 'bodily' and 
'spiritual' shame and states that the former is 
evolutionarily prior to the latter. 
The organic conditions which precede the 
emergence of bodily shame are, according to Scheler, 
a high degree of individualization, a preference in 
reproduction for quality rather than quantity and in 
particular, where the sexual instinct, and the 
reproductive instinct in the strict sense, are 
separate from one another (21) : 
"This separation is a condition sine qua non 
for the existence of a sense of sexual shame 
... only where some individualization and 
some choice according to value can intervene 
in the reproductive process ... also only where the subordination of the procreative 
functions to an instinct of individual self- 
preservation occurs .. is the area delineated where a sexual [i. e. bodily] 
shame can arise. " (ibid) 
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3.3 Characteristics of shame 
However, he states that despite its ready 
association with things sexual, shame is not to be 
mistakenly thought of exclusively as a sexual 
phenomenon, nor is it, according to Scheler, 
exclusively social: 
"I1 existe, aussi primordiales qu'une pudeur 
devant autrul, une 'pudeur devant soi-meme' 
et une 'honte a ses propres yeux "' (29). 
This applies both to the 'bodily' and the 'spiritual' 
senses of shame. 
In addition, shame is essentially a self- 
referential phenomenon: 
"... en tout mouvement de pudeur se produit 
un acte, qu'on peut nommer acte de 'retour 
sur soi'" (30). 
Whilst it is a personal feeling involved in self- 
protection, shame is not, however, exclusively 
concerned with the self of the person experiencing it; 
it can be vicariously experienced. We can feel shame 
for others not as their behaviour reflects adversely 
on ourselves or on a third party, but on their behalf: 
"... ce qu'exprime tres nettement le 
reproche 'J'ai profondement honte pour toi 
devant toi-meme "' (34). 
Shame is thus 
"un sentiment de culpabilite pour le Jg 
individuel en general, qui nest pas 
necessairement mon Je Individuel propre, 
macs un Je individuel, ou qu'il soft donne, 
en moi ou en autrui. " (ibid). 
Further, according to Scheler, just 'to be seen' 
is not sufficient to provoke shame6; it is the way in 
which one is seen which is important. The occasion for 
shame is not when one believes oneself to be seen in 
one's individuality, nor when one believes oneself to 
6Cf Sartre on being seen (Section 4.3 below). 
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be seen as just an example of some generality, but 
when the way one is seen oscillates between these two 
(31) .7 
Because shame can be 'objectively' felt, it is, 
according to Scheler, an independent emotion which can 
be demanded by a state of affairs regardless of the 
existing emotional state of the self; it 'takes hold 
of' or 'invades' the self from without. 
3.4. Origins of shame 
'Bodily' shame and psychological shame are 
irreducible to one another and there is a very 
important difference between them; the former only 
requires the levels of "sensualite et du sentiment 
vital" for its experience, and is thus universal in 
human life in all stages of its evolution, whereas the 
latter presupposes the existence of a "personne 
spirituelle", which evidently is only a feature of 
humanity in its most highly developed form (51-2). It 
is the origins of bodily shame on which Scheler 
focuses. 
3.4.1 Shame and education 
Scheler criticizes the theory which views shame 
as a product of education and 
'This oscillation between individuality and 
generality explains the intimate connection between 
shame and sex. The latter, being that which humanity 
shares with all living things, is "the most general 
feature of our existence" (32), but at the same time 
it is also the most individual experience; it can thus 
be seen why, if shame concerns this tension between 
the individual and the general, the sphere of sex is 
one where its manifestation is highly probable. 
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"instead of seeing in it [shame] one of the 
roots of morality [cf Aldrich op cit; Heller 
op cit; Thrane op cit], makes it the 
consequence of a 'moral education' which 
dominates in a society. " (ibid). 
Such a theory neither poses nor answers the question 
of from where the educators' own sense of shame is 
derived and this is one of its obvious weaknesses. 
Moreover, it rests on three fundamental confusions: 
1. Confusion of the form of expression of shame 
(determined according to time and place and 
crystallized in custom) with the real expression 
itself; 
2. Confusion of the natural expression of shame (e. g. 
blushing), with the artificial (e. g. bathing costume) ; 
3. General confusion of the feeling of shame with its 
expression. 
It is not education but tradition which 
determines the form of expression of shame in any 
society. However, tradition does not create the 
expressional forms of shame: it only transmits already 
'given' forms (55). (These, according to Scheler, are 
genetically transmitted and only change 
"par le melange du sang" and "l'extension 
des relations genetiques entre sangs 
differentes" (ibid). ) 
Deviation from such a form automatically causes shame 
by drawing attention to the individual. Such forms 
may become 'empty' of the true feeling of shame, they 
are only 
"des formes mortes dont on fait encore usage 
sous la pression de 1'inertie historique. "" 
(54) . 
Prudery is one such 'dead form' of shame and it is 
only this which education can influence, according to 
Scheler. Theories which attribute shame to education 
thus only confuse prudery for genuine shame. 
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3.4.2 Shame and sex 
Despite the fact that by far the greatest single 
aspect of shame addressed by Scheler is its role and 
function in this respect, the intricacies of Scheler's 
intuitions concerning this will not be examined in 
detail here. 
His main concern is to refute views of (sexual) 
shame (such as Freud's) which interpret it negatively, 
assuming that shame is a voluntary impulse, acting to 
repress the sexual instinct. In fact, Scheler 
maintains, shame is fed by the latter and the degree 
of shame felt is proportional to the strength of the 
sexual instinct. Given that this is so, shame cannot 
operate in the way such interpretations believe. The 
consequences of this view of shame are deleterious, 
according to Scheler. When it is seen as a repression 
of the libido, which it is believed gives rise to 
various health problems, the view naturally follows 
that shame should be eradicated. Scheler, however, 
sees in shame a positive and protective 'force', 
especially with respect to sexual matters. 
3.5 Shamelessness 
Shamelessness ("le cynisme") is generally 
believed to indicate a lack of any sense of shame but 
Scheler regards this view as mistaken. He sees 
shamelessness as the reaction of a living sense of 
shame against an empty expressional form. Similarly, 
obscenity requires a sense of shame but is not 'born 
of it' as shamelessness is. It aims to offend the 
sense of shame by shocking, but does not "deny" or 
"annihilate" that sense. Obscenity is most commonly 
found in societies in which tradition and education 
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have 'over-developed' shame and particularly where a 
rigid sexual morality exists. 
3.6 Differences in shame between the sexes 
Scheler also considers the differences between 
the sexes with respect to their susceptibility to 
shame and the type of shame which in his opinion is 
most readily associated with each. 
He rejects both the idea that only one of the 
sexes originally possesses shame, from whom the other 
learns it, and also that there are quantitative 
differences between the shame each sex feels. (Such 
ideas again stem from confusion of shame's 
expressional forms with its essence. ) Scheler claims 
that sexual shame is more prominent in women than in 
men by virtue of their more fundamental role in 
reproduction. As an instance of bodily shame this 
therefore suggests that it is the latter which 
characterizes the female, who is not so inclined to ( 
or capable of) an awareness of the dichotomy of mind 
and body as the male and therefore less susceptible to 
psychological shame: 
"... chez la femme, l'activite spirituelle 
proprement dite - qui par principe n' est pas 
assujettie au service des instincts et des 
fonctions d'ordre vitale - est moans 
fortement et moans precisement degagee des 
fonctions biologiques... "; but 
"... la pudeur psychique a sa condition 
essentielle dans une conscience accusee gla 
la distance qui existe entre l'esprit at 
fame vitale, entre la personne et 
l'organisme. " (141) 
Men, by contrast, do have such a consciousness and 
thus are possessed of a keener sense of psychological 
shame than women. 
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3.7 Shame and 'worthje 
Shame is not wholly negative and "does not only 
result from a consciousness of non-value" (145). 
However, in the act of feeling ashamed, such a 
consciousness is always present. An important feature 
of shame is also its resistance to "everything which 
calls attention too readily" (ibid) but this is 
neither shame's essence nor its predominant aspect: 
"it is rather the fear 1) of being an 
object; 2) of the image we have of ourselves 
being crushed by the image others have of 
us. " (146). (cf Sartre op cit, below) 
Shame thus seems to arise when the lowest level 
of one's individual value is focused on, because one 
tends to want always to be seen in terms of one's 
highest value. 
Moreover, 
"shame is an affective state which implies 
or presupposes that we feel ourself as an 
object. " (ibid) . 
This may be called the "value-image" of the self and 
it may be i) the image one has of one's own self or 
ii) that which others have of it. According to 
Scheler, the latter is probably originally prior. 
3.8 Shame and honour 
In view of the above, shame is related to honour 
in which "the image which others can have of us and 
the associated consciousness of a diminution of esteem 
and affection are predominant. " But honour is a 
'pressentiment' forcing us in advance "to present the 
image of a being and a conduct worthy of respect and 
$The French word is "valeur"; however, since 
Scheler's discussion of this involves numerous 
similarities with the Rawlsian concept identified in 
Chapter One, it seems appropriate to use this term. 
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love", not a feeling of having lost esteem in others' 
eyes. 
Scheler defines honour as: 
"the feeling of our special personal worth 
which holds the esteem of our fellowmen. " 
(ibid; cf Rawls op cit). 
When that esteem is lost, we reproach ourselves, by 
taking on our fellowmen's value-judgments and attitude 
towards ourselves. However, according to Scheler, 
this is not the same as feeling shame, which does not 
necessitate 'taking the other's point of view', but 
which occurs 
"when we ourselves reproach our conduct. " 
(ibid). 
3.9 Shame-an th 
, self 
Scheler considers that the sense of shame has 
been an obstacle to the psychological analysis of the 
self (48), which also plays an important role in 
shame. In his consideration of this, Scheler returns 
to the theme of the opposition between individuality 
and generality, claiming that the self can experience 
its feelings and ideas as uniquely its own. This 
occurs at the level of consciousness which is prior to 
'self-consciousness'. 10 Once the self detaches itself 
from these feelings and ideas it can look at tben as 
its own (i. e. take an objective viewpoint). At this 
stage, however, it is possible to mistake our own 
self-generated ideas for those which we have in fact 
acquired from others, and vice versa. fie then 
distinguishes the p son from the self: 
9The fact that our self-reproval also coincides 
with the reproval of others vis a vis ourselves 
appears to Scheler to be incidental, not a necessary 
condition for shame. 
10cf Sartre's "prereflective consciousness". 
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"The person is a superconscious 'being' 
which exists in the accomplishment of its 
acts. It is never an 'object' as is the I 
and a fortiori the self. The self is a 
content of internal perception. The person 
rules the self. " (151)"- 
Following from this, Scheler considers self- 
consciousness. This is 
"an immediate consciousness of the self as 
individual" (ibid). 
An acute self-consciousness constitutes pride, being 
"reflective perception of one's own worth 
vis-a-vis the value of others", 
and quite different from vanity, which is 
"reflection on the image others have of 
us. " (ibid) . 
la 
The opposite of pride is modesty, which is different 
from and less than, humility, in which the self's 
value is always compared to that of a "superior model', 
and is thus perceived as mediocre. This comparison 
does not however necessitate looking outwards 
"towards the sphere of the not-me" (152), 
as in pride. It can be an entirely self-contained 
exercise. 
3.10 Critique 
There are a number of aspects of Scheler's 
account of shame which raise questions as to their 
accuracy and/or adequacy. 
11Scheler's notions of person and self are 
explored more fully in his work "Die Stellung des 
Menschen im Kosmos" (The Place of Man in the Cosmos) 
(1928). (See Farber op cit: 395) 
"i. e. in pride, we evaluate ourselves, in vanity 
we submit to and rely on others' evaluation of us. 
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3.10.1 Method 
Firstly, and fundamentally, the phenomenological 
method itself may be subjected to criticism. The 
'intuitions' of individual philosophers may be 
sufficient (although even this is questionable) to 
determine the 'essence' of shame as it is understood 
in their own cultural experience, but to generalize 
from such (possibly idiosyncratic) intuitions to claim 
a universal characterization of shame is suspect. 
Scheler begins with the a priori assumption that shame 
is a constant phenomenon and dismisses cultural 
variations as only significant at a superficial level, 
viz., the expressional forms, interpretations etc. 
Thus, although he is sympathetic to the consideration 
of anthropological data in his essay, these are only 
used to illustrate and support his claims concerning 
the alleged confusion between genuine shame and its 
multiple manifestations. 13 
3.10.2. Origins of shame 
When it comes to the origins of shame, Scheler's 
conclusions with reference to the role of education 
are again suspect, from a certain point of view. As 
indicated above, assuming 'genuine' shame to be 
constant, Scheler naturally takes the view that it is 
possible to mistake its expressional forms, 
interpretations etc for 'the real thing. ' 
"Education", therefore, may affect the former but not 
the latter. However, a social constructionist (even 
a 'weak' one) would allow for some influence of 
13The question as to whether such cultural 
variations (in interpretation, for example) might have 
an effect on the actual nature of shame, and thus call 
its putative universality into doubt (as a social 
constructionist position would maintain), is thus 
naturally ignored by Scheler, given his assumptions. 
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acquired attitudes to and expressions of shame on the 
phenomenon itself. Thus, while the predisposition to 
shame may be a feature rooted in human existence 
(given our 'bridge'-like position), this does not 
necessarily imply that the way in which it operates or 
is understood is always and everywhere the same. 
Naturally, the idea that the expressional forms 
of shame are genetically transmitted is also highly 
suspect, but within the historical context and 
framework of thought of the nineteenth century and the 
innovative and influential theories of evolution of 
Darwin etc., it is perhaps an understandable 
proposition for Scheler to make. 
3.10.3 Differences in shame between the sexes 
Scheler's attempt to ground differentials in 
shame between the sexes in terms of biology rather 
than socially-acquired gender must be viewed in the 
same way. It is possible that the female's 
reproductive role may serve to inhibit her from 
'transcending' her animal nature to a greater extent 
than the male's, but this does not preclude her 
sensitivity to 'spiritual' or 'mental' shame in the 
way in which Scheler suggests, nor does it imply that 
the male can ever completely transcend his animality 
(for if he could, on Scheler's account, he would then 
be incapable of shame). 
3.10.4 Shame and 'worth' 
The Appendix, while addressing a number of highly 
relevant questions succinctly (perhaps too briefly and 
summarily), also contains certain contentious points. 
Again, relating to distinctions between emotions, his 
consideration of embarrassment, contrasted with shame, 
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seems vulnerable to criticism. Scheler maintains, (as 
does Taylor following him) that the essence of 
embarrassment is its paralysis of action (mental and 
physical). But does not this also occur in shame, in 
the idea that one is somehow frozen in the effort to 
draw no further attention? (cf Schneider). It may be 
that the attempt to hide oneself, characteristic of 
shame, is absent in embarrassment (as Scheler claims), 
but this does not imply that the response in 
embarrassment fulfils a different function, or indeed 
that the subject feels differently. Perhaps the idea 
that embarrassment is not so directly concerned with 
the self's status has some validity, and this is the 
crucial difference, but in view of the fact that in 
many other cultures, shame and embarrassment are not 
distinguished (they form lexical clusters, always 
occurring together, cf Levy 1984), it appears that the 
distinction is somewhat contrived. 
In his return to the theme of pride and shame, 
Scheler claims that the former always involves a 
comparison of ourselves with others, while the latter 
does not. In this, he is close to Hume's thinking. 
However, this idea has been questioned by Taylor (op 
cit) , who points out that the referent (s) for pride 
are aspects of the self and its achievements, 
attributes and appurtenances, which are exceptional - 
not in that the subject possesses them while others do 
not, but rather in that they are unusually remarkable 
in terms of the subject's own "norms of expectation". 
Thus, in feeling proud of something I have done (e. g. 
passed an examination), I may not compare myself to 
what others have done (they may all also have passed) 
but only to my own previous record of achievements (I 
may never have passed an exam before). 
3.10.5 Shame and the other 
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Finally, Scheler seems to be guilty of making a 
glaring contradiction when he talks of our 
identification with the 'other's' point of view in 
shame (150). First he states that when we lose 
others' esteem, we take on their value-judgments of, 
and attitude towards, ourselves. This implies that we 
identify with their view of us. However, he goes on 
to say that this does not constitute shame, which 
requires self-reproach, apparently independently of 
what others think, although he seems also to imply 
that our own view and that of others will always 
coincide. 
3.11 Evaluation 
Scheler's phenomenological essay represents 
another example of an approach to the study of shame 
which attempts to isolate it from its social context 
and which explicitly rejects the utility of examining 
its expressional forms and interpretations. As such, 
it must be subjected to criticism, and the adequacy of 
his phenomenological method must be emphatically 
questioned. Notwithstanding the above comments, on 
the whole Scheler's study is fairly comprehensive. It 
must therefore be recognized as valuable for relating 
the phenomenon of shame to humanity's situation in the 
world, i. e., for highlighting metaphysical 
considerations and for addressing a wide range of 
questions concerning its origins, nature and 
functions, which, whilst the answers he gives may be 
criticized for their substantive content, it is 
important to ask. 
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A, SARTRE 1956) 
441. Introduction 
Sartre's study of shame is the reverse of 
Scheler's. That is, rather than undertaking a 
specific consideration of shame which also includes an 
assessment of its ontological significance, Sartre - 
as his subtitle, "An essay on phenomenological 
ontology", clearly states - attempts to provide a 
phenomenology of being, in which the discussion of 
shame features as a demonstration of two fundamental 
aspects of this ontology, namely, the 'proof' of the 
existence of the other and the role of this Other in 
the constitution of individual being. Indeed, 
Sartre's description of the phenomenon of shame is so 
closely bound up with his exploration of the question 
of intersubjectivity that it is extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to isolate it from this context 
without thus obliterating its meaning as understood by 
Sartre (cf the discussion of Taylor's misinterpreta- 
tion of him in Chapter One above). Thus, while it was 
also necessary when examining the previous views of 
shame to bear in mind the philosophical context in 
which its discussion occurred (without however having 
to consider it in detail), in Sartre's case it is 
perhaps even more essential. 
.2 '"Being-For-Ot ers_' 
The first part of Sartre's study is concerned 
with identifying two fundamentally different types of 
beings which 'inhabit' the world, "Beings-in- 
themselves" and "Beings-for-themselves", and exploring 
the relationship between them. Broadly, the 
14References throughout this section are to the English translation of Sartre's work. 
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distinction between the two types may be summarized 
thus: 
"Beings-in-themselves are non-conscious 
things, which can be said to have essences, 
which exist independently of any observer 
and which constitute all the things in the 
world. 
Beings-for-themselves are conscious beings whose 
consciousness renders them entirely different 
from other things, in their relation both to 
themselves and to one another, and to those other 
things. " (Warnock 1993: ix) 
As noted above, one of Sartre's main reasons for 
discussing shame is to demonstrate that humans have 
another 'mode' or 'structure' of existence in addition 
to 'Being-for-Itself', which is 'Being-for-Others': 
'". ., we have discovered that human reality is- for-itself. Is this all that it is? Without 
going outside our attitude of reflective 
description, we can encounter modes of consc- 
iousness which seem, even while themselves 
remaining strictly in for-itself, to point to a 
radically different type of ontological struc- 
ture. " (Sartre op cit: 221) 
Irrespective of whether it is possible to be ashamed 
in the absence of any concrete Other (which Sartre 
concedes: ibid), originally and initially shame is 
created by a Being-for-itself being seen by a not- 
self, i. e., an Other: 
"... shame is not originally a phenomenon of 
reflection ... It is in its primary struc- ture shame before somebody. " (ibid, original 
emphasis) 
This 'new' structure is created by the other: 
"This being was not in me potentially before 
the appearance of the Other... " (222) 
4,. 3. The genesis of objective sel. £_awarenesq 
The way in which I am seen by the Other is of 
crucial importance. Firstly, when an Other looks at 
or sees me, it is as an ob ect that I am viewed. This 
engenders objective self-awareness In me; by virtue of 
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my being seen as an object by another, I too am able 
to see myself as an object, which was impossible prior 
to the appearance of the other (i. e. in the modes of 
pre-reflective and reflective consciousness). 
Secondly, the way I am seen corresponds to the way I 
Al; It is not a false view of me which the Other has, 
otherwise it will not create shame but may arouse 
irritation or anger (222). Shame requires congruence 
between appearance and reality: 
"Shame is by nature recognition. I rec- 
ognize that I am as the Other sees me. " 
(ibid. original emphasis) 
There is an irreconcilable split between the two 
structures of one's being (the For-itself and the For- 
others): 
"There is ... no question of a comparison between what I am for myself and what I am 
for the other as if I found in myself, in 
the mode of being of the For-itself, an 
egMivalent of what I am for the Other. " 
(ibid, emphasis added) 
which amounts to a destruction of one's previous inner 
unity. Most importantly, according to Sartre, this 
"new type of being" (ibid) is given precedence over 
the For-itself: 
"The For-itself refers to the For-others. - 
(222); 
thus we 
"... give[n] primacy to the object which we 
are to Others over the subject we are to 
ourself. " (Sartre 1988: 32) 
and see ourselves through eyes other than our own. 
The feeling of shame is therefore not merely a 
reaction to being seen and thus objectified by the 
Other; shame itself is the experience of losing one's 
subjectivity and thus one's freedom. This 
objectification and the loss of subjectivity and 
freedom inherent in it constitutes a constant threat; 
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thus, intersubjective relations are characterized by 
Sartre as hostile. (cf Part Three, Chapter Three: 
'Concrete Relations with others'. ) 
4.4 The Existence of the Other 
Notwithstanding the remarks made in the opening 
paragraph of this Section, since a full exposition-and 
criticism of Sartre's theory of the alter ego is 
beyond the scope of the present study15, an attempt 
will be made to outline only those features of his 
theory of intersubjectivity on which the experience of 
shame bears directly. 
Like Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger before him, 
Sartre seeks to address the problem of solipsism, i. e. 
"... a scepticism about or a failure to 
account for knowledge of other people. " 
(Hammond et al op cit: 205). 
His method, following Husserl, is to 
".., describe the phenomena which give rise 
to certainty that other subjects exist. " 
(ibid: 228). 
One such phenomenon Is the experience of shame. 
Sartre seeks to show that my being, in its own 
being, implies the other's being. Because I have a 
structure of being which is created by the Other (i. e. 
Being-for-others), which, as demonstrated above, is 
exemplified in the experience of shame, and because 
"... I need the Other in order to realize 
fully all the structures of my being" (222), 
therefore 
"I cannot doubt [the Other] without doubting 
myself. "(237) 
Thus, the concrete example of an experience of shame 
given by Sartre is intended to show that since shame 
15This 
may be found in e. g. Schuetz 1948 
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entails awareness of others, through this experience 
their existence is thus confirmed: 
"Anyone may recognize ... that immediate and 
burning presence of the Other's look which 
has so often filled him with shame. In 
other words, in so far as I experience 
myself as looked-at, there is realized for 
me a trans-mundane presence of the Other. 
... By the 
Other's look I effect the 
concrete proof that there is a 'beyond the 
world'. " (270) 
Shame is thus at the same time the means whereby 
one of the structures of one's own being (i. e. Being- 
for-others) is constituted and the means by which 
Beings-for-themselves know or become aware of, the 
existence of Others. 
4.5- Shame as the "primordial status" (Rotenstreich op 
cit: 80ý 
It can be seen from the foregoing that for 
Sartre, shame is not a phenomenon which refers merely 
to acts of an agent and their actual or potential 
evaluation by others (as is the case in conventional 
accounts), but rather one which reflects the situation 
of each individual human's status as an object for 
others: 
"Shame is the consciousness of being 
irremediably what I always was ... Pure 
shame is not a feeling of being this or that 
guilty object but in general of being pn 
object; that is, of recognizing myself in this 
degraded, fixed and dependent being which I am 
for the other. " (288) 
Thus, as Rotenstreich points out (op cit: 77-80), 
Sartre "totalizes" the phenomenon of shame by taking 
this inherent aspect of evaluation (which itself 
implies dependence on the opinion of the Other) and 
interpreting it as descriptive of the total situation 
of the human being's involvement in the world: 
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"I am evaluated; hence I am an object, fixed and 
thus degraded. " (op cit: 78) 
As such, in Sartre's account, the interpretation of 
shame is not situated in "the realm of deeds" but In 
"the realm of status" (op cit: 80), which status Is 
seen by Sartre as an original one. 
4.6 Critique 
There are a number of points on which the 
validity of Sartre's account may be questioned. 
4.6.1 The role of the other 
A critical discussion of Sartre's views on the 
role of the Other in shame was undertaken in Chapter 
One, in the context of considering Taylor's account of 
shame. The conclusion of this discussion, it will be 
recalled, was that Sartre correctly identifies 
consciousness of delf before the Other as the original 
source of shame. Taylor's assumption that he 
therefore implies that the presence of another (real 
or imagined) is necessary in every experience of shame 
was however contested, on the basis that by 
considering Sartre's account in abstraction from his 
general ontology, she thus misinterprets his position. 
4,6.2 dentification with the other's view o£pnqp If 
Similarly, the question as to whether in shame 
the person experiencing It necessarily shares the 
Other's view of herself (as Taylor understands Sartre 
to imply) was explored. It was concluded that 
endorsement of this view is not implied by Sartre, 
only that recognition and acceptance of the apparent 
validity of such a view is required in shame. 
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4.6.3-The host le nature of human interaction 
According to Sartre, 
"... all relations with others are based on 
confrontation and conflict. " (Hammond et al 
op cit: 227) 
As indicated above, Sartre considers that the evidence 
for this view lies in the loss of freedom entailed in 
being objectified by the Other. Whether or not such 
a view of intersubjective relations is accurate is 
however questionable. As Shouery notes, while there 
is in one's encounter with another potentially "a hope 
for affirmation and authentication", such a 
possibility is excluded by Sartre. It is excluded 
because Sartre can see no possibility of genuinely 
inter ub ective relations. However, the grounds on 
which Sartre's position is based (i. e. that a 
relationship between two individuals as subjects is 
impossible) is untenable. As Schutz points out: 
"In the mundane sphere of everyday life I 
conceive myself as well as the Other as a 
center of activity, each of us living among 
things to be handled, instruments to be 
used, situations to be accepted or changed. 
... What is relevant to the other, what is 
within his reach, certainly does not 
coincide with what is relevant to me and 
within my reach, if for no other reason than 
that I am "Here" and he is "There. It Yet 
recognizing that the Other lives in a 
setting not defined by me does not transform 
him into my utensil. He remains within his 
situation (as defined by him) a center of 
activity; I can understand him as being not 
me, his activities as being not mine, his 
instruments as being beyond my reach, his 
projects as being outside my accepted 
possibilities. " (op cit: 198) 
Thus, in everyday life we do experience each other as 
subjects. Indeed, the phenomenon of conversation, 
involving simultaneously utterance by one and 
interpretation by another and vice versa, presupposes 
such intersubjectivity (ibid: 199). Thus, Sartre's 
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assumption that the subjectivity of the Other negates 
one's own subjectivity, is faulty. 
Shouery argues that it is Sartre's own experience 
of being dictated to and dominated by others which is 
responsible for his particular characterization of 
human interaction as hostile: 
"Sartre confuses the psychological experience 
with ontological reflection and considers 
whatever man experiences psychologically as an 
ontological mode of being-in-the-world. For this 
reason ... his psychological awareness of 
the 
other and of the world can hardly be separated 
from his ontology. Sartre ontologizes his 
psychological states and attempts to universalize 




In this section, various similarities and 
differences between certain aspects of the preceding 
accounts will be considered. In addition, a 
comparison of their general approach to the phenomenon 
of shame with that of contemporary philosophers, will 
be made. 
5.1 Shame and the other 
In Hegel's account, the 'other' hardly features 
as a relevant element in the experience of shame. 
Although he does not explicitly deny the other's 
relevance, the emphasis is on 
"the self-transcendence of man and the self- 
productive character of spirit" 
(Rotenstreich op cit: 62). 
By contrast, Scheler and Sartre both recognize a 
significant role for the 'other', but disagree 
strongly on what might be called the 'original nature' 
of shame. As noted above, Scheler firmly states that 
shame is not an exclusively social phenomenon: 
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"Il existe, aussi primordialesgu'une pudeur 
devant autrui, une 'pudeur devant soi-meme "' 
(op cit: 29, emphasis added). 
Conversely, Sartre, as the previous section has shown, 
regards shame not as merely aroused but indeed created 
by 'the other', in that it is our being objectified by 
'the other' which is responsible for our feeling 
shame: 
". . shame is not originally a phenomenon of 
reflection ... it is in its primary 
structure shame before somebody. " (op 
cit: 221) 
However, elsewhere Scheler does state that shame 
implies a consciousness of the self's worth as object 
(146-7), the self-image being our own or that which 
others have of us and that 
"this second case is perhaps that which 
enjoys original priority. " 
Does not this then contradict his earlier claim and 
imply that our potential for 'solitary' shame arises 
later than (and is possibly even derived from) 'shame- 
before-others', as Sartre maintains? 
This question of objectification is the basis of 
a further difference between Scheler and Sartre, which 
relates to Scheler's concept of the 'person'. For 
Scheler, what distinguishes humanity from the rest of 
the living world is, as noted above, its possession of 
'spirit' 16, and 
"The act-center, in which spirit appears 
within finite spheres of being, called a "person'... " (Farber op cit: 395) 
16. 'The term 'spirit' ... is supposed to comprise the concept of reason, the intuition of essences, and goodness, love, etc. " (Farber op cit: 395) 
17Cf 
also Scheler op cit: 151; see above. 
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Moreover, 
"... Scheler regards spirit as the only 
being that is itself not capable of being an 
object. ... The center of spirit, 
the 
person, is therefore neither being as an 
object nor as a thing, but only an 
essentially determined, ordered structure of 
acts. Other persons are also not capable of 
being objects. " (ibid) 
Cf Emad (op Cit: 369): 
"While everything can become an object for 
an act, act itself can never become an 
object. " 
Clearly, such a view directly contradicts Sartre's 
contention that all relations between Beings-for- 
themselves are "subject-Object" relations (cf Broucek 
op cit) and that indeed, it is our fundamental 
objectification by the other which is the source of 
shame. 
5,2; The ontolQgica1 siýnificaýe of shame 
One of the major important differences between 
Hegel, Scheler and Sartre clearly concerns the 
ontological status of shame. For Hegel, man becomes 
ashamed because Spirit begins to transcend Nature; and 
it is in this separation that shame is engendered. 
For Scheler, whilst humanity's unique position 
between the 'animal' and the 'divine' is seen as the 
condition for our potential to feel shame (and in all 
probability thus creates in us a ready propensity or 
disposition towards shame), shame is of regarded as 
a persistent state. However, according to Sartre 
(given the pivotal role which he accords to the Other 
in the creation of shame), by virtue of our existence 
in a world peopled by others, we are inevitably In a 
constant and total 'state' of shame. 
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A further comparison may be made between the 
three philosophers on the ontological status of shame. 
As already indicated, Hegel's entire philosophy 
embodies an anticipation of the eventual transcendence 
of nature by spirit, of which shame is an exemplary 
phenomenon. This transcendence may be thought of as 
a state of harmony. By contrast, whereas Scheler also 
sees shame as indicative of the tension between nature 
and spirit, this tension is seen as inherent in 
humanity's unique 'cosmological' situation, between 
the animals and the gods, and therefore permanent. 
Although Sartre's account of shame takes a 
somewhat different perspective, there is nonetheless 
a similarity with Scheler's. His recognition that 
there is no possibility of escaping (through 
transcendence or any other means) the relation with 
the other in the constitution of Being may be compared 
with Scheler's resignation to the immanent disharmony 
of humanity's place in the cosmos. 
5.3 The ethical evaluation o same 
At this point, it may be asked what effect the 
different perspectives on the nature of shame 
exemplified in the accounts examined in this Chapter 
have on the way in which shame is evaluated morally. 
Chapter Three explored the question of shame's moral 
value according to some contemporary philosophers and 
social scientists. In this subsection, therefore, it 
will be illuminating to explore not only the ethical 
evaluation of shame in earlier accounts but also to 
compare this with the contemporary debate. 
As noted above, inherent in Hegel's view of the 
transcendence of nature by Spirit is a moral 
evaluation of nature. It was shown that the 
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experience of shame is the situation in which the 
superior evaluation of the spiritual over the animal 
is demonstrated. Implicit in this evaluative schema 
is the idea that 'nature' is what man 'is', while 
spirit is what he 'ought to be', aspires to, and 
eventually, will become. Nonetheless, since shame 
occurs at the point at which this transcendence of 
nature by spirit begins, in Hegel's account: 
"As a beginning of spiritual and reflective 
existence, shame is a beginning only; it is 
a beginning also of the ethical attitude 
... '" (Ratenstreich op cit: 63) 
Thus, it is not considered an ethical phenomenon 
itself. 1B 
The tension between this 'is' and 'ought' is also 
clearly brought out in Scheler's account (cf pp 223- 
224 above), in his assertion that in shame is embodied 
an awareness of an opposition between actual reality 
and aspiration. 
The ethical significance of shame is not 
explicitly discussed by Sartre. However, In view of 
his rendering of shame as fundamentally an ontological 
phenomenon, and thus its "totalization", it may be 
said that in his account, the primary ethical 
connotation of shame is extinguished (cf Rotenstreich 
op cit: 79). 
5.3.1 Comparison wh contemporary ev_a1, Itc jj 
shame 
Both Chapter Three and the present Chapter have 
indicated that shame may be variously interpreted as 
18A distinction, between interpretations of shame 
such as Hegel's, which view it only as a "prelude 
towards the ethical attitude" (ibid: 67), and those 
which see it as ethical in itself, will be considered below. 
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i) an emotion or 'feeling'; ii) a disposition or 
attitude (i. e. the 'sense of' shame); iii) a complex 
phenomenon with many dimensions, one of which is its 
significance in terms of ontology. How shame is 
evaluated ethically depends on which of these 
interpretations is placed on it. 
As'already stated, the primary interpretation of 
shame in contemporary accounts, as in 'traditional' 
accounts, is as an emotion or feeling. Since in the 
majority of theories of emotions, these are seen as 
transitory episodes in psychic life, rather than 
chronic states of mind, the tendency is to conclude 
that emotions in themselves cannot be characterized as 
ethically desirable character traits or 'virtues'. 
This does not, however, imply that shame cannot be 
regarded as 'good', but rather that it cannot be so 
regarded in itself, only as a means to an end which is 
good. Thus, since (in traditional accounts at least) 
the capacity for shame is regarded as preferable to 
shamelessness, and indicates the agent's commitment to 
certain values (such as 'honour'), it is good. 
In addition to this evaluation of shame as good 
or bad, it Is clear from the foregoing that whereas 
most of the 'metaphysical' accounts1s regard shame's 
status as the basis of the 'ethical attitude' as one 
of its most fundamental features, for many 
contemporary philosophers this aspect of shame is not 
considered. 20 Similarly, any possible role for 
emotions such as shame is rarely discussed in analyses 
19With the possible exception of Sartre, as discussed above. 
`0However, cf the views of e. g. Aldrich (op cit) 
and Thrane (op cit), discussed in Chapter Three. 
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of ethics. 2' Such omissions seriously distort the 
consideration of ethics, since to ignore the affects' 
status as the ground of morality is effectively to 
miss the point. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
There are three major themes running through 
these 'metaphysical' accounts of shame, which, 
although each is not necessarily given emphasis by 
every thinker, nonetheless highlight a number of 
'problematics' encountered in the consideration of 
shame. 
Firstly, there is the idea that shame is 
characteristic of a distinction and tension between 
the two aspects of humanity's nature, as both animal 
and human. This is given expression by both Hegel and 
Scheler. 
Secondly, there is the question of the 
relationship between "I" and "the Other" exemplified 
in the experience of shame, considered exhaustively by 
Sartre and to a limited extent by Scheler. 
Thirdly, the significance of shame as the basis 
of the 'ethical attitude', identified by both Hegel 
and Scheler and discussed in the previous subsection, 
represents another question for dispute. 
Finally, an additional consideration is that of 
methodology in the analysis of shame. Perhaps the 
main issue in this respect is the value or otherwise 
21cf the exceptions noted in the Introduction, 
e. g. Blum (op cit) and Williams (op cit), and more 
recently, Oakley (1992). 
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of approaches such as Scheler's phenomenology 22 As 
noted in the section on Scheler, there are both 
advantages and disadvantages inherent in this method. 
As already discussed, whilst phenomenological 
description and reflection may be valuable in 
focussing on important aspects of shame, in 
disregarding the social context in which shame is 
experienced it excludes a significant and highly 
relevant area altogether. However, irrespective of 
the degree of attention paid to social context in 
these accounts, in considering the metaphysical 
implications of shame they do nonetheless represent a 
more holistic approach than the extremely atomistic 
tendencies of contemporary accounts exemplified by 
authors such as Taylor (op cit). 
It has been shown that one of the major 
distinctions between the views of shame considered in 
the first Chapter(s) of this study and those examined 
here is that the latter, for various reasons, see 
shame as inherent in the nature of the human 
situation, whereas the majority of more modern views 
of shame see it only as an arbitrary emotional 
property of individuals, which they may or may not 
experience. 23 
In contrast to the perspective of the accounts 
presented in this Chapter, therefore, the contemporary 
interpretation of shame might be appropriately 
characterized as a 'liberal' one. 
22This 
will be discussed further below, in Chapter 
Six. 
23cf Brandes (op cit: 129; see Chapter Four, n. 51) for an explicit expression of this view of shame as 
requiring the "existential control" of the individual, 
particularly for its supercedence. 
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SUMMARY, EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the Introduction, it was stated that in this 
Chapter, some attempt would be made to decide, on the 
basis of the substance of the study, what would appear 
to be the most 'promising' way to study shame. ' 
Clearly, such an evaluative decision is significantly 
influenced by a variety of more or less subjective 
factors. As Mesquita and Frijda have remarked (albeit 
in the context of discussing on which 'component 
element' of the 'emotion process' researchers should 
concentrate): 
"It is a complex issue to decide which level 
of description is interesting and in what 
respect. " (op cit: 199). 
Since in the case of shame it is not merely the degree 
of interest which is in dispute, but more pertinently 
the degree of importance and even 'usefulness' of the 
approach which is being assessed, this question is 
perhaps even more complex. Thus, should research into 
emotions generally, and shame in particular, be for 
its own sake or should it have a purpose?; for 
example, can what is learned from shame research be 
used beneficially for moral purposes, in deciding 
whether it should be encouraged or discouraged? ' 
'This is not to imply that there is a 'right' or 
a 'wrong' approach; the multiplicity of disciplines 
and the diverse perspectives and methodologies both 
within and between them inevitably yield a variety of data which are equally valid. However, the issue is 
to determine which kind of data has the greatest 
relevance for the purpose. 
2cf Armon-Jones (1986a: 35) on the implications of 
social constructionism for practical ethics, i. e., the 
cultural pre- and proscription of certain emotions. 
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In addition, it is clear that both of the major 
debates concerning shame explored in the first Part of 
this study are closely allied to, or even arise 
directly from, the differences in approaches adopted 
by the respective sides. For example, the question 
concerning to what extent emotions are universal or 
culture-specific is inevitably answered differently by 
those whose approach (whether strictly 
phenomenological or more loosely, as in the 
interpretation indicated in Chapter One) focuses on 
'common denominators' in 'shame' experiences and by 
those who emphasize those aspects which are apparently 
culture-dependent and therefore potentially 
different. ' 
Likewise, as was indicated in Chapter Three, the 
ethical evaluation of shame is dependent on whether it 
is conceptualized as an emotion, an attitude or 
disposition, or a virtue, i. e., on whether it is 
viewed as primarily a psychological attribute or a 
moral quality. 
some attempt to reach conclusions concerning the 
issues examined in each Part or Chapter has already 
been made in the text of the dissertation. The 
following, therefore, will not attempt to draw overall 
conclusions, except where appropriate, but will 
summarize and evaluate each of the approaches examined 
in the course of this study in turn and consider its 
general utility. In addition, given the relationship 
between the various approaches and debates, each of 
the latter will be assessed in conjunction with those 
3cf Averill (1985: 97): "When analyzing a complex 
phenomenon ..., there is always a danger of 
emphasizing first one component and then another, 
depending upon the thesis one wishes to defend. " 
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approaches which have engendered it, and on the basis 
of the data considered. 
6.1 Philosophical analysis and 'phenomenology' 
The way in which emotions in general are 
conceptualized influences, if not determines, the way 
in which research into any given emotion is 
conducted. 4 Thus, the prevailing tendency in 
philosophy (until relatively recently) to regard 
emotions as permanent and inherent 'natural' human 
characteristics inevitably led to a concentration on 
'essences'. Despite the acceptance and integration of 
cognitive and 'judgmentalist' theories of emotion 
(identified in the Introduction) and the consequent 
modification of the earlier 'model' of emotions, the 
methodology in philosophy has remained much the same. 
Thus, Taylor's account of shame, which was identified 
as a paradigmatic example of the attempt to lay bare 
the bones of the concept by delineating a constant set 
of beliefs operative in every single case, is in some 
respects a repetition of Scheler's account (if not, in 
fact, a more sterile one). Whether or not her 
context-independent account is accurate, by excising 
all consideration of the circumstances in which shame 
is experienced and the kinds of situations which 
engender it, Taylor succeeds in rendering an account 
which is almost devoid of meaning. As more than one 
conmentator has noted (cf e. g. Deigh 1988; Rosaldo 
1983), it is precisely the cultural component in shame 
experience which makes it problematic. Thus, the 
conclusions reached as a result of such an approach 
may be true, but are of little use for the purpose of 
assessing shame's significance, moral evaluation etc. 
`See Lutz (op cit: 53-80) for an excellent 
"exploration of the concept of emotion as a master 
cultural category in the West. " (54). 
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Moreover, as noted during the course of Chapter 
One, contemporary philosophers tend to concentrate on 
the analysis of shame as it appears to them, in terms 
of their own experience, intuitions and limited 
observations of others' experience of shame. s Such 
'parochialism' in shame analysis is justifiable if 
there is recognition of its limited applicability. 
However, the tendency to universalize (implicitly or 
otherwise) from the conclusions reached is widespread. 
In accordance with the general view of emotions, the 
assumption appears to be that shame's characteristics 
are universal and therefore unproblematic. There is 
little, if any, explicit consideration of other 
cultures. 
6 .2 Eidetic analysis & empirical phenomenology 
The above criticism applies perhaps even more 
strictly to the kind of genuinely phenomenological 
analysis undertaken by, for example, Scheler. 
Husserlian eidetic analysis relies on the intuitive 
experience of the Ego. However, such an approach, 
eschewing as it does the utilization of pre-existing 
concepts and requiring the suspension of received 
ideas about the phenomenon under investigation (in 
this case shame), would seem to represent a 
potentially valuable entree into the mode of 
experiencing of 'shame' of individuals in other 
cultures. Thus, whilst there is a seeming 
contradiction between the professed aims of eidetic 
analysis (i. e. the discovery of the 'essential 
properties' of a phenomenon) and the project of 
establishing whether and what differences exist in the 
experience of 'shame' cross-culturally, it appears 
sIt may be argued that the use of examples from 
literature goes some way towards substantiating the 
claims made by individual philosophers. 
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that adoption by anthropologists of the kind of 
phenomenological methodology employed by Ablamowicz, 
for example (based on the methods of Merleau-Ponty 
[1962] and Lanigan [1977,1988]), could furnish just 
the kind of data such a project requires. 
6.3 Psychoanalysis 
As noted in Chapter Three, the psychoanalytical 
approach in general is concerned with the exploration 
of the unconscious, the uncovering of the 'hidden', 
and the bringing to light of unresolved issues buried 
in the psyche. With regard to shame, the focus is on 
the implications of its repression and denial, 
primarily for the individual, and the prevalent 
psychoanalytical interpretation of shame and the 
overall bias in discussions of this emotion in the 
discipline, is towards its negative characteristics 
and functions and its impediment of the 'healthy' 
integration and functioning of the personality. Thus, 
probably the major drawback of the psychoanalytical 
approach is its preoccupation with pathological shame, 
and its neglect of the role shame may normally play. 
In addition, whilst all the disciplinary 
perspectives, models and approaches to shame 
considered in this study have been engendered in 
culturally and historically specific circumstances, 
and thus from one point of view may be considered to 
have potentially limited utility and applicability to 
the understanding of 'shame' other than in our 'own' 
culture, psychoanalysis is particularly susceptible to 
such a criticism. This is because although an 
advantage of much psychoanalytical work on shame is 
its reliance on empirical data gathered directly from 
clients in the course of therapeutic encounters, the 
interpretation of such data is framed largely in terms 
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of the psychoanalytic model derived primarily from 
Freud. 
The overall conclusion is that while the 
psychoanalytical approach highlights a number of 
important and valid issues concerning the experience 
of shame in 'western' culture, in accordance with its 
general perspective its conclusions concerning the 
value of shame are necessarily skewed. It cannot 
therefore be employed as a paradigmatic model, but 
requires to be considered in conjunction with other 
models and explanations of both the usual role of 
shame and its potential individual, social and moral 
value. 
6 .4 'Social Constructionism' and psychological 
anthropological empirical studies. 
In Chapter Two, it was noted that a prerequisite 
of the social constructionist theory of emotions was 
acceptance of the idea of emotions as, in part at 
least, cognitions. One of the earliest proponents of 
such a theory of emotions, it will be recalled, is 
Averill (op cit), whose portrayal of emotions as 
"syndromes" identified them as: 
"an organized set of responses (behavioral, 
physiological, and/or cognitive)" 
in which 
"no single response is a necessary or 
sufficient condition for the entire syndrome 
... " (1985: 98) 
The social constructionist theory of emotions 
builds on this view, attempting to demonstrate that 
aspects of social structure and organization, mediated 
by cultural values, constitute the subjectivities 
(such as self and feeling) of individuals (cf Rosaldo 
1984: 150). Psychological anthropological and cultural 
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psychological accounts of 'shame' in non-'western' 
cultures are therefore concerned with identifying and 
explicating the precise ways in which this 
relationship affects the interpretation and operation 
of ' shame'. 
As noted in Chapter Two (section 4), the value of 
the constructionist approach to 'shame' lies in its 
recognition of the significance of contextual factors 
in its conceptualization and experience. This renders 
it a more realistic method for understanding such an 
emotion and concept, given the clear relevance of such 
factors, than the 'essentialist' structural analysis 
employed by Taylor for example, which eliminates them. 
Nonetheless, as was identified earlier, whilst it may 
be an especially appropriate way in which to approach 
the study of 'shame', cultural constructionism in 
particular cannot adequately account for all aspects 
of general emotional experience. It may not therefore 
be useful to exclusively employ such an approach when 
attempting to understand emotions in which culture 
plays a less obviously crucial role (such as fear), or 
to accept its claims with respect to the constitution 
of all emotional experience. 
6.5 Psychology: the cognitive process model of 
emotions 
The model of emotions as multi-component 
cognitive processes, adopted by Mesquita & Frijda (op 
cit) in their review of the psychological and 
anthropological literature on cultural variations in 
emotions and outlined in Chapter Two above, is in many 
ways a development and refinement of Averill's model 
(despite the lack of any citation of the latter's 
work) but without its commitment to a master role for 
sociocultural factors in the constitution of emotion. 
As noted in Chapter Two, it thus appears to offer the 
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best of both worlds in terms of the seemingly 
unsettlable dispute between 'phenomenologists' (and 
'naturalists') and 'social constructionists' as to the 
universality or otherwise of emotions, by allowing for 
the cultural influence on (or even possibly 
determination of) certain aspects of emotion, while 
accepting that other aspects appear to be 
physiologically or neurologically grounded and more or 
less impervious to external factors. 
If this model were to be adopted, by breaking 
down reports of the experience of shame by informants 
into their constituent parts, anthropologists or 
cross-cultural psychologists could thus assess the 
extent to which each of the various components of an 
emotion is subject to cultural variation or is 
apparently cross-culturally similar. As such, the 
value of this model as a heuristic device in the 
comparison of 'western' shame with other-cultural 
'shames' would appear to be considerable. 
6.6 The universality or cultural specificity of 
emotions in general and shame in particular 
6.6.1 Emotions in general 
As Mesquita and Frij da' s review shows, the debate 
as to the universality or cultural specificity of 
emotions is not confined to the two major theoretical 
protagonists with which this study has been concerned 
but is widespread and ongoing amongst researchers in 
a number of disciplines in the social sciences. 6 
6cf e. g. Wallbott & Scherer (op cit); Wierzbicka 
(1986). 
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As noted in Chapter Two, given their view of 
emotion-as-process, the authors conclude on the basis 
of their review that: 
"... global statements about cross-cultural 
universality of emotion, or about their 
[sic] cultural determination, are 
inappropriate. " (op cit: 198). 
This is because even if similarities appear to 
exist between certain emotional elements across 
cultures, these frequently co-exist with differences 
in other elements. 7 
A further thesis which undermines the debate and 
suggests that it may be impossible to reach an 
unequivocal conclusion, is that of Levy (op cit). In 
the light of much of the ethnographic evidence, Levy's 
hyper-/hypocognition thesis (outlined in Chapter Three 
above) appears to have considerable validity. That is, 
underlying the apparently considerable variation in 
aspects of emotion categorization and experience 
across cultures, it seems plausible that humans 
everywhere have the potential capacity for a number of 
'generic' emotions, which are either developed or not 
according to the socio-economic, cultural and 
political environment and the availability of such 
emotions permitted by this environment. Moreover, the 
cultural 'transformations' of these emotional 
potentialities can be so significantly different that 
talk of 'universal emotions' appears inaccurate. 
7Thus, possibly, affecting both the overall and 
the contextual meaning of each element. Cf Averill: 
"The components that make up a complex 
phenomenon are seldom unique to, or found 
only in connection with, that phenomenon ... if some of these [components] undergo 
change, then the properties of the whole may 
also change - not in some superficial sense, 
but fundamentally so. " (1985: 97) 
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Furthermore, the reductionism of the 'universal 
structure' thesis (exemplified in Taylor's account) 
implicitly necessitates going further, to 
physiological 'base-lines'. However, once this level 
of analysis and comparison is reached, the question is 
if anything harder to determine, since it is doubtful 
whether on this basis, shame for example could be 
distinguished from other 'emotions', such as terror. 
As noted earlier, it is because shame is such a 
sociocultural context-dependent concept that the 
different cases and circumstances of shame cannot be 
disregarded. 
Thus, although apparently neither side in the 
debate can justifiably claim to have an unequivocal 
answer to the question, the general conclusion would 
seem to be that cultural influence on aspects of 
emotional experience is of considerable significance. 
6.6.2 Shame 
Given limitations of space and the fact that the 
purposes of this study are less specific, it is not 
the intention here to attempt a detailed cross- 
cultural comparison between shame and some of the 
other apparently equivalent concepts described 
elsewhere in this work, although some limited degree 
of such comparison has already taken place, for 
example in Chapter Four (section 5) .8 However, the 
general conclusion to emerge from the consideration of 
these is that as noted above, the degree of 
significance of cultural influence in this particular 
emotion and concept is considerable, suggesting that 
although some capacity for shame may well be 
"The achievement of such a project would require 
an extensive study of its own and it is hoped this 
will be undertaken in the future. 
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universal, the precise way in which it manifests 
itself, and the preoccupations with which issues of 
'shame' are concerned, are likely to be importantly 
different depending on the nature of the "encompassing 
social formations" (Rosaldo 1984: 149). 
6.7 The relationship between the concept of 'shame' 
and the self-concept 
As noted in the Introduction, this issue is a 
subsidiary one in relation to the question of 
'shame's' universality or otherwise, and it has not 
been possible to explore the nature of the 
relationship in detail. However, some limited 
conclusions do emerge from the consideration of cross- 
cultural differences in conceptualization of the 
'self' (see Chapter Two). 
Whereas, as Obeyesekere (op cit) points out, it 
may be inappropriate to talk of 'selves' at all, it 
does appear that 
"... whereas the affect 'shame' may 
everywhere concern investments of the 
individual in a particular image of the 
self, the ways that this emotion works 
depends on socially dictated ways of 
reckoning the claims of selves and the 
demands of situations. " (Rosaldo 1984: 149) 
6.8 The conltmpora rrsocial and moral signjicaQce 
and value of shame 
A distinction has to be made when- reaching 
conclusions as to the status of the above debate, 
between the more objective, empirically determinable 
question as to whether shame is still a significant 
element in the emotional experience of late twentieth 
century 'western' individuals on the one hand, and the 
more subjective assessment as to shame's status in 
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relation to morality, and its individual and social 
desirability and utility, on the other. 
These questions have already been addressed in 
the concluding section of Chapter Three. With regard 
to the former, it was noted there that work such as 
Lewis's strongly indicates the continued experience of 
shame, albeit not necessarily overtly recognized. 
Furthermore, the fact that contemporary novelists 
continue to deal with matters pertaining to shame, 
even making its experience the theme of their work (cf 
Fine op cit), is sufficient to demonstrate that, in 
'folk psychology' at least, shame is still a highly 
salient concept in 'our' society. A literary work 
(provided it is not explicitly concerned to present a 
historical or futuristic perspective) may be likened 
to a cultural dictionary, in that it reflects current 
popular preoccupations as well as usage of 
terminology. Thus, in "The Killjoy", a man's shame of 
his lifelong disfigurement is juxtaposed with the 
sexual shamelessness of the young girl with whom he 
becomes involved; each is testimony to the persistence 
of shame. 
In addition, the idea that shame, induced by 
public shaming, has lost its potency and efficacy as 
a means of social control in our contemporary 
industrialized society, 9 due to the demise of 
communitarianism typical of previous eras, is 
convincingly countered by Braithwaite's argument that 
"the nature of interdependencies in modern 
urban social relations can actually increase 
rather than decrease our exposure to shame. 
(1993: 2). 
'This is identified by Braithwaite as a claim 
frequently made by critics of his theory of 
reintegrative shaming as an effective means of crime 
control. 
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Thus, as was noted in Chapter Three, in traditional 
face to face communities, it is the 'whole person' who 
is shamed (which person, is, however, 
"accepted as good; it is just a part of 
their conduct which is disapproved as bad. " 
[141). 
In urban social relations, however, due to the 
"proliferation of roles" (ibid), individuals no longer 
present themselves in such an integrated fashion to a 
single 'audience' (i. e. the community), but present 
different aspects of themselves to different audiences 
(15); thus, 
" ... by partitioning audiences 
in a way that 
enables us to present radically different 
selves to those different audiences, our 
shame can be many-sided and more 
unmanageable in a role-segregated world. "10 
So far as the moral significance and value of 
shame is concerned, it is clear that this cannot be 
assessed so objectively. However, the claim of both 
Creighton (op cit) and Heller (op cit), i. e. that an 
over-reliance on either guilt or shame obstructs the 
optimal functioning of a society", and that some 
degree of balance between the two extremes (not 
however an equilibrium but an 'asymmetrical' emphasis) 
appears to have considerable validity. 
"Brandes (op cit: 126-127) makes a related point 
in his discussion of the concentration in 
'Mediterranean' anthropology on 'shame' in rural 
village communities rather than urban areas. Since 
enough research in the latter has not yet been 
undertaken to establish empirically that shame is more 
potent (or at least functions differently) in the 
former, it may be that Braithwaite's contention is 
correct. 
"Presumably this argument also applies, by 
extension, to the optimal functioning of individuals 
(cf the psychoanalytical literature, e. g. Lewis op 
cit, on individual tendencies towards either shame or 
guilt). 
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The argument of certain guilt theorists (e. g. 
Lamb op cit), that shame cannot be considered moral 
because of its inherent lack of relationship to the 
concept of e. g. responsibility, is also too 
simplistic. 12 As identified by e. g. Nagel (1979) and 
Williams (1981) in their contributions on 'moral 
luck', opposing the idea of radical individual 
responsibility, there are things for which we are in 
a very real way appropriately blamed or praised, 
despite our lack of responsibility for them, which 
cannot be 'legislated away' (as Lamb, for example, 
tries to do). There is thus a conflict between the 
liberal ethic of Lamb and a conservative ethic which 
accepts the attribution of blame and consequent 
feeling of shame for such contingent facts. 
As such, perhaps the greatest criticism of the 
argument (cf e. g. Schneider) that shame has a value 
and utility, in both social and ethical terms, beyond 
that which is recognized by many theorists, and that 
it should thus be encouraged rather than eliminated, 
is that the contemporary western 'liberal' 
interpretation of shame which predominates in the 
works of such theorists cannot accommodate the 
persistence of such illiberal interpretations of 
shame, which dictate shame for one's appearance, for 
one's social position etc. 
12It does, however, exemplify the way in which a 
culture emphasizes certain emotions which 'fit' with 
the prevailing ideology. Guilt is thus valued because its experience demonstrates that we are moral beings 
and capable responsible agents; by contrast, shame indicates deficiency, lack of autonomy and 
responsibility, which are disvalued. Thus, the individualist ideology of moral agency and 
accountability which characterizes contemporary 'western' society, sits ill with a concept such as 
shame which may be experienced for attributes etc. for 
which people cannot be held responsible. 
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The way towards resolution of such 
incompatibility, and in order to achieve a positive 
evaluation of shame which avoids its illiberal 
connotations, is not to deny the moral significance of 
shame but rather to re-think our notions of 
individualism, liberalism and responsibility 
themselves. For example, while the significance of 
the individual can still be retained, that concept 
must be broadened to allow for the recognition that 
such individuals have broader identities formed 
through attachments to others (cf e. g. Walsh 1970) and 
so as not to deny our 'radical sociality' (cf 
Schneider op cit). Attempts to rework such concepts 
are evident in the liberal-communitarian debate 
referred to above (see Chapter Three). 
In conclusion, there seems little doubt that the 
predominant cultural valuation and emphasis j placed 
on guilt rather than shame (possibly for the sorts of 
reasons considered in Chapter Three and reiterated 
above), but this does not however imply that the 
latter is no longer significant. Rather, it appears 
that there is a discrepancy between the claims and 
stipulations of an intellectual 'elite' (particularly 
in philosophy and specifically in the field of ethical 
enquiry) and the empirical situation. Philosophical 
accounts of shame are thus primarily prescriptive 
rather than descriptive. 
It now remains to consider what implications the 
data and conclusions of the present study of 'shame' 
have for its further investigation in the future. As 
such, the final Chapter will identify a number of 
potential research issues in this field of study. 
267 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE FUTURE OF SHAME RESEARCH 
7.1 Interdisciplinary considerations 
°... access to the shame literature is not 
easy. Although there are many brilliant 
contributions, the field lacks coherence; it 
is scattered over many disciplines, with the 
contributors speaking virtually different 
languages. " (Scheff 1990a: xvi). 
As indicated in the Introduction, this 
dissertation itself constitutes a modest attempt to 
take not only a cross-cultural but also an 
interdisciplinary perspective on the concept and 
emotion of 'shame'. Chapter Six has demonstrated the 
variety of views explored, both within and between the 
disciplines of philosophy, anthropology, psychology 
and sociology. 
As the quotation which opens this Chapter 
suggests, the question as to which research approach 
towards shame appears most 'promising', discussed in 
the previous chapter, raises the related question of 
just what the relationship should be between the 
different disciplines which concern themselves with 
this subject. However, the quotation not only 
accurately portrays the fragmentary nature which 
characterizes shame research but also epitomizes the 
situation prevailing in some other research areas. 
Thus, before focusing on the particular case of shame, 
some consideration will be made of the way in which 
the general problem, of how to reconcile the seemingly 
inevitable and natural intellectual division of labour 
and the concomitant tendency for disciplines to become 
'ethnocentric', has been recognized and discussed by 
a number of authorities. 
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7.1.1 The intellectual division of labour and the 
"'ethno-centrism of discilines" Campbell 19691 
Durkheim (1983: 91-92) discusses the phenomenon of 
"intellectual individualism". Although made in the 
context of considering how multiple individual minds 
tend to be suited to studying different things and in 
different ways (presumably depending on, for example, 
interest or taste, competency etc. ), his remarks on 
this subject are equally applicable to the wider 
situation in which the study of any given topic is 
'parcelled out' between the various disciplines. 
However, even if disciplines implicitly recognize that 
"every object of knowledge offers an 
opportunity for an infinity of possible 
points of view" 
and that 
"for every object of knowledge there are 
differing but equally justified ways of 
examining it" (ibid), 
evidence of such recognition does not seem to be made 
explicit in much research (into shame in particular). 
In addition, Lynd (op cit) has referred to the 
necessity of researchers in one field taking into 
consideration the data yielded by colleagues working 
in different fields, while acknowledging the 
impossibility of any one piece of research being able 
to investigate an object of enquiry pertly from many 
perspectives simultaneously. Moreover, she states 
that: 
"It has always been the function of 
philosophy to push questions beyond accepted 
barriers. In doing so it has always 
inevitably made use of what can be learned 
from more specialized fields of study.,, 
(1952: 20). 
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It is questionable whether the second claim is as true 
of much contemporary philosophy as it may be of 
earlier. ' 
Campbell, identifying the "ethnocentrism of 
disciplines" in 1969, proposes a 'remedy' which is 
echoed in part by the recommendations of Scheff 
(1990a), intended to counteract what he describes as 
"the Balkanization of knowledge" (144). Each outlines 
a programme of reform both of the 'training' of 
individual intellects and of the academic institutions 
in which this occurs, which would encourage a more 
holistic approach to many research questions whilst 
still allowing for expert specialization. 
7.1 .2 Shame: Dhilosophical and anthropological 
approaches 
It may be objected that it is not only inevitable 
but also desirable that philosophers and 
anthropologists, for example, should 'speak different 
languages', since their concerns and purposes in 
considering shame are themselves different. 
However, as indicated above, whilst it is indeed quite 
legitimate that different disciplines should study a 
phenomenon in differing ways (cf Wolfram 1982: 268; 
Durkheim op cit), this is not to say that any one 
'In particular, the recent work of B. Williams 
(1993) on the concept of shame and other moral notions 
in the Ancient Greek world represents a significant 
exception. He does not employ the methods of cultural 
anthropology, and explicitly states this (op cit: 2), 
preferring to leave this to certain other classicists. 
Moreover, he, like many philosophers, draws on 
literature rather than ethnography. Nonetheless, 
Williams is thus conscious of the relevance of 
material from outside the philosophical (and 
classical) disciplines and highly sensitive to the 
value of its use. 
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discipline can afford to ignore the findings of 
colleagues working in other fields. 
Yet this is precisely what appears to be the case 
in much discourse on shame. As has already been 
suggested, it is any relationship between 
philosophical consideration of the logical features of 
concepts and empirical data which is most often 
lacking. Wolfram (op cit: 267) states that it is not 
the philosopher's task to conduct empirical research 
into a concept but only to indicate where it is 
relevant. 2 Even if this is so, actual reference to 
existing empirical evidence is still relatively rare. 
With respect to shame, many contemporary 
philosophical works ignore the increasing amount of 
ethnographic data collected by anthropologists over 
the past decade or two. Where reference to 
anthropology is made, it is most often to the now 
largely discredited distinctions between shame and 
guilt originally made by Mead and Benedict. ' 
It should, however, be stressed that 
responsibility for the relative lack of any serious 
communication between philosophy and anthropology 
where shame is concerned does not all rest on one 
side. There are a number of issues raised by the 
philosophical consideration of shame and brought out 
in this study which to date have not really been 
addressed by ethnographers 
in their research. For 
2In the light of the comments in the preceding 
subsection, on the inherent 
disadvantages 
of confining 
oneself to a single perspective on any topic, even 
this is debatable. 
3There are of course exceptions notabl Heller 
(op cit) who cites Strathern 
(op Cit) and S ie el (1975: 266) who refers to anthropology, as "9 
berg 
area of studies fascinating even for 
a vast 
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Philosophers .. " 
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example, it is clear from the more metaphysical 
accounts considered in Chapter Five that ideas about 
shame are a potential locus for an entree into the 
mythology and ideology of a culture. Anthropologists, 
as has already been noted, have traditionally studied 
shame as social sanction, and in the sub-field of 
psychological anthropology have emphasized the 
characterization of shame as an emotion or a 
'personality trait', in studies attempting to 
characterize whole cultures in terms of the prevalence 
of shame or guilt as an organizing affect. Some 
philosophers, by contrast, have taken a more 
cosmological and ethical view of shame and seen it as 
an important site of human views concerning humanity's 
'place in the cosmos' and its relations with other 
inhabitants including animals and spirits. Thus, the 
concentration of earlier anthropology on the functions 
of 'shame' and more recent work in the context of 
emotions across cultures has excluded a potentially 
rich area of metaphysical and ethical enquiry. The 
philosophical accounts of shame suggest the variety 
and depth of questions to which anthropologists could 
be addressing themselves. ' 
Considering that social anthropology has its 
origins in philosophy (cf Jarvie [1968]), and that the 
kinds of questions about the nature of humanity with 
which philosophy has traditionally been concerned are 
what the empirical research of anthropology seeks to 
answer (in part at least), such a dialogue between the 
two disciplines would appear to be indispensable. As 
Spiegelberg notes: 
`Spiegelberg (op cit) does however note that a 
certain amount of "interdisciplinary bridge building" 
has begun to be initiated by anthropologists, whose interest in philosophical questions related to their 
research has been increasing. 
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°... only a systematic and critical 
examination could answer such basic 
questions as those of man's essential 
structure, his distinctive features, his 
place in the universe, his dignity, and his 
destination. A mere empirical study of the 
varying patterns of culture, or even of 
cultural universals, could not yield the 
answers. Such questions require a 
philosophical approach. " (op cit: 267). 
Whilst anthropologists might feel such a comment 
disparages their enterprise, it would appear that 
Spiegelberg's general point, that philosophical 
analysis and empirical research are necessarily 
complementary, is unobjectionable (cf Wolfram op 
cit: 267). However, the specific relationship he 
proposes is one between phenomenology and 
anthropology, with the ultimate aim of their synthesis 
in a phenomenological anthropology (op cit: 265-272). 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to 
elaborate on this; suffice it to suggest that claims 
for the relevance of phenomenological philosophy for 
anthropology (and also, particularly in the present 
context of 'shame' across cultures, of 
phenomenological psychology for the related field of 
cross-cultural psychology, [cf Macleod 1969]) deserve 
closer consideration. 
7.2 Possible topics for further investiq ion 
It is interdisciplinary considerations such as 
those discussed above, together with issues raised in 
the substantive chapters of this work, which suggest 
a number of potential research tasks in the field of 
'shame' studies. 
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7.2.1 'Shame' and metaphysics in other cultures 
As the remarks made in section 7.1.2suggest, a 
potentially fruitful area for both anthropological and 
philosophical research would appear to be that of the 
relationship between the conception of 'shame' and the 
metaphysical beliefs of inhabitants of other cultures, 
particularly non-literate ones. s 
7.2.2 The 'ethnophenomenoloay' of 'shame' in other 
cultures 
In the light of the comments above, and as was 
suggested in Chapter Six, the kind of phenomenological 
methodology utilized by Ablamowicz could possibly 
constitute a successful means of gaining access to the 
indigenous experience of 'shame' in other cultures. 
Thus, anthropological research into shame abroad may 
benefit from the explicit adoption of such an 
approach. This would hopefully yield richer and more 
detailed data with which to work in the task of 
providing, via 'reduction', an interpretation of an 
other-cultural experience of 'shame, '` from which 
starting point such questions as the extent of 
influence of sociocultural factors on such experiences 
could then proceed. 
Scf for example the work of Fajans (1983) on the 
Baining of Papua New Guinea. Also, Creighton, in her 
work on Japan (see Chapter Four above), demonstrates 
the significance of the broader metaphysical views of 
a culture and their influence on the concept of shame. 
"This is not intended to imply that ' interpretive' 
anthropologists do not already, to a large extent, 
employ similar methods in their fieldwork. It is only 
to suggest that a more rigorous and explicit 
employment and discussion of phenomenological 
methodology may prove advantageous. 
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7.2.3 An ethnography of Ang1o/American shame. 
It has been suggested that ideas about, and the 
experience of, shame in 'our' culture, possibly vary 
between different sub-groups in society. Thus, 
detailed comparative empirical research into the 
concept of shame 'at home' (cf Jackson 1987; Marcus & 
Fischer op cit), with particular attention being paid 
to such potential variations and again, possibly 
drawing on some sort of phenomenological methodology, 
could constitute another area in which significant 
advances in the understanding of this field may be 
made. Moreover, bearing in mind the comments of 
Brandes (op cit: 125-127) that there has been a 
tendency (particularly in the context of Mediterranean 
anthropology) to assume that shame is a moral concept 
more characteristic of rural communities than urban, 
which has led to a neglect of the possible 
manifestations of shame in this context, some effort 
could be made to redress the balance and therefore 
concentrate on these areas. 7 
7.2.4 Shame and the Buddhist doctrine of 'anatta' 
Given the article of faith in the research 
literature that shame is a concept inextricably bound 
to the self-concept, it would be interesting to 
explore whether or not 'shame' in Buddhist cultures 
provides a possible counter-example. The doctrine of 
anatta or 'no-self' enshrined in Buddhist scripture 
(and extensively discussed by e. g. Collins 1982), 
whilst arguably prescriptive rather than descriptive, 
calls into question the nature of a concept/emotion 
such as 'shame' where the idea of an individual 'self' 
7cf Braithwaite (1993), on the continuing 
significant role of shame and shaming in modern industrialized Qesellschaft communities. 
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is, ideally at least, absent (cf Obeyesekere [op 
cit)). 8 It may be that the 'western' self-concept is 
a product of our particular language game (Harre 
1985: 261-263; Obeyesekere op cit: 246-248) and that 
"... one can have 'reflexive emotions' that 
are not necessarily tied to ideas of the 
self, or at least that could be 
distinguished from self notions. " 
(ibid: 247), 
such as shame (and guilt). Such a possibility 
deserves investigation and perhaps research of the 
kind described above would be a useful starting point. 
7.3 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the remarks made in the first 
part of this Chapter, on the actual and potential 
relationship between various disciplines concerned 
with the study of shame, in the end it must be 
recognized that a conflict of perspectives and 
frameworks on any topic is inevitable (and indeed 
desirable). As Durkheim points out, this is due to 
the nature of knowledge, which is itself organic. 
Thus, to expect the elimination of conflict and the 
achievement of consensus is unrealistic, not least 
because reality is both rich and complex (op cit: 92) 
and each approach to a particular subject reflects an 
aspect of that reality. 
Despite this inevitability of conflict, it is 
hoped that what this study has demonstrated is that to 
frame the discussion as to the constitution of 
emotions in general, and shame in particular, in terms 
"Of course, the first step in any such research 
would have to be an exploration of the extent of the influence of such a doctrine on the actual empirical 
experience of persons, i. e., an ethnopsychological and 
possibly phenomenological account of the indigenous 
self-concept (if any) of the culture under 
consideration. 
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of a contrast between an absolute, 'essentialist' view 
on the one hand and an extreme relativist, 
'constructionist' view on the other, is unhelpful. 
The recurrent similarities between western shame and 
'shame' elsewhere, illuminated by this study, cannot 
be denied, despite the equally evident differences. 
However, their co-existence cannot be accommodated by 
either of the above positions; hence the need for 
alternative models and approaches such as those 
identified, examined and evaluated in this study. 
Thus, the agenda for the cross-cultural study of 
emotions must move on and away from both these 
extremes towards a more 'concessive relativism', 
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